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Background of study 
Over the past 10 years or so, there has been a notable increase in the sentiments which are 
intolerant or overtly demonizing Muslims who are perceived as not belonging to the 
mainstream in Singapore. This follows a common trend noted among Muslims in Malaysia 
and Indonesia as well, who are Sunni and follow the Shafii school of jurisprudence. The 
notable groups which are on the receiving end of such demonizing sentiments include the 
Shiites, the so-called “liberal” Muslims and also the Ahmadiyyah.1 The language of epidemic 
and threat is constantly employed to delegitimize and demonize these so-called Other 
Muslims.  
Also, with the growth of social media, these sentiments have become diffused and are 
reproduced by laypeople, and not simply a top-down dissemination by the religious elite. It is 
common now to see, especially in the social media in Singapore, this idea of how those 
aforementioned groups of Muslims, however they are to be defined, as a “threat to one’s 
aqidah”, loosely and commonly understood as “faith”. Rhetoric and sentiments expressed on 
social media are reflections of sentiments existing in material reality, and such ideas do 
pervade public discourse through religious courses and sermons, views of the religious elite 
and popular reading predominating local religious bookstores and libraries. We also see other 
manifestations of this rhetoric such as “threat to Islam”, or “threat to Islamic tradition”, or a 
                                                          
1
 For a better understanding of the discrimination and violence against the Ahmadiyyah community in 
Indonesia, see, for example, Budiwanti (2009) and Burhani (2013; 2014).  
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“threat to the religious authorities/ulama” in social media, and sometimes echoed in religious 
classes and public sermons. More examples will be discussed in latter chapters of this study.  
These sentiments echo those found in Malaysia and Indonesia. While the demonizing 
sentiments and hate speech are virulent across the Internet, what is more worrying is that such 
trends have been used to legitimize persecution and violence against such groups. In 
Malaysia, the Shiites are persecuted and arrested for their beliefs, practices and owning 
publications by Shiite scholars. (Alatas, 2014; Mohd Faizal, 2013a; 2013b) The demonization 
is also legitimized by the state through the official TV and radio stations, and in Friday 
sermons in mosques. In Indonesia, hate crimes have been committed against the Shiite 
minority, with the number of reported incidents escalating since 2006. (Formichi, 2014: 1)  
Violence by Islamist vigilante groups under the guise of protecting or defending Islam is also 
known to have been acted out against scholars and activists who are labelled as “liberal” or 
“Western” in their outlook.2 In 2005, a controversial fatwa was given out against “Sipilis” 
(Secularism, Pluralism and Liberalism) by the Council of Religious Scholars (MUI) in 
Indonesia, which has been used to justify hate crimes against liberal Muslims.
3
 
This thus brings us to the question of why there are prejudices within the Malay-Muslim 
community towards Muslims of different orientations. If diversity can be accepted as inherent 
within any community, including Muslims (Hirji, 2010: 8), why is there this notable 
phenomenon of prejudice towards Muslims of differing views and orientations? Specific to 
this study, I will be looking at the antagonizing and demonizing sentiments against the Shiite 
                                                          
2
 For instance, during the Monas incident in 2008, where activists from the National Alliance for the Freedom of 
Faith and Religion (AKKBB) were attacked by members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). See “Hardliners 
ambush Monas rally,” The Jakarta Post, 6 February 2008. Also see Kersten, “Religious Pluralism versus 
Intolerance: Sectarian Violence in Indonesia” (2014)  
3
 See the fatwa here: https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/tahukah-anda/fatwa-mui-tentang-pluralisme-
liberalisme-dan-sekulerisme-agama.htm#.WPrVaNKGM2w accessed on 22 April 2017. The fatwa is not 
available on the MUI official page.  
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and liberal Muslims in Singapore. Although similar sentiments are also expressed towards the 
Ahmadiyyah community in Singapore, I will only be focusing on the two abovementioned 
groups because they are generally still seen as Muslims, albeit deviant or suspect in terms of 
their legitimacy as Muslims.  The Ahmadiyyah, on the other hand, are officially seen as being 
out of the fold of Islam.
4
 There are also existing tensions between certain Sufi groups and 
their Salafi counterparts, each accusing the other of heresy, but this will not be discussed in 
this study.  
Thesis statement 
This study posits that the rise of prejudices towards the intra-Muslim Other is related to the 
rise of religious fundamentalism among Muslims in the region, including Singapore. It is thus 
in my interest to delve deeper into the problem of religious fundamentalism as an orientation, 
which is manifested through the problem of prejudice. Some studies have been done with 
regards to the social psychology of fundamentalists, but not much has been said about the 
complex diversity of orientations of the Muslims in Singapore. Many of the studies of the 
Muslims in Singapore do not delve into the question of religious orientation. For instance, in 
the discussion of the Muslims in Singapore, they look into the demographics and their 
general socio-political concerns (Kamaludeen, 2010; Hussin, 2012), and not so much about 
critically analysing the competing orientations and issues of intra-Muslim diversity. 
However, there are studies, such as by Azhar Ibrahim (2008: 85), which seek to highlight the 
varying discourses of Islam within the local Muslim context.  
                                                          
4
 In Singapore, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) has issued a fatwa on 23 June 1969 which 
states that the Ahmadiyyah are “not Muslims and are deviant”. The fatwa can be accessed from 
http://www.muis.gov.sg/officeofthemufti/documents/Ahmadiyah%20(English).pdf (accessed on 6 December 
2016) A recent article was published in Yahoo News about the Ahmadiyyah community in Singapore. Despite 
the generally tolerant environment in secular Singapore, the Ahmadiyyah community had faced some tensions 
in the Muslim community, such as the desecration of a dozen of their graves in 2008. There were also many 
negative responses by Singaporean Muslims online towards this article. See “Behind the Belief: The Ahmadis of 
Singapore,” Yahoo News Singapore, 2 May 2017 (https://sg.news.yahoo.com/behind-belief-ahmadis-singapore-
234827643.html accessed on 4 May 2017) 
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The concept of religious orientation can be understood as an approach to reality based on 
certain concepts and also the qualitative elements in the structure of thought, which 
influences the manner of thinking and presentation of facts. It is also affected by the social 
position of the observer. (Mannheim, 1991: 244).  One’s religious orientation conditions their 
sensitivity and sense of issues. (Shaharuddin, 2002: 1) It is “a style of thinking that is made 
visible through (1) verbal and written expression, (2) reaction to triggers in society, (3) 
preoccupation with certain ideas, and (4) absence in thought structures.” (Mohamed, 2012: 3) 
In other words, the study of religious orientations is important in helping us understand the 
complex interplay between dominant ideas in society and their manifestations in lived 
realities. Dominant religious orientations thus dictate how religion is supposed to be 
governed and experienced in a given society. There are many orientations of a given religion 
in any society, and the ones that become dominant are usually due to their appropriation by 
the elites in the society. Certain religious orientations also may become marginalized due to 
the power structures in the society.  
Scope of study 
In this study, I aim to demonstrate how the prejudices point to the deeper problem of the 
fundamentalist religious orientation among contemporary Malay-Muslims in Singapore. This 
study thus seeks to understand the problem of fundamentalism through the traits of the 
prejudiced personality, such as authoritarianism, institutionalism and the need for 
definiteness. These traits correlate very well with certain dominant traits of fundamentalism, 
especially that of authoritarianism. (Hunsberger and Altemeyer, 1992: 118; Hunsberger, 
1995: 120) There are several other salient traits of fundamentalism, such as scripturalism or 
literalism and puritanism (Antoun, 2008: 73), which means that not all fundamentalists have 
a prejudiced outlook. However, fundamentalists also generally share traits such as 
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absolutism, dualism, an oppositional outlook and the demonization of the Other (Jones, 
2010), which explain the tendency towards prejudice. It is not to argue that all 
fundamentalists are necessarily prejudiced (they may be literalist in their religious 
interpretation, but not to the detriment of the Other), but the general intolerance or 
antagonism towards those who threaten to challenge the fundamentalist worldview (Goplen 
and Plant, 2015: 1475) tends to condition those with the fundamentalist orientation towards 
prejudice. Seen in this light, prejudice thus becomes a crucial aspect of fundamentalism.  
I am making sense of the concept of fundamentalism as a religious orientation and a 
psychosocial outlook which shapes one’s attitude vis-à-vis religion. It is “an orientation to the 
world, both cognitive and affective. The affective, or emotional, orientation indicates outrage 
and protest against (and also fear of) change and against a certain ideological orientation, the 
orientation of modernism…” (Antoun, 2008: 3) Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992: 118) 
define religious fundamentalism as “the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that 
clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and 
deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be 
vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, 
unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental 
teachings have a special relationship with the deity.” This definition reflects certain key traits 
of fundamentalism that I will elaborate on later, such as the absolutist belief in one’s truth 
claim and that these beliefs are in diametrical opposition to evil. The idea that the ones who 
follow these fundamental teachings “have a special relationship with the deity” reflects the 
supremacist attitudes that fundamentalists tend to adopt. 
In Singapore, the kind of fundamentalism that has emerged does not entail the formation of 
Islamic parties or political movements. This is because of the political structure of the secular 
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state which does not allow groups to form religious-based parties. Nevertheless, the kind of 
orientation which sheds a certain socio-political outlook vis-à-vis Islam still exists among 
Singaporean Muslims and these are often expressed on social media, where Singaporeans 
have relatively more freedom to articulate their respective political and religious views. This 
is expressed for instance, in terms of the antagonism towards the notion of secularism, or 
through Western secular critiques of Islam.  
Theoretical approach adopted in the study 
In this study, the traits of the prejudiced personality are used to help us further understand the 
fundamentalist orientation, through their accordance to the traits of fundamentalism. Gordon 
Allport’s concept of the “prejudiced personality”, based on Newcomb’s concept of “threat 
orientation” will be the core theoretical perspective adopted in this study. Allport discusses 
the concept of prejudice. Prejudice can be understood as “a pattern of hostility in 
interpersonal relations which is directed against an entire group, or against its individual 
members.” (Allport, 1955: 12) Pertinent to our discussion here is his illustration of the 
prejudiced personality, or functional prejudice. His discussion focuses on individuals, but I 
think it is relevant in the discussion of social groups as well. This discussion helps us make 
sense of how a prejudiced mind work, and how it becomes conditioned to be as such.  
Allport argues that this personality is conditioned by what is called a “threat orientation”, 
meaning that insecurities underlie this personality. These insecurities are founded upon fears 
that one has “of his own consciousness, of change, and of his social environment” and also a 
sense of “ego-alienation, longing for definiteness, for safety, for authority.” (Ibid, 396) 
Allport also argues that the root cause of this sense of insecurity and alienation is repression 
as the individual “cannot in his conscious life face and master the conflicts presented to him, 
he represses them in whole or in part.” (Ibid, 397) 
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Some key traits of the prejudiced personality which he illustrated include moralism, 
dichotomization, a need for definiteness, externalization of conflict, institutionalism, and 
authoritarianism. (Ibid, 397) The prejudiced personality, cognitively, has a strong need for 
certainty and predictability. This hence relates to a moralistic attitude, as well dichotomizing 
morality in black-and-white terms. This attitude towards morality also means that it is “only 
surface compliance; it does not solve the conflicts within. It is tense, compulsive, projective.” 
The bifurcation of morality also means that the prejudiced personality is more likely to stress 
on the distinctions between the in-group and out-group. Allport further asserts that 
“prejudiced people are more given to perseveration, which means that old and tried solutions 
are considered to provide safe anchorage.” (Ibid, 404) We can see that those who exemplify 
the traits in this personality type would persist on maintaining the status quo and 
conservatism, regardless of its problems, and due to its fear of change, would also be 
struggling to cope with diversity.  
Due to the tendency towards projection, the prejudiced personality is also given to “seeing 
qualities in others that they should see in themselves but do not. In fact, all along the line they 
seem defective in self-insight.” (Ibid, 404) The prejudiced personality is also likely to be 
reliant on externalized measures in dealing with problems. Thus, the Other is to be blamed, as 
opposed to identifying one’s own misgivings. There is an unwillingness and inability to think 
of oneself as a source of problems, thus causing unwillingness and inability to take 
responsibility and ownership over one’s destiny. Questions of what it means to be a Malay or 
a Sunni Muslim, for instance, is taken for granted and so diversity among Muslims is not seen 
as natural in a given society. Hence the presence of the Shiite other is seen as something to be 




Allport relates this to the aforementioned sense of ego-alienation, where one has not been 
trained to be in touch with one’s inner self, and instead represses the individual conscience. 
This insecurity in dealing with oneself from within is thus projected through the reliance on 
an institution or authority. Social order is seen as the priority, even if it means to support an 
authoritarian and unjust leadership. The prejudiced mind does not believe in the authority and 
dignity of the human conscience, and therefore would not be very supportive of democratic 
systems and ideas. According to Allport:  
“From early life they have never been able to integrate their natures; the 
result is that the ego itself does not provide a fixed anchorage point. By 
compensation, therefore, the individual must find outer definiteness to guide 
him. There is no inner definiteness… prejudiced individuals suffered much 
deprivation. Many things were forbidden…They therefore developed an 
urge for quick and definite answers. To think abstractly is to risk ambiguity 
and uncertainty.” (Ibid, 403) 
The paternalistic or authoritarian manner of governing society would mean that its members 
are not encouraged nor facilitated to make sense of differences positively. Therefore a sense 
of personal conscience is not cultivated towards developing a broader sense of social justice 
which transcends in-group boundaries. Authoritarian cultures bring about greater tendencies 
towards prejudiced behavior, which then in turn rely on authoritarian structures for external 
stability and discipline, thus preserving the status quo. The discussion on prejudice and its 





Setting the Backdrop: Context of intra-Muslim prejudices among the Malays 
The construction of religious deviance and heresy 
The perpetuation of prejudices against the Other reflects the complex processes in the 
construction of religious deviance or heresy. It is about drawing clear boundaries between the 
in-group and out-groups, so as to maintain the monopoly of truth claims over the religion. 
The question of heresy is fundamentally one of authority, and is tied very closely to both self-
interest and group interest. (Kurtz, 1983: 1088) Often times, heresy is so potent and greatly 
threatens the orthodoxy because it “bears such a close resemblance to orthodoxy. It is 
developed within the framework of orthodoxy and is claimed by its proponents to be truly 
orthodox.” (Ibid, 1088) Burhani (2014: 139) points that “the ‘insider enemy’ is often 
considered more harmful and feels far more menacing than the danger from an outsider 
enemy… The heretic… is still seen as being inside the Muslim community, allowing for 
dangerous access to Islamic groups where he may proselytize his ‘deviant’ beliefs.”  
The construction of heresy can thus be seen as a means of maintaining the sanctity of the in-
group through the rejection of all other out-groups. Henderson (1998: 119) argues that “In 
fact, these patterns of the ways by which orthodoxy constructs heresy may be of even broader 
and greater significance than the actual historical character of the heresies. For they may 
illustrate universal tendencies or templates in human culture and even psychology for 
representing a hostile or threatening other, particularly an internal enemy.” He also refers to 
Allport’s discussion of prejudice, in which “people who reject one out-group will tend to 
reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, 
anti any out-group.” (Ibid, 123) Henderson argues that in the construction of heresy, there is a 
tendency to unify one’s enemies as though they all form the same threat. This can be seen in 
contemporary Malay-Muslim discourses which tend to equate Shiites, liberals, Ahmadiyyahs, 
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Jews, Zionists, the West and others as all the enemies of Islam. Prejudice is used to construct 
and entrench the divide between the legitimate in-group and the heretical out-groups.  
The problem of prejudice and the demonization of the intra-Muslim Other is thus not new. 
There is a long history of “othering” in Muslim history based on narrow bigotry and 
prejudiced views about the Other. Knysh (1993:50) demonstrates that narrow factionalism 
and bigotry were common features found in the Muslim polemical treatises and in the so-
called heresiographical works. These included works by writers such as al-Nawbakhti, al-
Ash’ari, ‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi and Ibn Hazm. However, there were scholars who 
attempted to objectively move beyond the sectarian limits and to develop a broader vision of 
divergences within Islam. For instance, al-Shahrastani (d. 548), in his classic work called The 
Book of Religions and Religious Sects (Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nihal) sought to study the 
diversity of sects in Islam. By operating via the principle of impartiality, he tried to 
demonstrate in detail the views of various Muslim theological schools. Knysh also argues that 
al-Shahrastani had abstained consistently from the accusations of heresy (zandaqa) and 
unbelief (kufr) which were pervasive in the writings of his contemporaries and predecessors. 
(Ibid, 50)  
Imam al-Ghazali (d.1111) also tried to address this pertinent problem during his time. He saw 
that Muslims were conveniently excommunicating others, without providing a strong basis 
for excommunication. He was very troubled by the atmosphere of intolerance, mutual 
suspicion, and psychological intimidation that was caused by narrow and exclusivist 
definitions of the mainstream Muslim ummah that were perpetuated recklessly. (Jackson, 
2002: 32)
5
 Sherman Jackson, in his study of Al-Ghazali’s work Faysal wa Al-Tafriqa also 
                                                          
5
 However, al-Ghazali’s image of tolerance is also somewhat questionable, due to his attacks against the 
philosophers, such as al-Farabi and ibn Sina.  
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asserts that in the construction of heresy, it is not just about the role of the central authorities, 
but also through “the threat of stigma, malicious gossip, ostracism, or verbal attack by 
respected members in the community.” (Ibid, 30) To him, such ‘instruments of informal 
authority’ are “far more imminent, far more effective, and far more determinative of religious 
belief than is the threat of formal excommunication.” (Ibid, 30) We see the prevalence of 
such behaviour today too, in terms of how the deviant Other is spoken about and labelled, not 
just by the elites, but reproduced by laypersons as well. In the construction of a heresy in 
contradistinction to the orthodox in-group, one cannot simply just look at the formal 
institutions and doctrines. The entrenchment of the in-group is fundamentally about power, 
community and identity. (Barzegar, 2011: 208)  
Context of sectarianism in the Malay world  
The notion of orthodoxy and representation of mainstream or normative Islam has always 
been contentious in Islamic history. Consequently, that has brought about an atmosphere of 
plurality in terms of how Islamic beliefs and values are to be interpreted and manifested, 
since no particular group can genuinely claim absolute orthodoxy. Nonetheless, certain 
groups and orientations have indeed claimed dominance, in religious or theological matters, 
as well as in the political and social spheres. This can be seen throughout the development 
and concretization of Islamic doctrines, and it has generally been accepted that Sunni Islam 
or the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (henceforth ASWJ) is the representative of orthodoxy in 
Islam.  
In the Southeast Asian context, and in our case the Malay Archipelago, the ASWJ has also 
been firmly established as the orthodoxy. Fauzan Salleh (2001) discusses the entrenchment of 
the ASWJ as the dominant or orthodox representation of Islam in Indonesia. We can see 
parallels happening elsewhere in the Malay Archipelago, including present-day Malaysia and 
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Singapore. Fauzan applies Henderson’s (1998) characterization of orthodoxy, and highlights 
how this has been manifested in the Indonesian context as well. For instance, with regards to 
the notion of unity, he claims that “…since Sunni Islam, as representative of Islamic 
orthodoxy, has long nurtured within itself several distinct theological and legal schools, the 
idea of an orthodox unity becomes more difficult to maintain. Sunni apologists and 
heresiographers tried in fact to extend this unity back to the early years of Islam when “a 
unified theocratic community” had supposedly existed… Therefore, reference to this ideal of 
a unified community became a standard measure of whether a school was either orthodox or 
heterodox… It is true that the Sunni heresiographers tended to minimize the fragmentation.” 
(Ibid, 55) Thus, according to the Sunni outlook, Islamic history is envisioned in a 
triumphalist and majoritarian manner and the idea of jamaah (congregation) is asserted as a 
symbol of unity. Thus, heretics are perceived as those who seek to undermine this unity by 
being different and thus breaking away. This view corresponds with Crow’s (2005) claim that 
Sunni historiography is generally triumphalist and seeks to cover up instances of conflict and 
differences. This is very much tied to the Sunni self-identification of orthodoxy in Islam. 
Barzegar (2011: 228) argues that “just as orthodoxy is defined by the negative construction of 
heresy, so too is sectarian identity defined by the exclusionary narrative construction of its 
presumed antithesis. In the case of Sunni identity, both Shiism and Christianity, despite their 
great variety and change over time, remain attractive discursive sites against which the Sunni 
imaginary is enabled.” The Sunni self is not only defined in a triumphalist manner, but also in 
terms of exclusionary boundaries, and in this case, Christianity and Shiism are seen as the 
out-groups.  
Such a discourse still holds ground today, such as in the Malaysian context, whereby the 
threat of the breakdown of Malay unity is constantly trumpeted by the ruling elites to ensure 
conformity to in-group norms. Given that being Malay necessitates the embracement of 
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Sunni-Shafii Islam, Muslims who adopt a different orientation or school of thought, like the 
Shiites, are perceived as threats to this unity.
6
 We can see how the justification for orthodoxy 
becomes doubly reinforced through the collusion of religion and ethnicity. To be Malay, one 
also has to be a certain kind of Muslim. Hence the question of the freedom of belief becomes 
highly contentious, which thus warrants a discussion on authoritarianism and its link to the 
intolerance of differences. The construction and maintenance of the orthodoxy of the ASWJ 
is situated within the socio-political context of Islamization since the period of Islamic 
resurgence in the 1970s and the competition between UMNO and PAS to outdo each other in 
terms of their Islamic credentials.  
In the modern context, a certain representation of ASWJ has been developed and propagated 
at the official level, though not without contestations of course. This process has been 
facilitated by the centralization and bureaucratization of religious authorities, making it easier 
to define and maintain the boundaries between orthodoxy and heresy. A factor which lends 
legitimacy to those claiming orthodoxy would be the authority to produce fatwa and being 
associated to the state, which would lead to concrete social and political implications. For 
instance, we can see in Indonesia the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), and the Malaysian 
Fatwa Council under the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) in Malaysia 
playing such roles. The MUI, for example, sees itself as “the watchdog of religious orthodoxy 
and repeatedly made statements condemning deviant movements and sects.” (Bruinessen, 
2013: 4) In Singapore, the voice of orthodoxy could be represented by traditionalist scholars 
in the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (Pergas) and the 
                                                          
6
 As claimed by a leading Malaysian cleric and member of the National Fatwa Council in his justification of 
banning of Shiite activities, “(Shia) has expanded secretly and now has many supporters who are starting to 
practice their faith in public. We don't want any religious differences. They are a threat to Muslim unity in 
Malaysia.” “In otherwise tolerant Malaysia, Shiites are banned,” Al Arabiya News, 13 January 2011 
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Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), since they shape the type of religious 
discourses here.  
The orthodoxy’s self-definition has to be contrasted and affirmed through the identification of 
the heretics. In fact, it can be argued that there is a strong emphasis on identifying and 
defining the outliers by those who claim orthodoxy.  Thus the process of self-definition is 
more overwhelmingly extroverted and negative – the question of what we are is to be defined 
primarily by what we are not. In the modern centralized religious orthodoxy, the 
identification of deviance has been consolidated through bureaucratic and legal means, hence 
drawing the orthodoxy-heretic divide more clearly. In Malaysia alone, groups which have 
been outlawed include certain Sufi orders, the Shiites, Ahmadiyyahs, and the so-called liberal 
Muslims by the Fatwa Council. This is also reflected in fatwas made by the Majlis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI), such as the one against the liberal Muslims in 2005. My intention here is 
not to disregard the importance of the orthodoxy. It is a phenomenon which occurs in every 
established religious tradition and it is crucial in maintaining and contributing to the 
development of religious traditions. What I am questioning, though, are the problems of 
authoritarianism of those who claim orthodoxy which ends up preventing the dialogical 
transfer of knowledge, the freedom of belief and the cultivation of tolerance and other 
democratic values in general. Worse still, the authoritarian tendencies have also legitimized 
violence against those branded as heretics.  
Regional connections and the spread of sectarian sentiments 
Much of the literature on Muslim sectarianism focuses on the Middle East. Not much has 
been written about the problem of sectarianism in the Malay world, which points us to the 
question of whether the sectarianism that we see today is an import from the politics of the 
Middle East. Muslim sectarianism, as we understand it today in the Malay world, is a more 
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recent development. Shiism, for instance, has been largely tolerated in Southeast Asia for 
generations, and even impacting local cultures. (Marcinkowski, 2008; 2009) Nevertheless, it 
is increasingly becoming a pertinent problem in the Malay world as more intolerant voices 
are stepping up to condemn and even legitimize acts of violence against Muslims from 
minority sects, as well as others who are deemed as not fitting into the mainstream. It can be 
said that the spread of anti-Shiite and anti-liberal Islam views are recent developments.  
We certainly cannot dismiss the importance of regional connections in influencing the kinds 
of sentiments among Muslims in Singapore. It is important to trace the sources of anti-liberal 
Islam and anti-Shiism sentiments that are being circulated in Singapore. It is noteworthy that 
the sentiments expressed by the Muslims here share a similar tone and parlance as those from 
Malaysia and Indonesia, which shows that the problem of religious prejudice and 
fundamentalism is indeed a regional one. Sentiments in Singapore tend to mirror or adopt 
those coming from Malaysia and Indonesia using the same kind of fear-mongering and 
demonization. However, the Muslims in Singapore mostly share such prejudices without 
formulating their own original analyses of the situation. For them, the basis of legitimacy for 
their sentiments can be affirmed by the regional trends, such as the fatwas which mark the 
deviance of Shiism and liberal Islam.   
Muslims in Singapore express these prejudices in the manner of a moral panic, such as how 
the dangerous ideology of liberal Islam has entered the Singaporean shores, implying that the 
sources of liberal Islam are foreign and that it is infiltrating the minds of the Muslims here.
7
 
The concerns about the presence or growth of Shiism in Singapore are also expressed as such. 
The arguments given are often theological in nature, as a means of excluding them from the 
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folds of mainstream Islam. None of the anti-Shiite and liberal Islam voices in Singapore 
approach it from the angle of politics of representation, or in the words, the question of who 
gets to speak for Islam in the community. In the case of Malaysia for instance, it can be 
argued that the anti-Shiite and liberal Islam sentiments point to the bigger politics of the 
Malays, with regards to who gets to represent and speak for the Malays.  
Although the sense of prejudice and fear-mongering towards the intra-Muslim Other in 
Singapore has not escalated to the point of overt physical violence against them, they reflect a 
similar religious orientation and sense of anxiety. It also reflects who they acknowledge as 
the legitimate sources of religious authority, as well as their attitudes towards such figures of 
authority. The trends of demonizing Shiite and liberal Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia 
serve to justify the propagation of such views in Singapore. To Singaporean Muslims, 
because other Muslims in the region vilify these so-called deviant Muslims, added with the 
stamp of legitimacy from certain fatwas against them, it is thus acceptable and unquestioned. 
The fact that local religious teachers and preachers also identify similar enemies, such as 
certain liberal Muslim organizations, goes to show that they are very much influenced by the 
broader anti-liberal Islam trends in the region, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. 
From Malaysia, Khalif Muammar’s Facebook posts and writings are often shared by 
Singaporeans who proclaim to be against liberal Islam.
8
 Khalif Muammar is known for his 
writings lambasting liberal Islam, in books such as Atas Nama Kebenaran: Tanggapan Kritis 
Terhadap Wacana Islam Liberal and Islam dan Pluralisme Agama. He is also a lecturer and 
active on social media, warning Muslims about the dangers of liberal Islam. HAKIM, which 
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is an intellectually-driven organization based in Malaysia, also publishes articles denouncing 
liberal Islam and also sometimes denouncing Shiism in the same vein.
9
 Other institutions 
which peddle anti-liberal Islam sentiments, such as Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia 
(IKIM) also become sources of legitimacy.
10
 JAKIM’s fatwa which outlaws liberal Islam in 
Malaysia is also sometimes quoted by Singaporean Muslims as a means to justify their anti-
liberal Islam stance. Another source of anti-liberal Islam is Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia 
(ISMA), which is an Islamist and Malay rights non-governmental organization (NGO) known 
for its harsh denigration of liberal Islam and Shiism. Their articles are also often shared by 
the anti-liberal Islam proponents in Singapore.
11
 
From Indonesia, Adian Husaini is a popular voice against liberal Islam who is often quoted 
and shared by Singaporean Muslims who are against liberal Islam. His books which condemn 
liberal Islam, such as Virus Liberalisme di Perguruan Tinggi Islam and Liberalisasi Islam di 
Indonesia: Fakta, Gagasan, Kritik, dan Solusinya are shared online amongst such 
Singaporeans. MUI’s 2005 fatwa which denounces secularism, pluralism and liberalism as 
Sipilis is also sometimes referred to justify their anti-liberal and anti-pluralist position. 
Certain Indonesian think tanks and universities are also spoken of pejoratively as “dens of 
liberal Islam”. There are concerns within the Singaporean Muslim community that MUIS is 
sending its young asatizah (religious teachers) to Indonesia and that they might be influenced 
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by liberal Islam there. There are also anxieties, as reflected in the discussions in the anti-
liberal Islam Facebook group, expressed about having liberal or progressive-oriented 
speakers invited by MUIS to give lectures, a sign that MUIS is now being infiltrated by 
liberals. Certain popular Indonesian scholars like Quraish Shihab and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla 
are also viewed with suspicion or downright denigration for their supposedly Shiite or liberal 
leanings.  
The growth of anti-Shiism, which is currently spearheaded by the Malaysian government 
through the mainstream media and institutions like JAKIM also has its repercussions in 
Singapore. Those who are prejudiced against the Shiites laud this as a positive effort to curb 
the spread of Shiism. Singaporean Muslims also get access to Malaysian TV channels such as 
RTM1 and al-Hijrah TV, which perpetuate anti-Shiism. There are TV shows, especially 
those with specifically Islamic content, which vilify the Shiites openly. Popular Malaysian 
preachers who have a mass following in person as well as on social media, such as Ustaz 
Kazim Elias
12
 and Ustaz Azhar Idrus
13
 are also known to express anti-Shiite sentiments in 
their lectures. These preachers sometimes get invited to give talks in Singapore, and their 
views generally go unchallenged. They are generally viewed and accepted as legitimate 
authorities of Islam in the region.  
Another current source of prejudicial views from Indonesia is Radio Hang 106 FM, which is 
a Batam-based radio station known for its vilification of minority sects like the Shiites, and 
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has a popular following amongst Singaporeans. A preacher by the name of Hakim Abdat is 
known for denigrating the Shiite minority, referring to them as infidels and warning radio 
listeners about the purported threat posed by the Shiites to Islam. As the sermons aired by the 
radio station vilify other Muslim sects such as the Shiites, the undertone of their message 
justifies attacks against the Shiites in certain circumstances.
14
 The popularity of Radio Hang 
among Singaporean Muslims was reflected in a social media furore when it was deemed as 
propagating extremist ideas that influenced some Singaporeans towards violence. The 
extremist and exclusionary ideas promoted by the radio station were not seen as a problem 
and some Singaporeans saw the identification of Radio Hang as a source of extremist ideas as 
a government ploy to control the Muslims.  
On social media, there are also videos of sermons by certain Islamic preachers from outside 
of the region shared by Singaporean Muslims. Although these speakers are generally not very 
well-known in this region, their sermons are shared to justify the anti-Shiite prejudices. 
People tend to share sensationalized images and videos of Shiite practices, which further 
serve to misrepresent the Shiites and aggravate the pre-existing fears about Shiism. Such 
videos and images become very widespread and diffused, given the nature of social media. 
The popularity of such videos does not augur well in fostering a more informed and positive 
view of the Shiites among Sunni Muslims. Same goes for the liberal Muslims, where 
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The rise of Salafism or Wahhabism in the region is also a significant factor in contributing 
the waves of intolerance towards Shiism in the region.  The Salafi or Wahhabi orientation 
which originates from Saudi Arabia is known for its exclusivism and tendency to dismiss or 
excommunicate Muslims who do not subscribe to their brand of Islam. The Salafis are known 
for their hatred and exclusionary attitudes towards the Shiites. At its most extreme, Salafism 
justifies committing outright violence against the Muslim Other. Even if it does not directly 
propagate violence, it is still extremist in terms of its prejudiced and exclusivist outlook.
16
 
Academic Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid asserts that the Salafi orientation has become 
mainstreamed amongst Malaysian Muslims. It can be argued that even if one does not claim 
to follow the Salafi orientation, the type of outlook espoused which is highly intolerant of 
pluralism within Islam has become normalized among many Muslims today, including those 
in Singapore.  
Ahmad Fauzi notes the rise of Salafi orientation in Malaysian education system and 
bureaucracy. He finds that “over a span of 30 years or so… the students who grew up 
imbibing the Wahhabi/Salafi-oriented curriculum in schools are now in the work force. Some 
are in the civil service, some have become influential bureaucrats, scholars, academics, 
lawyers, others hold positions of power while some have joined politics. So they hold the 
levers in administration that allows them to make decisions.” He also finds that  “some 
respected international Muslim scholars are labelled “secular” or “liberal’’ to keep the 
Muslim masses from hearing them out; others who are deemed to be not toeing the 
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establishment line are banned or find it hard to book venues in which they can speak.”17 The 
point that he was trying to make was that those with the Salafi orientation, given its 
intolerance towards differing views and interpretations within Islam, seek to promote a 
monolithic view on Islam by curbing debates and dissent. There are also many Salafi-oriented 
ulama joining the ranks of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), (Mohamed 
Nawab, 2014) such as Ustaz Fathul Bari Mat Jahaya, who is known for his staunch anti-
Shiite views.  
Similarly in Singapore, there are many graduates from Saudi universities who return to 
become religious teachers or work in Islamic organizations and institutions. These graduates 
have been trained and adopted the Salafi orientation, and there have been private institutions 
established which promote the Salafi orientation. There are also local mosques with teachers 
who are of the Salafi orientation. Some of these Salafi-oriented individuals also have their 
own websites and Facebook pages, where we can find the promotion of anti-Shiite and anti-
liberal Islam sentiments as well.
18
 However, not everyone who adopts Salafi thinking identify 
themselves as a Salafi.  
On a broader scale, we cannot deny the role of geopolitics in amplifying the age-old sectarian 
prejudices towards the Shiites. The role of Saudi petrodollars in exporting the Wahhabi 
ideology to Malaysia, for instance, is fundamentally aimed at securing its supremacy against 
rival nation Iran, as an authority of Islam for the world. The rejection of liberal Islam is also a 
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reflection of similar trends occurring in other Muslim majority countries, whereby those of 
the progressive or reformist orientation are perceived as threats to the establishment and 
hence a threat to Islam, due to their critical posture towards Islamic traditions. This is why it 
is also common amongst the traditionalist and fundamentalist circles in Singapore to be wary 
of international scholars who are deemed pejoratively as liberal, such as Amina Wadud, 
Abdullahi An-Naeem and Khaled Abou El Fadl, due to the bad press that they have received 
in other countries.  
Dakwah phenomenon and the rise of fundamentalism 
The discussion on the rise of exclusivism among Muslims which foster sectarian sentiments 
and conflicts would be insufficient without looking into the phenomenon of dakwah or 
Islamic revivalism or resurgence among the Malay-Muslims. It can be argued that the 
phenomenon of Islamic revivalism from the 1970s has sowed the seeds of fundamentalism 
among the Malay-Muslims. (Mohamed, 2012: 4) There are both internal and external factors 
giving rise to the dakwah phenomenon (Muzaffar, 1987; Zainah, 1987; Nagata, 1984; Azhar, 
2014), but some of the notable ones include urban alienation, reaction to modernization and 
Westernization and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in other countries. The Muslims at 
that time were grappling with many changes and uncertainties in society, and this pushed 
them towards a heightened consciousness of an all-embracing Islamic identity. The calls to 
implement Islam as a totalizing way of life and system in society has brought about a 
heightened sense of supremacism and exclusivism amongst the Muslims vis-à-vis the Other, 
especially non-Muslims and Muslims who are perceived to have been secularized or 
Westernized.  
The dakwah phenomenon in Singapore developed around the same period of the 
intensification of Christian evangelism in the 1980s, which thus entrenched the exclusivist 
23 
 
outlook. (Mohamed, 2012: 8) Furthermore, in an overwhelmingly Sunni environment, the 
presence of the Shiites (especially among the Malays) caused great concern. (Azhar, 2014: 
113) Those who embraced this outlook, mainly middle class and educated youth, were also 
adamant in their rejection of secularism and all other so-called Western concepts which were 
seen as antithetical to their understanding of Islam. (Muzaffar, 1987: 21) Such a reactionary 
and dualistic outlook has been manifested into the kind of anti-liberal Islam sentiments that 
we see today, especially since those who were involved in dakwah activism through the 
university Muslim societies and usrah circles, as well as other youth groups, are now holding 
positions in Islamic institutions and organizations.  
The context of Shiism in Singapore  
Marcinkowski (2008: 21) argues that the main issue for Singaporean Shiites seems to be the 
establishment of trust between them and non-Muslim Singaporeans, and to a lesser extent, 
with the Sunni Muslims, given that both form the minority in Singapore. Nevertheless, I 
would like to point that there are many instances of distrust by the local Sunni population 
towards the Shiite community, especially the Malay Shiites. Local Sunni Imam Syed Hassan 
Al-Attas claimed that the Sunnis and Shiites co-exist harmoniously in Singapore.
19
 However, 
this is mostly evident among the elites, such as the Jumabhoy and Namazie families who 
have good relations with MUIS and the local Sunni leaders. Nonetheless, I would like to 
argue that anti-Shiism is indeed visible within the Malay-Muslim community, especially 
when it is reproduced amongst the laypeople and has repercussions on the Shiite community.  
Sunni-Shiite polemics within the Malay community have existed since the 1980s, due to the 
conversion of some members of the Muslim organization, Himpunan Belia Islam (HBI), to 
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Shiism. News of the conversion had created quite a stir within the community.
20
 The Muslim 
organization Muhammadiyah even sacked six of the members due to their affiliation to 
Shiism, claiming that “their struggles differ in terms of faith and beliefs.”21 In the mid-1980s, 
the leaders of some Muslim organizations and some religious teachers tried to stop the spread 
of Shiism, due to said conversion among the HBI members.
22
 Several Muslim religious elites 
expressed their dismay at such behaviour and the perception that Shiism was wayward, 
claiming it was a serious allegation, and that it was something that needed to be examined 
properly. They were mainly concerned that such anti-Shiite prejudices would cause 
dissension and disunity within the community.
23
  
In the mid-1990s, anxieties towards the Shiite community arose within the Malay community 
due to the case of a Singaporean Muslim preacher who was arrested for having married 10 
wives.
24
 His claim to having married them through the commonly accepted Shiite practice of 
mut’ah (contractual marriages) saw him as being suspected of being a Shiite.25 In 1995, a 
controversy erupted within the Malay community, following Pergas’ forum on the threat of 
Shiism entitled Ancaman terhadap Pegangan Ahlus Sunnah Waljamaah. The forum exposed 
the dangers of encroaching Shiism within the region, and the panelists claimed that Shiism 
was out of the folds of Islam. Pergas also gave out free books which critiqued Shiism at the 
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 Several letters were written to Berita Harian in complaint of the forum, claiming 
that Pergas went against MUIS’ fatwa which saw Shiism as a legitimate branch in Islam, and 
that Pergas was essentially encouraging Muslims to engage in takfir or excommunication 
towards one another.
27
 Pergas later released a letter to Berita Harian, claiming that they did 
not excommunicate any Muslims and only sought to warn the Muslims of extreme or Ghulah 
Shiism.
28
 MUIS eventually responded to the polemics, advising the local Muslim community 
to put an end to such debates, as it was not beneficial for the community, and for the 
community to focus on more important and pressing issues.
29
  
Such polemics had led to rising suspicion and prejudice among the Malays towards Shiism, 
especially amongst families and friends of those who converted from Sunni Islam. However, 
most Malays had never heard of Shiism and therefore were quite ignorant of it. Nonetheless, 
there were already those who perceived the Shiites as deviant. The anxieties were mainly 
towards Malays who became Shiites, rather than the Pakistani, Indian and Persian Shiite 
communities, who had been in Singapore for generations.
30
 The existing anti-Shiite attitudes 
within the local Malay community have led to the need for taqiyyah (prudent dissimulation) 
amongst some members of the Shiite community. Taqiyyah, as a practice, is normally done in 
times when one’s life could jeopardized by virtue of their Shiite belief, such as during times 
of conflict. (Tabataba’i, 2007: 210) Nevertheless, even in Singapore, some Shiites find that it 
is unsafe for them to openly practice their Shiite beliefs, exemplified for instance through the 
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differences in the way they perform their prayers from the Sunnis. Some Shiites are not 
forthcoming in expressing their Shiite identity, for fear of being jeopardized in their careers 
or for fear of being exposed to ignorant or prejudiced remarks by their Sunni counterparts.
31
 
Other Shiites have faced difficulties when it comes to marrying Sunni partners, struggling for 
acceptance from the Sunni side of the family. This has been largely due to spread of anti-
Shiism through rumours and religious classes with teachers who are prejudiced against the 
Shiites. A recent case also demonstrated certain experiences of discrimination faced by a 
Shiite couple who was trying to get married in Singapore. A kadi (Muslim marriage official) 
refused to marry the couple, after finding out about the groom’s Shiite background (his 
partner was a Sunni who later on adopted Shiite Islam). As such, they had to appeal through 
MUIS to get their marriage officiated.
32
 
There is also a fear of facing public backlash when using public spaces like mosques. There 
have been various instances faced by the Shiites where the members of the Sunni majority 
created a fuss when Shiites are known to conduct talks in MUIS, or in local university 
campuses and mosques. Complaints were made to MUIS about how the Shiites were 
supposedly “infiltrating” public spaces. As such, events organized by the local Shiite 
organizations are generally not open to the public, or not held in public spaces such as 
mosques. The legitimacy of Shiite religious teachers was also put into question by some 
members of the local Muslim community, including some religious teachers, with regards to 
recognizing the Shiites under the Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS).
33
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MUIS has an official fatwa or religious opinion on their position on Shiism, which states that 
Shiism is a school of thought found in Islam, although it is not part of the ASWJ. The fatwa 
also states that MUIS adopts the same position as many Muslims around the world, that 
Shiism is a part of Islam, except for the al-Ghulah, or the extremists within Shiism.
34
 
Nonetheless, despite having such a stand on Shiism, they tend to err on the side of the 
majority which generally does not see Shiism as belonging to the mainstream Muslim 
community. MUIS does not put itself out as overtly supporting the Shiites and at present, the 
local asatizah are also generally silent on the matter. Other than coming out with general 
statements about respecting differences in matters of religious opinion (ikhtilaf) and 
appreciating diversity during Friday prayer sermons,
35
 there is not much effort at tackling the 
issue of anti-Shiite prejudices. Muslim politicians and community leaders do not want to be 
seen as supporting the Shiites, although sometimes they would give out sentiments to 
encourage Muslims to be respectful to one another,
36
 or to not be divisive despite having 
differences in beliefs.
37
 Such statements are usually made to caution Muslims from being 
influenced by political and sectarian strife in other countries. Although at the individual level, 
there are Singaporean Muslims who are open to Shiites or do not see them as a problem, 
nevertheless, the Muslim community in Singapore as a whole does not openly accept the 
Shiites. This has become more pertinent in recent times, through the waves of anti-Shiism 
happening elsewhere in the region. We can see Muslims in Singapore similarly reproducing 
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anti-Shiite sentiments, notably on social media. The current wave of anti-Shiism is more 
recent, due to the rise of anti-Shiite rhetoric from the Salafis, the politics of the Middle East 
and the developments of anti-Shiism in the region which demonstrate a turn towards 
fundamentalism.  
The context of liberal Islam in Singapore  
Liberal Islam, specifically in Singapore, can be seen as a thought orientation, not a movement 
or an organized collective – with the exception of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL). It is an 
orientation of thinking and approaching issues amongst the progressive and reformist 
Muslims in society. Azhar (2009: 80) refers to reformism as “(1) a consciousness and 
commitment that challenges or opposes religious conservatism and traditionalism, which 
have predominated the religious life and imagination of the people; (2) the conviction of 
correcting aberrations and misleading conception and practices, with the basic aim of 
ensuring awareness on the fundamental spirit of the religious ideas and its purpose among the 
religious adherents; and (3) providing alternatives to the conventional or dominant practices 
and ideas, and at the same time ensuring that the new alternatives are also subjected to 
constant scrutiny, in as much as it is accessible to the general public.” Similar to Azhar’s 
discussion of the reformist and progressive orientation, JIL articulates some of its key 
principles such as “opening the doors of ijtihad (independent reasoning) to all dimensions of 
Islam” and “emphasizing on religio-ethics, and not the literal meaning of texts.”38 In the spirit 
of progressive Islamic reformism, JIL aims to expand the space for dialogue which is free 
from the pressures of conservatism and also to build a political and social structure that is just 
and humane. 
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29 
 
The orientation calls for a reinterpretation or contextualization of what one may consider as 
fossilized ideas or rulings in Islam, with the inclination towards progressive social change 
and siding with the oppressed and marginalized in society. It also seeks to address the broader 
questions of modernity through integrating Islamic and modern values, ideas and practices, 
such as on issues of secularism, democracy and citizenship, and also to promote a more 
humanistic understanding of Islam, as opposed to the more predominantly legalistic and 
ritualistic ones. In Singapore, some perceive it to be a mere label attached to the name Islam
39
 
or that it is an ideology (Aljunied, 2015: 6), but I am arguing that it is an orientation in 
understanding Islam vis-à-vis society.
40
 It is also not a school of thought or jurisprudence, 
unlike Shiism, and yet it has also been targeted as a threat, much like the Shiites.  
Furthermore, unlike the presumption that liberal Islam is a Western or Orientalist import, the 
push for reform is not a new phenomenon in the Muslim society. It is part of the long 
trajectory of Muslim reformism and is an organic process from within the Muslim 
community. The quest to reform and pursue progressive change is an experience of coming to 
terms with modernity, while seeking to retain authenticity derived from the corpus of Islamic 
traditions. The suspicion or even outright rejection of reformism within the Malay-Muslim 
community is not new. In the early 20
th
 century, when reformist ideas such as the calls for 
greater exercise of reason and ijtihad were introduced by the Kaum Muda faction, they were 
harshly denigrated by the traditionalist ulama of the Kaum Tua faction. Such calls for reform 
were deemed as challenging the authority of the established ulama. Some deemed them as 
worse than infidels or Christians, while others likened them to the Qadiani or Ahmadiyyahs, 
thereby alluding to their deviance. (Roff, 1962: 162, 177)  They were also seen as threats to 
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 See works such as Kurzman (1998), Azhar (2014) and Qodir (2007; 2010) for more in-depth discussions of 
what liberal Islam stands for. Kurzman’s work on liberal Islam is often cited by the fundamentalists as a guide 
to identify the proponents of liberal Islam. 
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societal unity and potential usurpers of royal power. (Ahmad, 2016: 8) Aside from that, a 
fatwa was released which denounced the Kaum Muda’s ideas as unIslamic. The Kaum Tua 
ulama also influenced the Malay rulers to enact a legislation to curb the spread of Kaum 
Muda ideas. Their publications were denied entry in some states and the authority of the State 
Council was used to obtain the refusal of permission for Kaum Muda members to speak 
publicly in mosques and at other religious occasions. (Rahimin, 2006: 96) 
The liberal Muslims are often viewed as a threat to the mainstream Muslim populace. A 
similar language, like that used against the Shiites, is similarly used to demonize the liberals, 
although the liberals cannot be seen as a separate sect with its own unique trajectory and 
theological as well as jurisprudential schools. The liberals are often portrayed as enemies 
from within, since they are viewed as trying to weaken Islam and the faiths of Muslims from 
within. Liberal Muslims are also often seen as not being Muslim enough or are “loose” or 
less devout Muslims, and are thus deviant by virtue of their ideas and affiliations. For 
instance, they are seen as Muslims who trivialize Islamic obligations, such as allowing 
Muslims to perform the hajj at any time.
41
  Thinkers and scholars who are labelled as liberal 
or self-presented as progressive are often viewed with suspicion, due to their critical views of 
mainstream and conservative Islam.  
Another reason why liberal Muslims are also viewed in suspicion is because they are often 
stereotyped as being Westernized or being sympathizers or stooges of the West. This is 
because liberal Muslims argue favourably for supposedly Western constructs like secularism, 
human rights and democracy. Given the prejudiced personality’s dichotomized outlook, 
anyone who is deemed to be Westernized is thus automatically anti-Islam.  
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Liberal Muslims are also viewed with distrust due to the presumption that they are 
undermining Islamic traditions from within. Due to the liberals’ call for law reforms or 
reinterpretation of texts in the Islamic tradition, they are seen as deviant and trying to 
undermine these age-old traditions. Liberals are perceived as being disconnected from 
traditions and are not guided by them. The term liberal Muslim is also often used to denigrate 
others who disagree with established interpretations of Islamic rulings and practices. This 
term is used as a blanket term against those who question certain interpretations.  
The liberal Muslims are often subjected to criticism and demonization on several issues, 
namely: secularism, feminism, pluralism and the use of reason. These ideas, which are 
presumed to be of Western origin, are not seen as compatible with Islam. The fear or 
discomfort towards secularism can be attributed to various circles within the Singaporean 
Muslim community, notably among certain asatizah and dakwah circles. For instance, Pergas 
has this to say about secularism in their publication, Moderation in Islam: “whatever the form 
of secularism, whether it be one which totally rejects the role of religion in society, or one 
which limits it to just the moral aspects of society, or one with the purpose of eliminating 
religion from society, or one which accepts religion to secure harmonious living, it is, in 
principle, conflicting with our understanding of religion” (Pergas, 2004:109). Pergas also 
denied that they were advocating for secularism in the Muslim community, claiming that 
there are differences in the principles of secularism and Islam.
42
 Such concerns had also been 
reproduced at the varsity level, such as forum discussions on the need to withstand the tide of 
secularism.
43
 Before the advent of social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, 
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Singaporean Muslims would discuss socio-political and religious issues on an online platform 
spearheaded by Pergas called Cyberummah. Through the threads on their mailing lists, one of 
the key topics of discussion was the rejection of secularism.  
Another group are the staunch followers of Malaysian scholar Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-
Attas, some of whom consider themselves as “Attasians” or “Naquibians”. This followed the 
popularity of his work, Islam and Secularism (1978). His ideas have been popularized in 
Malaysia such as ABIM through the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim, which later has its 
influences in Singapore as well. There is also a number of Singaporeans who attend Al-Attas’ 
Saturday Night Lectures in Malaysia and attend courses in Malaysian higher institutes of 
learning which teach his ideas. As such, there have been courses conducted in Singapore 
about the notion of the “Islamic worldview”, which is set in diametrical opposition to the so-
called Western secular worldview.
44
 This anxiety about the question of secularism is one of 
the key sources of antagonism towards liberal Muslims, whose religiosity are deemed as 
suspect due to their support for the establishment of the secular state. What is often assumed, 
amongst the proponents of this so-called Islamic worldview, is that secularism is against 
religion and thus un-Islamic. The concept, which carries many definitions and is still 
contested by scholars, including Muslims, is simply reduced to one that is supposedly at odds 
and incompatible with Islam. Despite having foreign Muslim scholars come to Singapore and 
assuage the fears of Muslims about secularism, the concerns among various segments in the 
community still arise from time to time.
45
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Progressive and reformist voices within the Singaporean Muslim community are few and far 
in between, usually found among the academic and certain activist circles. A key figure 
within the local community is renowned sociologist and intellectual Syed Hussein Alatas, 
whose writings in Malay are significant examples of reformist ideas in Islam within the 
Malay community. These works include Siapa yang Salah (1972) and Kita dengan Islam: 
Tumbuh Tiada Berbuah (1979). His book Biarkan Buta is a compilation of polemical debates 
which challenged the traditionalist religious establishment on their prohibition of organ 
donation in the 1970s. (Azhar, 2014: 114) His legacy has been continued by academics from 
the Malay Studies Department, such as Shaharuddin Maaruf, Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, 
Syed Farid Alatas and Azhar Ibrahim. These scholars are active in engaging in various issues 
within the community, though most of their views are dismissed as ‘liberal’ by the Malay 
community. Rumours surrounding the department, claiming that it is the den of liberal Islam 
in Singapore and warnings about certain courses which purportedly disseminate liberal ideas 
on Islam are not unheard of. It is quite common to hear of students on the NUS campus 
warning others about the supposedly liberal leanings of some of the modules offered, and that 
the lecturer is not a legitimate authority to speak on Islam and the Muslim community.
46
 
Ambivalent attitudes towards social scientific methods in discoursing about Islam are quite 
among some students, which can be seen as an impact of the demonization of liberal Islam. 
The discomfort towards social scientific thinking is further exacerbated by certain local 
religious teachers, such as Abdul Harim Abdul Karim and Noor Deros, who warn their 
students of the dangers of secularism and the Western social sciences in their private courses 
which they sometimes offer to university students. This stems from a deeper distrust in the 
discourses and knowledge about Islam that are disseminated by Western scholars, especially 
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those who study Islam without being Muslims themselves. These scholars of Islam, despite 
their academic credentials, are sometimes viewed with suspicion, as they are presumed to 
have certain ulterior motives to undermine Muslims. The term ‘Orientalist’ is used to 
denigrate the credibility of such Western scholars of Islam.
47
 
At the level of activism and community engagement, there are some circles who demonstrate 
keen interest in discussing and writing about progressive and humanistic ideas in Islam. For 
instance, a group of young Malay graduates and professionals who call themselves The 
Reading Group, are active in organizing seminars and discussions, as well as publishing 
writings on their website
48
 and in their journal Tafkir.
49
 Progressive ideas on gender are also 
gaining traction within the local Muslim community, through platforms such as the Gender 
Equality is our Culture (GEC) programme under the women’s research and advocacy 
organization AWARE, which advocates for gender-equitable interpretations of religion and 
culture. Online platforms are also available for like-minded individuals to get together to 
share their views, such as Singapore Muslims for Secular Democracy and Beyond the Hijab, 
which are helmed by students, activists and young professionals.  
Although progressive and reformist ideas in Islam are slowly making headway within the 
local community, they are not met without backlash by other members of the community, 
especially among the religious circles.
50
 Even purportedly liberal Muslim scholars from 
Malaysia and Indonesia, such as Ulil Abshar-Abdalla and Zainah Anwar, had received strong 
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criticism from Pergas when they came to speak in Singapore in 2003.
51
 The Reading Group 
has received quite a bit of negative attention by certain members of the community, who 
accuse them of spreading deviant ideas through their journal and their promotion of works by 
scholars from the region and elsewhere who are deemed as liberal and thus deviant.
52
 The 
online groups also sometimes receive comments by members of the Muslim community who 
claim that they are not in the position to speak about Islam, as they do not have the authority 
to do so. As such, it can be said that progressive ideas still remain on the margins, and given 
the amount of demonization and fear-mongering about them, it is still very challenging for 
them to leave a significant mark in the community. It is noteworthy that the vilification of 
liberal Muslims cuts across various Muslim circles and institutions. While there are certain 
key figures who are consistent in their demonization of liberal Islam, what is notable is that 
various other individual religious teachers also echo similar sentiments, be it in classes on 
aqidah or Islamic thought, or on mainstream and social media platforms. An example would 
be the articulations of Ustaz Muhammad Mazdiuky Muhammad Ishak, who is known to be a 
traditionalist ustaz. In a Facebook post, he said that liberal Islam has to be eradicated. He 
claimed that liberal Muslims seek to align God and the Prophet’s commands to suit human 
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My primary mode of research is analysis of public discourse. I have looked at 4 main sources 
of information: public talks, religious courses, newspaper articles and social media discourse. 
I conducted participant observation in public talks and religious classes, especially on themes 
concerning aqidah and Islamic theology, because this problem of prejudice towards the Other 
Muslims has been posited as a problem of aqidah or central beliefs. During such talks, I 
noted mostly the content and style of presentation, as well as the audience present. Some of 
these include a symposium organized by Andalus Institute and a talk on the dangers of liberal 
Islam held at the Singapore Post Centre in 2015. The speakers were mainly religious teachers, 
a few of whom who have quite a following, especially in the age of social media. Other 
materials include lectures from religious classes which had been uploaded online. The aim is 
to try to capture and demonstrate this notable phenomenon of the rejection and the vilification 
of Muslims deemed as deviant, which cuts across various Muslim circles and institutions, and 
to make sense of it.  
This type of discourse generally reflects the orientation and interests of the religious elites, 
who are vested in maintaining the religious status quo. Also to be considered as public 
discourse is social media discourse, which is more loose and free-flowing in terms of the 
exchange of ideas. Here, I observe more nuances in the types of views espoused about the 
Shiite and liberal Muslims. With the presence of audio and visual aids on social media 
websites such as YouTube, Facebook and blogs, the level of demonization is a lot more 
severe than in real life because people mostly hide behind their online anonymity. Many 
Muslim clerics are also turning to social media sites as a new platform to reach out to the 
masses, and often make use of it to disseminate their views and teachings. There are also 
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Facebook groups which rally people to come together in their demonization of the Shiites or 
the liberal Muslims.  
Ideas perpetuated on social media, even if they may be exaggerated through the guise of 
online anonymity, reflect a certain type of discourse surrounding a particular subject matter, 
in this case the prejudices towards Shiite and liberal Islam. As pointed by Törnberg and 
Törnberg (2016: 132), “Social media is becoming an important source for the (re)production 
of discursive power in society, while simultaneously constituting a unique source for 
studying everyday discourses outside the scope of mass media.” Ideas do not operate in a 
vacuum and are always a reflection of a broader community of discourse. They reflect the 
social groups from which they originate and their position vis-à-vis maintaining a certain 
position in society. In the case of the anti-Shiite and anti-liberal Islam sentiments, these 
prejudices have more to say about the prejudiced in-group, rather than the out-groups that 
they are rejecting. What is being articulated about Shiite and liberal Muslims, which often 
consist of stereotypes, caricatures and misrepresentations, inform us more about the 
orientation and preoccupations of the in-group. It helps us make sense of why they have such 
preoccupations and the type of religious orientation that conditions such prejudices.  
Structure of the thesis 
This study will be broken down thematically into chapters as follows: 
i. Introduction  
ii. Literature Review  
Chapter 2 looks into approaches to the study of intra-Muslim prejudice, as well as on the 
broader topic of religious orientation of the Malay-Muslims. I will also look into studies on 
fundamentalism and its connection to prejudice.  
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iii. Drawing the link between prejudice and fundamentalism  
In chapter 3, I will examine in greater detail the concept of prejudice and its mechanisms. 
This will be used to critically analyze the anti-Shiite and anti-liberal Islam sentiments found 
in various public discourses, both online and offline. Following which, I will discuss further 
the social psychological dimensions of religious fundamentalism. Finally, I will demonstrate 
how prejudice is closely linked to the fundamentalist orientation, which thus forms the 
conceptual core of this study.  
iv. Expressions of anti-Shiite and liberal Islam sentiments in Singapore  
Chapter 4 focuses on the how prejudice manifests itself in the public discourse of Muslims in 
Singapore. This is to illustrate the prejudiced personality. This is where most of my research 
findings will be discussed. This chapter is broken into further segments, namely:  
(a) Expressions of anti-Shiism  
(b) Expressions of anti-liberal Islam  
v. Analysis: The manifestations of the prejudiced personality and its correlation to 
religious fundamentalism 
Chapter 5 points back to the problem of religious fundamentalism as exemplified through the 
traits of the prejudiced personality. The traits of the prejudiced personality, namely 
authoritarianism, institutionalism and the need for definiteness, correlate very well to the 
traits of fundamentalism which have been explicated in Chapter 3. Finally, I will argue in this 
chapter that the root cause of prejudice and the reason why Malay Muslims are turning 





Chapter 6 concludes the entire study by summarizing the key points. I will also look into the 





This chapter focuses on the literature review on existing approaches that have been adopted 
in the study of the fundamentalism as a religious orientation, specifically focusing on its 
aspect of prejudice. There is a notable dearth in works which discuss the problem of religious 
fundamentalism among Singapore Muslims, as well as those discussing intra-Muslim 
dynamics, specifically the denigration of Muslims who are seen as deviant. This is the gap 
that this study seeks to fill.  
Approaches to the study of intra-Muslim prejudice 
Several pertinent approaches have been adopted in the study of intra-Muslim prejudice. First, 
are the socio-political and historical studies on Muslim sectarianism and diversity. This is not 
a new area in the study of Islam, which also extends into other fields, such as theology and 
philosophy. The question of theological tolerance is thus not a recent concern. The famed 
theologian and mystic, Imam al-Ghazali himself had endeavoured to make sense of the 
boundaries of belief and unbelief. Sherman Jackson, in his study of al-Ghazali’s work, Faysal 
al-Tafriqa, asserts that al-Ghazali aimed to “define the boundaries within which competing 
theologies can coexist in mutual recognition of each other… not to establish who among the 
theological is ‘right’, but rather to demonstrate the folly and unfairness of the practice of 
condemning a doctrine as heresy simply because it goes against one’s theology.” (Jackson, 
2002: 5) Al-Ghazali’s position, it can be argued, would be at odds with the intolerant views 
that I would like to address in this study.  
Another relevant area is the studies on the history of the making of orthodoxy and heresy. 
The construction of religious deviance or heresy can be understood in terms of the process of 
41 
 
out-group formation. One interesting study would be the one done by Henderson (1998), The 
Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy. In the Islamic context, the Sunni Muslims can be 
accepted as orthodoxy or the mainstream due to these aforementioned traits, plus its 
dominance in the Muslim world.  However, studies such as this one do not quite capture the 
animosity and prejudice that has really been quite ingrained in Muslim history. Such 
animosity has obviously been escalated into countless sectarian conflicts; but on a more day-
to-day level is captured in the prejudicial attitudes cast upon Muslims who are deemed as not 
belonging to the mainstream or orthodoxy.  
Studies on religious fundamentalism or extremism have also gained traction and interest in 
the academia and the field of policy and security studies, especially since the rise of Islamism 
as a political orientation and the tragedy of September 11 2001 in New York City. In this 
study, I am inquiring as to why and how fundamentalism, as an orientation, has become so 
pervasive, such that it becomes reproduced by people of various segments in society, and not 
just the religious elites or those who have a stake at preserving the status quo of the Islamic 
orthodoxy.  
Studies on the social psychology of religious fundamentalism are very relevant for this study. 
They outline the traits of fundamentalism which explain the dualistic worldview and the 
perception of the Other as a threat.  In this study, I am arguing that social psychology is an 
important area to pursue in the study of religious fundamentalism. The field of social 
psychology is a necessary component in developing a critical social scientific outlook on the 
study of religious fundamentalism. It complements the existing literature which is dominated 
by sociology, political science, history and security studies. It gives a more complex 
understanding of society by discussing the inner workings of the human being, which then 
affects how society, at a broader level, responds to changes and problems. Social psychology 
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is instrumental in helping us understand the processes of social behaviour, thus explaining 
why we see recurring patterns of certain types of behaviour cutting across different levels of 
society, such as in schools, family units and in the individual person.  
A social psychological outlook can also help us understand why conflicts of ideologies or 
values occur between different groups – “conservatives” and “liberals” for instance, and how 
certain ideologies and values become dominant and entrenched though they may not ideally 
benefit members of the society in the humanistic and emancipative sense. The application of 
social psychology, or perhaps moral psychology, is also important to understand the social 
contexts which condition abstract ideals and values, and how they are later manifested in 
society.  
Theories from social psychologists or social thinkers, especially those which draw influences 
from social philosophy and other humanistic social sciences, should also be used in 
developing the corpus of critical discourse in study of the fundamentalist orientation. Some of 
the possible options would include:  
i. Gordon Allport: In The Nature of Prejudice, his detailed discussion of 
prejudice and how prejudiced personalities are likely shaped by and inclined 
towards authoritarianism echoes Fromm’s discussion of the authoritarian 
personality. In Malay Studies, this concept of prejudice has been used 
internalization of negative stereotypes by the Malays in Singapore. (Noorainn, 
2009) 
ii. William James: His combination of philosophy, religious thought and 
psychology in his classic work The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) 
to understand varieties of religious experiences is helpful in the study of 
various orientations in the practice and outlook on Islam amongst the Malays. 
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A relatively newer approach which is inspired by James, adopted by Robert 
Towler in The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional 
Religion (1984), has influenced the study of traditionalistic orientations of 
Islam amongst the Malays, such as by Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman (2004) and 
(2007).  
iii. Karl Mannheim: In Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, he discusses 
the need for social psychology and the study of valuation, which is also 
echoed by other social psychologists like Erich Fromm. The study of feudal 
psychology was taken up by S.H. Alatas (1968), inspired by Mannheim’s 
work on valuation, though this was not taken up for further development.  
Literature review of works on religious orientation among Muslims in Singapore 
There is still a dearth of works which analyze the diverse religious orientations of Muslims in 
Singapore. As mentioned earlier, many of the studies on the Muslims of Singapore focus on 
the demographics and identity of Singaporean Muslims, as well as the more state-centric 
discourses of terrorism and Muslim exclusivity. Studies on religious orientations do not seem 
to draw much attention in this field, and it is thus in my interest to contribute to the existing 
discourse. However, there are some studies, as will be discussed below, which critique the 
dominant orientations among the Muslims in Singapore, especially that of the elites.  
This study takes after a study done by Mariam Ali (1989) on the religious diversity of 
Muslims in Singapore. Although it does not focus specifically on religious orientations, it 
critiques the attitudes of the religious elites in Singapore, who are noticeably authoritarian 
and intolerant of diversity within the community. In her study, Mariam finds that “In 
contemporary Singapore, the most crucial discourse pertinent to the status of ulama pertains 
to the general religious discourse of the late 1970s and 1980s. This discourse revolved around 
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the perceived need to practice “pure Islam” free from any religious innovations.” She also 
asserts that “…Inclusively they (the religious elites) often claim that there is a need to protect 
the aqidah ‘faith’ of the umma ‘religious community’ from being misguided by deviant 
sources.”  
Her findings coincide with rise of Islamic revivalism through the dakwah movements since 
this 1970s. Her findings are highly relevant to this study because they show that the 
puritanical and fear-mongering attitudes of the elites towards groups which differ from them 
are not recent problems. The seeds of prejudice towards the Other has been sowed since the 
1970s and 1980s. She also finds that “The reason their (Ahmadi and Ingkaro Sunnah groups) 
request (to dialogue) was treated as irrelevant by MUIS or other organizations was that the 
issues they raised are regarded as settled issues within the current of mainstream definition of 
orthodoxy. Therefore, instead of dealing with the content of their claims, criticisms against 
them are largely attributed to devious intentions threatening the solidarity and harmony of the 
Muslim umma.” (Ibid, 1989: 126)  
Shaharuddin Maaruf (2002) examines the feudalistic or authoritarian tendencies among the 
Malay religious elite. He posits that “One prominent feature in the religious orientation of the 
feudal Malay ruling class is the centrality of the motif of divine retribution. It is reflective of 
an authoritarian religion where morality is not of inner conscience and spiritual discipline, but 
more of compulsion and fear of punishment from an external authority. The idea of divine 
retribution alienates conscience from concrete everyday living. Consequently man need not 
be morally accountable to his fellow men but only to ‘God’. As a corollary, human will and 
self-determinism is negated. Man is no longer charged with the moral duty of challenging 
injustices around him but could transfer that responsibility to divine intervention on his 
behalf.” (Shaharuddin, 2002: 6)  
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Some further points that he raised which are noteworthy is also that there is a “dualistic 
worldview with its anti-thesis of the world and the hereafter. Further, he argues that there is a 
continuation of a feudalistic and authoritarian religious orientation in the age of modernity, 
whereby “The religious orientation remains dualistic, authoritarian, ritualistic, intellectually 
limited and preoccupied with the problem of human temptation and desire, thereby 
suggesting continuity from feudal days… There is reason, then, to expect that continuities 
with the religious orientation of Malay feudalism are even stronger in mainstream Malay 
society, which remained feudalistic, traditional and agricultural.”  
Noor Aisha (2004; 2007; 2008; 2014) is critical of the dominant traditionalist orientation of 
the Muslim religious elites in Singapore. Traditionalism, as an orientation, can be defined as 
“a dogmatic attitude that clings firmly to old ways, resisting innovations or accepting them 
only unwillingly.” (Mannheim, 1986 in Noor Aisha, 2004: 416) This rejection or fear of 
innovation is not based upon conscious reflection or deliberation. Sociologist Towler (1984: 
80–93) explicates traditionalism as a style of religious belief whereby “its essence is to 
cherish the entire tradition received as sacred such that if any part is threatened or called into 
question, it is the whole pattern which is put at risk. It is characterized by a strong sense of 
‘obligatoriness’ of ‘the necessity of believing rather than what is believed.” These studies by 
Noor Aisha adopt this concept as a means to critically analyze the unchanging perceptions 
and approaches to issues within the Muslim community pertaining to Islamic law and the role 
of the Muslim religious elites.  
Norshahril Saat (2010) identifies a similar problem of traditionalism and authoritarianism 
among the religious elite in Malaysia. He notes their exclusivist behaviour by similarly using 
the “threat to the faith” rhetoric in order to preserve the status quo. He argues that “Their fear 
or threat to the faith being undermined in interaction and relations with non‐Muslims is a 
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major basis that conditions their responses. Such views breed intolerance and exclusive 
streaks which undermine efforts in bridging goodwill among the different ethnic groups. It 
reveals a negative orientation that may serve as an impediment towards social cohesion in a 
plural society such as Malaysia, as well as any steps towards any fruitful dialogue.” Such 
attitudes can be seen among the Muslims in Singapore as well, due to the strong influence of 
Malaysian religious preachers here. Malaysian Muslim preachers are often invited and 
sponsored to give public talks in local mosques and some, such as Ustaz Azhar Idrus and Dr. 
Muhammad Asri Zainal Abidin have a large following on social media as well. 
A more recent study done on the growth of religious fundamentalism among the Muslims in 
Singapore was done by Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib (2012). I am adopting a similar 
trajectory to this study. A notable example which he illustrates is of a guide book on the 
Muslim ritual prayers, which portrays an authoritarian outlook on Islam. Mohamed notes 
that, “… one paper stood out: ‘Sholat Sebagai Pembentuk Peribadi Muslim’ [Prayers as a 
Shaper of Muslim Personality], where participants learned that one who neglects his/her 
obligatory prayers is liable to either be (a) punished by death, (b) tortured, (c) declared an 
apostate, or (d) declared as a fasiq or liar. At the height of the dakwah phenomenon, the 
polarising effect of dakwah was clearly seen, driven by the movement’s sense of ‘superiority’ 
over the ignorant masses. The task of doing dakwah thus confers on the individual a sense of 
being ‘God’s spokesperson on earth’. He or she is now qualified to speak in the name of 
Islam: ‘Islam says…’, ‘Islamic position on….’, and ‘God wants…”. These, invariably, 
objectify Islam and became a visible manifestation of neo-fundamentalist thought (Roy, 
2004: 21).” 
Another highly relevant work is that of Azhar Ibrahim (2014), which critically analyses the 
dominant orientations of Islam in the Malay-Indonesian world. In this work, Azhar critiques 
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the growing prevalence of the revivalist or dakwah orientation among Muslims. This can be 
corroborated to this study’s critique of the fundamentalist orientation. He illustrates several 
key traits of the revivalist character, which is similar to other studies on the psychosocial 
outlook of religious fundamentalists. Some of these relevant traits include the attitudes of 
anti-Westernism and anti-Secularism, whereby the revivalists “believe that Islamic 
civilization is under attack by the imperialist West or its Zionist allies. The West is seen as 
bent on destroying Islam – a project dating back to the Crusades, through the period of 
colonialism and on to present-day neocolonialism.” (Azhar, 2014: 5) 
Azhar also notes that “revivalist religious fervor and enthusiasm are more effective and often 
succumb to the rhetoric of exclusivism. They usually demonstrate their prowess and efficacy 
not through intellectual sobriety and rigour, but through their emotive, biting rhetoric against 
their adversaries: the atheistic West, Zionists, nationalists, modernists, reformists, liberals, 
secularists and the like. Moreover their religious utterances, with strong legalistic expressions 
and commands, show a clear absence of emphatic and inclusive spirituality. To revivalists 
there is only one paradigm of truth, the revealed religion (ad-Din). The rest are misleading 
and aberrant teachings.” Such an illustration is helpful in helping us critique the Muslim 
fundamentalist orientation, or the fundamentalist orientation in general, as exclusivist, 
authoritarian and supremacist in nature.  
Literature review of theoretical works relevant to this study  
As aforementioned, the primary theoretical perspectives adopted in this study pertain to the 
social psychology of the fundamentalist orientation. Most relevant to this study is the concept 
of prejudice as propounded by Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice. Allport defines 
prejudice as “an avertive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to that group, and is 
therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group.”(Allport, 1955: 
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7) It necessitates an attitude of hostility towards the Other, based on the presumption of 
certain negative attributes towards the Other. Also noteworthy in his exploration of the 
“prejudiced personality” (Ibid, 395), which attributes the state of insecurity, or the notion of 
the “threat orientation” (Newcomb, 1950), as the basis of prejudice.  
Relevant to the problem of prejudice is the question of authoritarianism in religion. 
Authoritarianism, as discussed by Allport (1955: 406-7), is a trait of the “prejudiced 
personality”. Erich Fromm illustrates this very cogently. He argues that ideas underlying a 
certain religious orientation “were powerful forces within the adherents of the new religion, 
because they appealed to needs and anxieties that were present in the character structure of 
the people whom they were addressed.” (Fromm, 1941: 281) 
The alienation of oneself from his/her human potentials and thus the over-reliance on 
authority has developed what Fromm terms the “authoritarian” or “sado-masochistic 
character”. It is a paradoxical type of character which loves to dominate and be dominated – 
in fact they are on the flipside of the same coin. He argues that the sado-masochistic 
tendencies are likely to be present in everyone, though there are some whose characters 
become dominated by such tendencies. A person who has such a character “admires authority 
and tends to submit to it, but at the same time he wants to be an authority himself and have 
others submit to him.” (Ibid, 1941: 164)  
This concept has been largely used in studies critiquing the fundamentalist orientation. 
Khaled Abou El Fadl (2001: 141), in his critique of the absolutism and literalism of the 
Wahhabis, defines authoritarianism as “an act of ultimate lack of self-restraint that involves a 
fraudulent claim whose natural effect is to usurp the Divine Will. Authoritarianism, then, is 
the marginalization of the ontological reality of the Divine and the depositing of the Divine 
Will in the agent so that the agent effectively becomes self-referential. In the authoritarian 
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dynamic, the distinction between the agent and the Principal becomes indistinct and 
blurred…” To him, the authoritarian is thus acting in place of God, and imposes its will 
against Revelation. Such an attitude can be seen in how the authoritarian imposes its will 
against the Other, and in this case, the intra-Muslim Other.  
Several pertinent studies have been surveyed pertaining to the psychosocial outlook of 
religious fundamentalists. This will be elaborated in the subsequent chapter. Some pertinent 
points relate to the dualistic, prejudicial and authoritarian nature of the fundamentalist 
orientation. For instance, Jones (2010: 91) asserts that “the fundamentalist worldview is one 
that operates beyond the level of mere cultural chauvinism that presumes an epistemological 
and ontological superiority, but rather it claims to be the ultimate view of reality.” The 
supremacist and us-against-them nature of the fundamentalist orientation thus entails “high 
levels of discriminatory behavior, including sexism, racism and homophobia… This is hardly 
surprising given that this is a worldview that is built upon discrimination via the strong 
identification of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ behaviors and ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ socio-cultural groups.” 
Most pertinent to this study are the studies which show the strong connection between 
religious fundamentalism and prejudice. Many studies have demonstrated the link between 
religious fundamentalism and prejudice. There is a strong correlation between prejudice and 
religious fundamentalism. These studies have demonstrated how religious fundamentalism is 
related to prejudice toward a variety of groups including gays and lesbians (Fulton, Gorsuch, 
& Maynard, 1999; Jackson & Esses, 1997; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002; 
Mavor & Gallois, 2008; Rowatt et al., 2006), radicals (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), 
single mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997), religious outgroups (Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 
2005), and people who do not believe in God (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999). (Brandt and 
Reyna, 2010: 716-7) Blogowska and Saroglou (2013: 103), in their study on fundamentalists’ 
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attitudes towards out-groups, find that “Personality and social psychological research on 
religious fundamentalism has mainly concentrated on two major topics: cognitive structures 
characterizing the fundamentalist “mind” and social consequences in terms of prejudice. 
Research attests that a fundamentalist mindset is characterized by dogmatism and 
authoritarianism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005), need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; 
Saroglou, 2002), and low integrative complexity of thought when it comes to existential and 
moral issues (Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 1994).”  
However, most of these studies focus on the context of Christian fundamentalism and its 
subsequent problems pertaining to prejudice. The study and conception of fundamentalism 
among Muslims still largely focus on the socio-political and historical dimensions, rather 
than the attitudinal and psychological dimensions. (Moaddel and Karabenick, 2008: 1676) 
Fundamentalism among Muslims is still largely understood in terms of violent extremism and 
political movements, and not so much as a religious orientation in itself. It is thus in the 
interest of this study to provide a social psychological approach towards understanding the 
problem of fundamentalism among contemporary Muslims through the dimension of 
prejudice.  
Some of these theoretical perspectives will be explored in greater depth in the subsequent 
chapters, to demonstrate the fundamentalist orientation underlying the sentiments of the anti-







Drawing the link between prejudice and fundamentalism 
In this chapter, I will examine in greater detail the concept of prejudice and its mechanisms. 
This will be used to critically analyze the anti-Shiite and anti-liberal Islam sentiments found 
in various public discourses, both online and offline. The concept of prejudice underlies the 
sectarian sentiments cast upon the intra-Muslim Other, regardless of how it may then 
manifest itself in public discourse and how it then shapes intra-Muslim relations. Following 
which, I will discuss further the social psychological dimensions of religious 
fundamentalism. These particular traits of religious fundamentalism which I am highlighting 
are useful in helping us understand the nature of the demonizing sentiments that are projected 
against the Shiite and liberal Muslims. Finally, I will demonstrate how prejudice is closely 
linked to the fundamentalist orientation, which thus forms the conceptual core of this study.  
The mechanisms of prejudice 
Several works will be employed here to help us better understand the concept of prejudice, 
and how it has been employed in the field of social psychology. This study focuses on how 
prejudice influences in-group and out-group dynamics, specifically in the context of religion.  
Gordon Allport’s extensive studies on this concept are crucial for our formulation of the 
conceptual basis of this study. Aside from his classic 1955 study, The Nature of Prejudice, 
other related works by him are also highly relevant. For instance, in “Prejudice: Is it Societal 
or Personal?” in The Person in Psychology (1968), he discusses the reasons for the 
occurrence of prejudice, which are applicable to both individuals and in broader society. He 
argues that prejudice is founded a deep desire for conformity, which occurs due to sense of 
deep-seated insecurities and yearning for status.  
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To him, “The status-seeking conformist will always reject groups he considers inferior, 
whatever the prevailing social practice may be.”  Such a mode of behaviour has to do with an 
authoritarian outlook on society, where social groups are arranged according to a hierarchy. 
In the context of this study, such an outlook can be cast upon groups whom the religious 
elites and institutions perceive as heretical or not belonging to the mainstream.  
Related to the hierarchical outlook of social order is the authoritarian basis of prejudicial 
thinking and behaviour. The prejudiced personality, who in its nature conforms to the social 
hierarchy, possesses what Allport and other thinkers like Erich Fromm and Theodore Adorno 
term as the “authoritarian personality”. Allport argues that there is a “strong need for aligning 
oneself with a strong authority figure, and with a protective in-group. Present too are a strong 
nationalism, a subservience to existing institutions, conventionalism, rigid moralism, and a 
need for wrong, as pure or impure, as all good or all bad. There are no shades of gray, no 
tentativeness, no suspended judgment.” The authoritarian personality has a dualistic or black-
and-white view on reality and morality, which is related to the hierarchical perception of 
society. Power and social order becomes central in their understanding of a good society, 
regardless of whether the elites are humanistic and democratic in their orientation or not. 
Allport also finds that the authoritarian personality lacks self-insight, and is thus very reliant 
on a top-down ordering of society, as opposed to a more democratic one. (Ibid, 196)  
The authoritarian outlook, as argued by Allport, is related to a form of religiosity that is 
extrinsic, as opposed to one that is intrinsic. A person or group that subscribes to a 
predominantly extrinsic brand of religiosity is more prone to prejudice because of the 
understanding of religion that is based on group identity and physical practices, such as 
rituals and other public religious activities. The preservation of group identity becomes a 
priority, which thus explains prejudicial behaviour towards those who are perceived as 
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different or a threat to one’s religious affiliation. Allport finds that this type of religiosity 
“correlates positively with racial and ethnic bigotry that is unfortunately widespread among 
churchgoers...” (Ibid, 149) An individual or group which prescribes a more extrinsic type of 
religiosity does so due to various insecurities, be it personal or political. A strong sense of 
group identity helps shield oneself from social and political anxieties. The Other is projected 
as a threat to one’s group identity, in order to bolster a stronger sense of group belonging.  
The fundamentalist psychosocial worldview 
This section focuses on some pertinent traits of the fundamentalist orientation. These traits, as 
I will elaborate in greater detail, largely correlate with Allport’s illustration of the prejudiced 
personality. Although some of the traits identified are used to discuss the case of Christian 
fundamentalism, many of them are still highly relevant to the case of Muslim 
fundamentalism. This is because fundamentalism, as will be illustrated below, is a thought 
orientation that transcends religious boundaries. It is a manner of viewing the world and is 
thus projected upon religion as well.  
To understand the social psychological traits of religious fundamentalism, it is useful for us 
to look into some of the key reasons for the rise of fundamentalism in the first place. Muslim 
fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon. It is a product of the decolonization and 
modernization processes in these countries, which has left many Muslims alienated and 
disenfranchised. This brings about deep moral and socio-political anxieties, especially among 
many younger Muslims. The anti-Western attitudes exemplify a sort of Orientalism-in-
reverse, whereby a similar bifurcated outlook is projected against the West. Such anxieties 
also mean that other Muslims who do not subscribe to the fundamentalist orientation are also 
viewed with distrust. The turn towards fundamentalism can thus be explained in terms of 
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contemporary Muslims’ insecurities about their Islamic identity vis-à-vis a rapidly changing 
and globalizing world.  
Valerie J. Hoffmann (1995: 210), in her study of Islamic fundamentalism in Tunisia, points 
that “Islamic fundamentalism is primarily a revolt of young people who are caught between a 
traditional past and a higher secular education with all its implications of Western intellectual 
impact and contact with the materialistically oriented culture of the modern urban 
environment. The contradiction between the values learned from the past and the realities of 
the present confront young people with bewildering contradictions and often a multitude of 
moral choices that create a sense of anxiety, loneliness, and disorientation…” Her study finds 
that fundamentalism occurs largely among alienated and disenfranchised youths in 
modernizing societies, who experiences anxieties due to instability from social change.  
However, I am arguing that fundamentalism, as a religious orientation, has become 
increasingly visible in contemporary Singaporean Muslim society, and not just among 
youths. Even those who do not publicly subscribe to fundamentalist organizations or follow 
fundamentalist preachers may reproduce similarly fundamentalist views on various social 
issues. Fundamentalism is to be seen as a product of globalization and is itself a globalizing 
force. Muslims in Singapore are not isolated from the globalizing forces of religious 
fundamentalism, and are very much subjected to the prominent and aggressive fundamentalist 
voices from the region, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. Fundamentalist groups are also 
very well-connected and techno-savvy. They have a very strong presence on social media and 
appeal to young Muslims who are seeking a pronounced and uncompromising Muslim 
identity.  
As such, some notable traits of fundamentalist orientation can be identified here. These traits 
include: (a) a dualistic view of the world, (b) absolutism and inerrancy, (c) oppositional and 
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paranoid outlook, (d) paranoia, (e) exclusivism and (f) demonization of the Other. These 
traits will be discussed in greater detail to help us better make sense of the fundamentalist 
orientation. These traits, as will be demonstrated later, are also in line with our discussion of 
prejudice.  
(a) Dualistic view of the world  
Fundamentalists have a notably dualistic view of the world. This is cast upon their 
understanding of religion, morality, social ordering and also towards the Other. The dualism 
of the fundamentalist orientation can be seen as such: “A dualistic or Manichean worldview 
is one in which reality is considered to be uncompromisingly divided into light, which is 
identified with world of the spirit and of the good, and darkness, which is identified with 
matter and evil. Ultimately, light will triumph over darkness. For fundamentalist movements 
the world outside is contaminated, sinful, doomed; the world inside is a pure and redeemed 
“remnant”.” (Almond et al, 1995: 406) This need to maintain the inner purity of one’s world 
from external contaminants is also hence projected upon the Other, who are perceived as a 
pollutant. (Ibid, 406)  
Strozier argues that dualistic thinking is a primary characteristic of the fundamentalist 
worldview. This applies to all the varieties of religious fundamentalism, regardless of the 
religion that one may subscribe to. He argues that “dualistic thinking causes one to “see 
others in very partial terms – as part-objects,” such that fundamentalists “lose the ability to 
imagine the inner world and humanity of others.” (Strozier, 2010: 13) These dualistic 
categories force the experience of others into group structures. Such thinking provides a 
moral framework that differentiates good from bad, and then totalizes the difference.” As 
discussed by Strozier, fundamentalists deny the subjectivities of the world or of the Other by 
compartmentalizing them into homogenous blocs. This is conditioned by their understanding 
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of morality, which leaves no room for grey areas. To the fundamentalist, one is either “with 
us” or “against us”.  
In her study on Muslim fundamentalists in Tunisia, Hoffman (1995: 210) finds that they have 
a dualistic and polarized view of the world, i.e. the morally superior Islamic world versus the 
morally bankrupt West. They perceive their lives as being “bifurcated between an Islamic 
culture that provides moral values, community, and spiritual satisfaction, and a Western 
culture that provides access to the material improvement of their lives.” This outlook is also 
reflected by the Muslim fundamentalists in Singapore, who imagine a monolithic and morally 
superior Muslim community which stands again the secular and morally inferior West. The 
so-called Western world is not understood in terms of its historical and political complexities, 
but is taken as a monolithic whole. The West is seen as contaminants to the purity of the 
Islamic faith and moral code, and hence to be denounced or opposed. In a similar fashion, 
Muslims who subscribe to modern values such as liberalism, pluralism and secularism are 
deemed as stooges of the West and are thus less Islamic in their orientation. 
Such an attitude is also thus applied to the intra-Muslim Other. Diversity is not taken to be a 
given in the Muslim community, because of the fundamentalists’ monolithic understanding of 
Islam. Differences of interpretations and practices in Islam are taken to be a sign of the 
decline of the supremacy of a homogenous Islamic ummah. The fundamentalists, threatened 
by the presence of groups or orientations who challenge their understanding of Islam, see the 
need to confront, demonize or avoid the Other. They do not see rapprochement as a 





(b) Absolutism and inerrancy  
The fundamentalist orientation is also characterized by its absolutist nature. This means that 
the fundamentalists perceive their way to be the only path to religious and moral salvation. 
They are uncompromising in their trumpeting of their faith, and expect others to subscribe to 
their vision of the world. Such a black-and-white view of the world, not surprisingly, can 
easily be used to justify violence against opponents and detractors. Fundamentalists are the 
ones who are likely to assume the role of moral policing in society, because of the 
presumption of the moral deviation from a presupposed ideal. They adopt a sense of mission 
when they embark upon such an act, with the expectation of cleansing society from its moral 
pollutants. As Hoffman (1995: 216) argues, this absolutism “also lends itself to other features 
of the fundamentalist personality that are frequently cited: intolerance and aggressive 
censorship of public morals…”  
A self-perception of inerrancy is also often noted in the fundamentalist orientation. This can 
be seen in terms of how fundamentalists assert their views, given their absolutist outlook. 
Their inerrancy is evident when they dismiss their opponents. To the fundamentalists, their 
interpretation and understanding of religion is free from error and transcend the boundaries of 
time and context. In other words, it is as though their interpretation is divinely-inspired and 
not a product of human imagination, which is subjected to error and conjecture. Such a 
manner of thinking is necessary for fundamentalists who are fraught with insecurities and 
anxieties about an ever-changing world. Thus, a sense of inerrancy is necessary to provide 
stability and security in terms of socio-political outlook and morality.    
Fundamentalists, as such, adopt a similar attitude when approaching religious sources. As 
argued by Almond et al (1995: 407), “First, they steadfastly oppose hermeneutical methods 
developed by secularized philosophers or critics; these are not appropriately applied to sacred 
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texts and traditions. This is not to say that fundamentalist interpretation itself is monolithic, 
only that it does not submit to the canons of critical rationality. Instead of following 
philological or historical methods, fundamentalists employ their own distinctive strategies of 
interpretation, including “hardened” and “updated” traditional approaches, designed in part to 
reify and preserve the absolutist character of the sacred text or tradition.” Such an approach 
thus provides fundamentalists with a sense of security and absoluteness. They are not 
honouring age-old traditions, but are in fact appropriating them to justify their absolutist 
stance. Unlike the traditionalists who cling to traditions in an unchanging manner, 
fundamentalists on the other hand impose their absolutist point of view upon traditions as 
though they are transcendent. It can be thus argued that fundamentalists seek an ahistorical 
and asociological understanding of the religious traditions that they claim to uphold.  
(c) Oppositional and reactionary outlook 
Another prominent trait of the fundamentalist orientation is the oppositional and reactionary 
attitude towards the Other. This relates to their dualistic outlook, in which the world is 
constructed in an “us-against-them” manner. They are generally militant and defensive in 
maintaining the truths of their position, since they are also absolutist in their orientation.  
Fundamentalists are reactionary in the way they uphold their beliefs, and especially against 
what they perceive as threats to their position. Aside from that, fundamentalists also have a 
paranoid stance towards the world and towards those who are perceived as threats to their 
position. Fundamentalists who are organized in groups in movements generally find 
themselves seeking to mobilize against the secularizing forces of the world. To them, “The 
traditional religion is attenuating, adherents are slipping away. Or the community that the 
fundamentalist movement seeks to defend is threatened with absorption into a pluralistic, 
areligious milieu. Reactivity draws other properties with it: selectivity, moral dualism, and 
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inerrancy accompany the defense against threat…” (Almond et al, 1995: 409) Because the 
fundamentalists perceive that the world is slipping into a state of moral decay and corruption, 
they take it upon themselves to defend it adamantly.  
Jones (2010: 91) argues that “The fundamentalist worldview… is constructed in opposition to 
all other competing interpretations of reality, particularly the secular-liberal consensus that 
predominates in most western societies. This oppositionality characterizes this worldview and 
directs fundamentalists’ worldview of and engagement with the world outside of their 
communities. The degree of oppositionality is amplified by other aspects of their world into 
those who will be ‘saved’ and those who will perish.” The oppositional outlook is thus related 
to the fundamentalists’ self-presumption of moral supremacy and being “saved” by the 
Divine. Hence, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, those who subscribe to the fundamentalist 
worldview are predisposed to “high levels of discriminatory behavior, including sexism, 
racism and homophobia.” (Ibid, 91) Pluralism and the protection of rights of minorities are 
generally seen to be threats to the fundamentalists’ absolutist worldview. Thus, 
fundamentalists generally perceive it to be their religious obligation to oppose calls for 
religious pluralism, such as in the case of Indonesia.  
It has been found that most fundamentalists do not subscribe to violence in the way they 
oppose the Other. However, fundamentalists are generally reactionary and emotive in their 
sentiments. To defend their absolutist views on religion and morality, they will employ the 
language of threat and fear as a means of asserting their legitimacy. As such, fundamentalists 
are also easily threatened and are conditioned by what Theodore Newcomb (1952) terms as 
the threat orientation. The Other is perceived as a source of threat, and therefore to be 
vehemently opposed. According to Newcomb, those who subscribe to the threat orientation 
are by nature defensive. Defensiveness can be exemplified in terms of reactionary or 
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aggressive behaviour, or through retreat. Those conditioned by the threat orientation also 
prejudicial in their attitude. Newcomb points that “People who have strong group prejudices 
are often not at all clear as to the nature of the threats with which they feel themselves 
confronted. Nevertheless, their behaviors – such as keeping the “outsiders” at a distance, or 
attempting to injure them – are of precisely the kind that we should expect when situations 
are perceived in terms of threat.” (Ibid, 1952: 579)  
(d) Paranoia 
Fundamentalists are also characterized by their paranoid outlook. Strozier et al (2010) talk 
about the paranoid gestalt, which is a prominent trait of the fundamentalist orientation. He 
points that “the paranoid gestalt is often embodied in the ideology of the group, and perceived 
threats to the validity or practice of the ideology are important sources of the humiliation of 
the group.” The preservation of group identity and supremacy thus underlies this paranoid 
gestalt. The Other is viewed with a sense of paranoia because they are perceived to be 
undermining the in-group. An understanding of in-group and out-group dynamics is thus 
useful here. In the case of the paranoid in-group, they perceive themselves to be under siege 
by the out-group. The in-group has a self-perception of being aggrieved and under threat. The 
out-group on the other hand, is perceived as destructive and hateful, and thus this in-group 
needs to defend itself from the presence of said out-group. As Strozier points out, “the 
designated destructive group is the chief source of danger to the paranoid group’s well-being 
or welfare. Even more crucially, the destructive group is the chief and determined obstacle to 
the achievement of the ideal state that the paranoid group is trying to establish. This ideal 
state is a very important element of the gestalt for the paranoid groups.” (Ibid, 220) 
The paranoid gestalt is conditioned by the dualistic or Manichean worldview which 
characterizes the fundamentalist orientation. A sense of moral obligation is often placed upon 
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this need to oppose the Other; the act of opposing the other can be seen as a necessary act of 
self-preservation. The Other is seen as an obstacle from the establishment of the ideal 
condition; in fact that destruction itself is often seen to lead to the ideal state. (Ibid, 224) 
Strozier et al also assert that “the paranoid group believes itself far superior morally but far 
weaker in any dimension of temporal power than the destructive group.” (Ibid, 224) This is 
due to the fact that the paranoid mentality arises from a standpoint of socio-political 
insecurity. Fundamentalists, given their siege mentality, view themselves as being politically 
marginalized, but at the same time possessing moral superiority over the Other. For instance, 
some Muslim fundamentalists view themselves as being oppressed by the secular and 
Westernized state, and thus it becomes their moral obligation to oppose the state.  
Apocalyptic paranoia is often riled up in fundamentalist discourse, which can be attributed to 
their threat orientation. Given that the world is viewed to be in a state of moral decay, 
fundamentalists then attribute it to the doom of the impending apocalypse. This apocalyptic 
paranoia often rests upon the pre-existing fears and anxieties in a given society, but is 
amplified by the fundamentalists through their emotive rhetoric. In the context of Malaysia 
and Indonesia, for example, the presence of liberal Muslims who support the religious and 
sexual freedom is seen as a sign of the Apocalypse. These Muslims are said to be the 
harbingers of the apocalypse due to the supposedly lax understanding of religion, thus 
pushing the Islamic ummah further into moral decline. This relates to the fundamentalists’ 
ahistorical and idealized imagination of a perfected and monolithic ummah established during 
the time of the Prophet, and any forms of moral deviation from that ideal is seen as leading 
the community closer to the Apocalypse.  
In relation to paranoia, we can also find conspiratorial thinking underlying the fundamentalist 
rhetoric. Muslims who do not subscribe to the fundamentalist worldview and cause are often 
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labelled as hypocrites or munafiqun in Arabic. They are often projected as enemies from 
within, allegedly seeking to undermine Islam from within. They are perceived as more 
insidious and dangerous than the external threats from the Western imperialists. Driven by an 
inexplicable paranoia, fundamentalists’ claims to conspiratorial thinking is thus irrational, to 
say the least. Any sort of challenge to the fundamentalists’ project is hence deemed as a 
product of an external conspiracy, or an infiltration from within. As an implication, as argued 
by Sivan (1995: 20), fundamentalists seek to “call for further exertion in self-chastisement 
and improvement, existing in tandem, with purges of the unworthy.” It is this very aim of 
purging the unworthy that often legitimizes the fundamentalist project, through the means of 
fear-mongering and spreading conspiratorial thoughts and beliefs. Fundamentalists are not 
one to be self-critical; in fact, they are not capable of it. This is because their worldview is 
largely driven by their anxieties about being in the world and a paranoid attitude in 
perceiving uncertainties.   
(e) Exclusivism 
The fundamentalists’ absolutist and supremacist view of religion also results in an exclusivist 
outlook towards the Other. Fundamentalists, it can be seen, are characteristically sectarian 
because they perceive others who do not agree with the position as threats or enemies to their 
existence. Tolerance is not a principle upheld by fundamentalists because their strong need to 
impose their monolithic view of religion on society. By viewing their interpretation of Islam 
as fundamentally superior to others, fundamentalists thus not only negate the complexities of 
Islamic history and traditions, but also aim to assert their views as the only way of 
approaching Islam.  
Almond et al (1995: 426) has this to say about the exclusivism of fundamentalists: “The 
separatism of the enclave is an important mode of fundamentalism, and it is also a form of 
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fundamentalist interaction with the outside world. This is true in two ways. First, 
fundamentalists are religious sectarians who build their enclaves with one eye on the 
threatening enemy… Hence fundamentalists calculate the height and strength and 
constitution of their walls according to their evaluation of the enemy’s invasive power. In this 
sense the enemy helps to determine the strategies of the fundamentalist.” Thus, 
fundamentalists depart from their conservative or traditionalist counterparts in the manner in 
which they seek to differentiate themselves and to impose their sectarian views upon the 
society in which they are a part of.  
Azhar (2014: 61), in his critique of the religious revivalists, also highlights the problem of 
their exclusivism in religion. He argues that “They usually demonstrate their prowess and 
efficacy not through intellectual sobriety and rigour, but through their emotive, biting rhetoric 
against their adversaries: the atheistic West, Zionists, nationalists, modernists, reformists, 
liberals, secularists and the like. Moreover their religious utterances, with strong legalistic 
expressions and commands, show a clear absence of emphatic and inclusive spirituality.” 
This is commonly found in the rhetoric championed by Muslim groups like ISMA in 
Malaysia and other groups in Indonesia, who project the Other not only as inferior in terms of 
religion, but as enemies of Islam.  
Fundamentalists have the tendency to practice what Susan Opotow (1990:1) terms as moral 
exclusion. According to Opotow, “Moral exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are 
perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness 
apply. Those who are morally excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or 
undeserving. Consequently, harming or exploiting them appears to be appropriate, 
acceptable, or just. This broad definition encompasses both severe and mild forms of moral 
exclusion, from genocide to discrimination.” 
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Opotow (1990: 2) further notes that “Moral exclusion can be mild or severe. Severe instances 
include violations of human rights, political repression, religious inquisitions, slavery, and 
genocide. The person or group excluded (“the other”) is perceived as a plague or threat, and 
harm doing can take such extreme forms as torture and death.” The act of Othering or 
excluding another from the fundamentalist in-group is a notable trait of fundamentalist, as an 
attempt at self-preservation and assertion.  
(f) Demonization of the Other  
Fundamentalists are shown to not only be intolerant, but also reactionary and antagonistic in 
their rejection of the Other, be it those from other religious communities, or those within their 
respective communities. The Other is perceived as a threat, and is demonized to prove the 
supremacy of the fundamentalists’ position on religion, morality and social hierarchy. Often 
times, the fundamentalist position is not defended by virtue of its moral and intellectual 
worth, but through outright demonization of the other. 
Fundamentalists, in their bifurcated view of the world, often define it in terms of “purity” and 
“pollution”. The Other is often projected in a dehumanized manner, using the language and 
rhetoric of threat and danger. As argued by Jones (2010: 104), the acts of demonization “is a 
useful political strategy because it allows social groups to caricature specific individuals or 
groups to such an extent that they appear less than human and thus not worthy of sympathy or 
emotion. This makes it easier to campaign against such groups, and encourages often radical 
action; demonization allows the group who demonize to deny commonalities and accentuate 
differences to such an extent that the demonized becomes non-human (Arens, 1980).” 
Demonization is thus a convenient act of dismissing the Other because it negates the 
necessity for dialogue and rapprochement. The Other is taken as a scapegoat for whatever 
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social ills that may occur, and simplified to represent a monolithic whole, rather than as 
complex entities.  
The correlation between fundamentalism and prejudice 
Allport (1955: 444) has noted the paradoxical link between religion and prejudice, in that 
religion “makes prejudice and unmakes prejudice”. He found that religion could either create 
prejudices in people, or that it could make them not prejudiced. He later found that prejudiced 
people tend towards an extrinsic form of religion, whereby one’s religious identity is 
determined in terms of one’s institutional affiliations and the external dimensions of religion. 
(Allport and Ross, 1967) Hunsberger and Altemeyer (1992) developed a more nuanced 
perspective on the link between religion and prejudice. They found that it is not religion per 
se which brings about prejudice, but a certain outlook on religion, notably the fundamentalist 
type. Laythe et al (2002) also found that religious fundamentalism is a predictor of prejudice. 
Prejudice has been shown to be correlated to fundamentalism through the traits of 
authoritarianism. (Hunsberger, 1995, Laythe et al, 2002) The trait of authoritarianism 
conditions people to be prejudiced and this has been found in several studies.  
As such, we can see that the abovementioned traits of fundamentalism relate very closely to 
the conceptualization of prejudice and the prejudiced personality. This means that the traits of 
the prejudiced personality can be used to help us better understand the problem of 
fundamentalism, especially through the trait of authoritarianism. It can be argued, therefore, 
that fundamentalists, by virtue of their psychosocial traits, tend towards prejudice. Although 
there are aspects of fundamentalism which do not involve prejudice, such as literalism and 
puritanism, it is in the interest of the study to focus specifically on prejudice as a dimension 
of fundamentalism. This aspect of fundamentalism has not been discussed enough, especially 
in the discussion of intra-Muslim sectarianism. Prejudice against the Other is a trait that is 
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commonly observed among religious fundamentalists because of their authoritarian, 
exclusivist and oppositional outlook of the world.  
Fundamentalists, because of their need to define themselves in oppositional terms, therefore 
behave in a prejudicial manner. In fact, this negative or oppositional means of self-definition 
is a common trait which can be observed in the voices who demonize other Muslims. In other 
words, the fundamentalists will proclaim their status of a true Muslim by virtue of themselves 
not being Shiite or not being liberal. The fundamentalists do not self-identify as 
fundamentalists. Some even see this term as pejorative, without admitting to the fact that they 
subscribe to the traits outlined above. This is why it is crucial to highlight and discuss the 
traits of the fundamentalist orientation, because the orientation has become prevalent among 
contemporary Singaporean Muslims, and also because those who display a fundamentalist 
outlook would not readily self-identify as such.  
It can be argued here that the fundamentalist orientation has become normalized. This can be 
seen in terms of how it has been reproduced across different levels in society, such as in 
social media, where many followers simply jump onto the bandwagon of demonizing the 
Shiite and liberal Muslims. The normalization process is also seen in terms of the dearth of 
public criticisms of such sentiments. The anti-Shiite and anti-liberal Islam demagogues often 
go about their hate-mongering unchallenged and unquestioned, and so this seems to easily 
justify such prejudicial behaviour.  
The following chapter will illustrate how prejudices are manifested through the anti-Shiite 




Chapter 4  
Expressions of anti-Shiite and liberal Islam sentiments in Singapore  
Chapter 4 focuses on the expressions of anti-Shiite and liberal Islam in the public discourse 
of Muslims in Singapore. This is where most of my research findings will be discussed and 
analysed. This chapter is broken into further segments, namely:  
(a) Expressions of anti-Shiism 
(b) Expressions of anti-liberal Islam 
A lot of the data can be found from Indonesian and Malaysian books, lectures, and social 
media websites, such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. However, similar views are echoed 
by Singaporean Muslims on social media, as well as in public talks and religious classes. 
Such sentiments echo the broader trends occurring throughout the Malay-Indonesian world. 
And it is these broader trends, which are reflected in the Singaporean context, that I am trying 
to capture in this study. These sentiments reflect the more recent manifestations of prejudices 
towards the Shiite and liberal Muslims.  
(a) Expressions of anti-Shiism 
There are numerous things said about the Shiites in the mainstream and social media which 
serve to demonize or overgeneralize and stereotype the Shiites. The differences between 
Sunni and Shiite creed and practices are taken to be a problem, instead of being accepted or 
tolerated. This is due to the unquestioning acceptance among most Malay-Muslims of the 
orthodox status of Sunni Islam, thus accepted as the in-group and Shiite Islam as the 
conspiratorial out-group. The in-group is asserted as the sole representative of Islam, while 
the out-group is rejected as deviant and a threat to be wary of.  
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In these portrayals of the Shiites, we find the prevalence of the prejudiced personality 
especially in its externalization and the dichotomization of the in-group and out-group. A 
general survey of the portrayals of the Shiites indicates that the Shiites are seen as the natural 
antithesis to the Sunnis in a taken-for-granted manner and that the irreconcilable theological 
and jurisprudential differences legitimize prejudice towards the Other. The theological and 
jurisprudential differences are not tolerated as a natural outcome of a complex historical 
development, but are constantly reiterated to clearly demarcate the in-group and out-group 
divide. The Shiites are also perceived as monolithic and unchanging, and there are no 
attempts to differentiate between the moderate and extremist Shiites. Crow (2005) argues that 
this is a negative legacy of the past where Sunnis tend to invoke the more radical doctrines of 
specific early trends within the Shiite movement and present them as representative of more 
moderate Shiite doctrinal beliefs. There is a tendency among the Sunnis to collapse views of 
the Imami, Zaydi and ghulat (extremist) Shiites into one common position labelled as the 
Rafidhah and thereby condemning them as doctrinally deviant. This legacy has thus been 
adopted by the more extremist Sunnis to delegitimize Shiism as a whole. There is no attempt 
to bridge the divide or even display a tolerance towards the complexities and diversity in 
Islam. This is related to the prejudice personality’s view of the world in a dichotomized or 
black-or-white manner. The Shiites are not only portrayed as wrong or misguided, but are 
also accused of trying to undermine Islam from within since they have broken away from the 
majority (jama’ah).  
Similar sentiments are being echoed by certain segments of Sunni Muslims in Singapore. By 
asserting the deviance or heresy of the Shiites, it indicates that the presence of diversity 
amongst Muslims is a source of threat. Videos and pictures of Shiite practices are circulated 
online to project Shiism as a strange and alien belief system, to the extent of it being out of 
the fold of Islam. Shiites are projected as an out-group through the emphasis on their 
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differences, rather than their similarities with Sunni Islam. A video of Singaporean Shiites 
having a majlis of prayers and ma’tam (chest-beating) at Bedok stadium was made viral in 
2015.
54
  When the video was made viral, there were calls made to the Office of Mufti 
inquiring about the matter and complaining to the authorities to take action against the 
Shiites.
55
 The Shiites are deemed as “kafir laknatullah” or “sesat” by many of the 
commenters on the video. Other comments include “Tuhan lebih tau azab apa yang akan di 
kirim buat mereka”56 and “Tidak percaya kpd Nabi Muhammad itu pesuruh Allah, malah 
cucu Nabi pulak yg dipuja, penganut Syiah ada lah kaum murtad kafir sesat yg bersekongkol 
dgn Yahudi @Jews ALkafirun Lakhnatullah”.57 Some of the commenters also urged for 
MUIS to look into the matter: “Astaughfirullah halazim... Rasullulah S.A.W tidak ajar 
macam gini... Muis tak buat sesuatu ke? Diamkan aje ke? Tolonglah Muis buatlah 
sesuatu...”58 and “muis tutup mata tak buat sesuatu ke atau muis pun seconkol dg shyiah. 
sekarang sudah banyak shyiah di singapura. muis tolang bukak mata.jangan ambil tak tahu 
aja. buat tindak kan segera sebelum terlambat.”59 This video was also widely circulated on 
other social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. For instance, Twitter user Ay 
Idzkie called the Shiite adherents in the video “ajaran sesat” and when another user 
expressed her shock and fear at the video, he claimed that “They even put Quran on their 
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 “Syiah di Singapore sedang rancak dengan mengadakan acara mereka” 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AEpNt5OW8_k accessed on 9 September 2016) 
55
 This was confirmed with me by a friend who is working at MUIS  
56
 Translation: God knows better how to punish them  
57
 Translation: Don’t believe in Prophet Muhammad as the messenger of God, but worships the grandson of the 
Prophet, the Shiites are a community of apostates, kafirs and deviants who ally with the Jews 
58
 Translation: May God forgive us… The Prophet did not teach this… Isn’t MUIS doing anything? Are they 
staying silent? Please MUIS, do something… 
59
 Translation: Is MUIS turning a blind eye by not doing anything or are they also in cahoots with the Shiites. 
Now there are many Shiites in Singapore. MUIS, please open your eyes. Don’t just ignore. Quickly take action 
before it’s too late 
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head”.60 Here, the user not only assumes that the Shiites are deviant, but that their practices 
are strange. Other social media users who shared this video warned other Muslims of the 
presence of Shiites in their midst and urged them to be wary of them.  
In another video on Youtube, it portrays a Shiite majlis where its adherents were doing the 
ma’tam (chest-beating) and singing some songs in praise of their Imams.61 The user who 
uploaded the video, presumably someone who is also anti-Shiite, warns the viewers not to 
follow the practice and that it is not Islam and that it perhaps originated from Christianity. 
While the practice itself is very commonly done amongst the Shiites and does not suggest of 
extremism, the comment section is generally filled with very negative and hateful responses. 
Many of the commenters used profanities to describe the Shiites or to express their disdain 
towards them. Some of these comments include: “Makin ramai puak syiah sesat ni! Mereka 
monyet ini sekarang berkumpul kat guillemard! Puak setan ni confirm masuk neraka! 
Awasilah anak2 kita dalam percampuran. Pastikan mereka belajar agama dimasjid, 
madrasah dan dengan asatizah yg diiktiraf MUIS”,62 “Syiah kafir dan di-laknat Allah, 
jauhkan diri dari anasir iblis ini. mereka ingin menuju ka-neraka jahanam, mengapa kamu 
mengikut”63 and “gua dah tahu semua ajaran sesat khinzir ni. yang paling dashat dia orang 
bila dah kena jam break pandai  BERmunafik pulak tu !!! Patut lah Allah letak neraka 
Jahanam yg paling bawah dan TERhina utk org2 munafikun ini. Tempat neraka tu lebih hina 
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 https://twitter.com/idzkieee/status/658337232495882240, accessed on 9 September 2016 
61
 “Syiah Singapore” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oCa4DMBjq4&app=desktop, accessed on 9 
September 2016) 
62
 Translation: There are more and more of this deviant Shiite tribe! These monkeys now gather at Guillemard 
(road)! This satanic tribe will definitely enter hellfire! Keep a watchful eye on who our children mix with. Make 
sure they learn religion at the mosques, religious schools and with religious teachers who are recognized by 
MUIS 
63
 Translation: Shiites are kafir (unbelievers) and condemned by God, stay away from these devilish elements. 
They want to enter hellfire, why do you follow? 
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dari neraka org non-muslim.”64 What is noticeable is that most of the voices are highly 
antagonistic of the Shiites, and there was hardly anyone who challenged such views or 
speaking positively of the Shiites. 
A local website in Singapore also demonstrates similar concerns about the presence of Shiites 
in Singapore. Shiites are perceived as disrupting the unity of Muslims in Singapore. It is 
stated on the website that “the key religious tenets of the Shiite sect is vastly different from 
that of the Muslims of the Ahlussunah Wal Jamaah, and the local status quo breeds confusion 
and conflict; in contradiction to the environment of religious harmony in Singapore.”65 It is 
notable here that the very presence of differences is perceived as a threat to religious 
harmony, as opposed to sentiments of intolerance and divisiveness. The website also claims 
that they “hope the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) would review its decision 
to recognize the Shi’ite belief as an acceptable variant of Islam.”  This clearly reflects their 
position as not accepting Shiism as a legitimate creed in Islam, and the recourse to MUIS as a 
source of institutional legitimacy in determining whether Shiism is to be accepted by the 
general Muslim populace or not.  
The website further elaborates on its anti-Shiite stance through its objectives. This includes 
“To reveal erroneous, confused and often deviant paths traversed by the Shi’ites by clear 
refutation of excerpts or articles from their own revered scholars based upon the Qur’an and 
Authenticated Sunnah along with the understanding and explanations of the Salafush Shalih” 
and “To caution Muslims about weak and fabricated narrations and doubtful historical 
sources which are used to create confusion, misinformation and to sow seeds of hatred 
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 Translation: I know all of the teachings of these deviant pigs. The worst is when they are “jammed break”,  
they are good at being hypocrites. It is no wonder that God puts the lowest and most condemned of hellfire for 
these hypocrites. That hellfire is worse than that of the non-Muslims.  
65
 http://www.shia.sg/, accessed on 4 October 2014 (This site has since been taken down) 
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towards key religious figures in the Sunni tradition.” This is a common prejudicial view of 
the Shiites espoused by Sunnis, though it can be presumed here that the administrators of the 
website adopts the Salafi orientation by making a reference to the Salafush Saleh (pious 
predecessors). Shiites are not only assumed to be deviant and misguided, but also hateful of 
Sunnis.  
We can also find similarly prejudicial views on the Singaporean Facebook group Melayu 
Singapura Tolak Syiah (Singaporean Malays Reject Shi’ism) where the presence of Shiites in 
Singapore is seen as a cause of concern since they disrupt the homogeneity of the Malay-
Muslims in Singapore who follow the Sunni-Shafi’i school. Again, uniformity is equated to 
unity, rather than understanding unity through a shared sense of brotherhood and solidarity. 
The rhetoric of threat to Muslim unity is thus used to rally Muslims together to confirm to a 
fixed set of dogmatic beliefs. In this group of over 1000 members, there is common style of 
parlance adopted to address the Shiites. These are comprised of stereotypes and caricatures of 
the Shiites, as well as their beliefs and practices. The same kind of alarmist language is also 
expressed towards the presence of Shiism in the local Muslim community. For instance, a 
member of the group claimed that “Shiites do not only antagonize the Sunnis, but they also 
endeavour to dismiss all the Islamic teachings brought by the Prophet (peace be upon him) 
and the companions from the pious predecessors. Do we have to remain silent and witness 
this cursed religion infiltrate Islam in our country today? SPREAD THIS!! BEFORE IT’S 
TOO LATE!!”66 
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 Translated from: Syiah bukan sahaja memusuhi ahlus sunnah, malah berusaha untuk membatalkan segala 
ajaran2 Islam yang dibawa oleh baginda Nabi a'laihi solatu wasallam serta para sahabat2 dari kalangan 
salafus soleh. Apakah kita harus mendiamkan diri dan menyaksikan agama laknatullah ini menusuk masuk 
dalam Islam di negara kita hari ini? SEBARKAN!! SEBELUM TERLAMBAT!!” 
(https://www.facebook.com/MuslimSingaporeTolakSyiah?ref=br_tf, accessed on 9 September 2016) 
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In this page, Shiism is often portrayed as an extremist and wayward religion, or even as a 
cult. Examples of extremist Shiite practices are shared with other members of the group as 
though it represents mainstream Shiism. For instance, certain rituals or excessive practices of 
cultish Shiite groups are taken as representative of Shiism as a whole. This includes the 
practices of self-flagellation and harm, praying in awkward positions and even consuming the 
faeces of the Imam. Such posts are met with predominantly negative responses, with the 
commenters expressing their hatred and disdain towards Shiism. Some mystify the Shiites, as 
though they are alien to Sunni Islam and for others, such posts reaffirm their existing 
misconceptions and prejudices about Shiism as deviant.  
Anti-Shiism in religious education is also expressed in modules concerning Aqidah or the 
doctrines of faith. In a course on Islamic thought in Singapore offered by the Al-Zuhri 
Institute, the Shiites are portrayed as a doctrine that is fundamentally at odds with Islam. The 
Shiite creed is deemed as deviant since it accuses the Prophet’s companions as kafir and this 
would bring the downfall of Islam since the companions led the community in spreading 
Quranic teachings, the Prophet’s sunnah and early history of Islam. 67 In the same lecture, the 
students are also warned of the spread of Shiism in Singapore, in the campuses and 
organizations. The Shiites are said to have a separate Quran (mushaf Fatimah). The lecture 
also cites from a Malaysian cleric, Dr Muhammad Uthman El-Muhammady, who warned that 
“this faith is silently expanding and that (Sunni Muslims) must beware so as not to follow 
their teachings because it destroys religion and it is a threat to national security.”68 The fact 
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 The lecture is for a module entitled “Pengajian Pemikiran Islam Di Singapura 2” at Al-Zuhri Institute in 
Singapore. The lecture slides can be downloaded online here: 
http://zuhri.com.sg/index.php?option=com_rokdownloads&view=folder&Itemid=110&id=3657:pengajian-
pemikiran-islam-di-singapura-2 accessed on 4 May 2017  
68
 Translated from: “Aqidah ini sedang berkembang secara senyap dan mesti berwaspada supaya Muslimin 
Ahlissunnah tidak terikut dengan ajaran mereka kerana ia memusnahkan agama serta menjadi ancaman 
kepada keselamatan negara” 
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that the lecturer of this module, a certain Ustazah Nek Mah Binte Batri, cites and presents 
such views in her lecture reflects her anti-Shiite leanings and the perpetuation of such views 
in a local private Islamic institution. Such views are actually quite commonly propagated in 
local religious classes in their discussion of the Islamic creed or in the discussions of the 
various sects and orientations in Islam. For instance, a public talk on the danger of Shiism 
(Bahaya Syiah) and on matters concerning the Sunni creed was given by Ustaz Fahrurazi 
Kiayi Kasim in November 2015.  Aside from that, books and popular readings overtly 
denouncing Shiism have also been found sold in local Muslim bookstores.
69
  
The extent of antagonism towards Shiism in the Singaporean context is not as externalized as 
that of the Malaysians. In other words, it has not been taken as an issue of national security 
and to the extent of persecution or violence. In the case of the Malaysia, the state clearly has a 
stake in the vilification of the Shiites. Nevertheless, the prejudices and the way these are 
articulated are similar to those among Malaysians and Indonesians. Although there are voices 
among the Sunnis in Singapore who articulate their hatred or prejudices towards the Shiite 
community by for example calling out against a kindergarten which was supposedly helmed 
by Shiites or had Shiite influence,
70
 the position of the Muslims here as a minority does not 
enable them to take further action against the Shiites. Nonetheless, it is quite noticeable on 
social media to see people warning others, especially youths, to be wary of the Shiites and to 
not be swayed by their beliefs. Others also expressed their desires for MUIS to take action 
against the Shiites, or to modify their fatwa on Shiism, but most of these sentiments are 
shared amongst contacts within the Muslim community, and not taken up as a national issue.  
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 For more discussion on anti-Shiism in Singapore, see “Bigotry in the Muslim backyard,” The Middle Ground, 
12 May 2017 (http://themiddleground.sg/2017/05/12/muslim-islam-shia-sunni-bigotry-shiism-divide-singapore/ 
accessed on 17 May 2017) 
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(b) Expressions of anti-liberal Islam 
In the Singaporean context, the prejudices of those against the liberal Muslims are articulated 
by reporting to authorities about the existence of so-called liberal Muslims in the local 
Muslim community. There is an expectation that the authorities would act in protection 
against religious deviance. Two letters were written to MUIS in 2009 to complain about the 
presence of liberal Islam in Singapore and later on shared on social media websites and 
blogs.
71
 The letter was written by a certain Faris Osman Abdat. In the first letter, he 
complained about Berita Harian’s promotion of a journal published by local progressive 
group, The Reading Group.
72
 He went on by claiming that the Reading Group promoted the 
writings of scholars such as Amina Wadud, Nurcholish Madjid and Khaled Abou El Fadl, 
individuals who were “either confirmed deviant or suspect in their understanding of Islam”. 
To him, the promotion of such ideas in Berita Harian showed that “Berita Harian is moving 
from merely misrepresenting Islam to now championing religious deviancy outright.” By 
addressing this letter to the Ministry of Muslim Affairs and to the then-President of MUIS, 
the author was seeking help from the authorities to take action against the so-called deviant 
group. The letter was also republished on another blog,
73
 whose owner, a local Muslim 
preacher by the name of Ustaz Zhulkeflee Haji Ismail, is a vocal critique of liberal Islam in 
Singapore. On his blog, he claims that “These “liberal” groups and individuals have been 
condemned as deviants, where Fatwa issued against many of them e.g. in Indonesia, Brunei, 
Egypt etc. The general Muslim masses may still be unaware of this, therefore his letter is a 
timely warning. Beware!” His endorsement of the letter reflects similar prejudices that he 
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 http://www.islamiq.sg/2014/03/liberal-islam-in-singapore-2nd-open.html, accessed on 9 September 2016 
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 http://www.islamiq.sg/2014/03/liberal-islam-in-singapore-1st-open.html, accessed on 9 September 2016 
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shares with the author of the letter towards liberal Muslims. The fact that these letters were 
made public reflects the intent of not only pinpointing the threat of liberal Islam, but to 
express the gravity of the purported threat.  
There is a tendency to associate liberal Islam with the support for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) rights. The prejudice against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
Muslims is often demonstrated online by its opponents, who claim to be defending Islam and 
Islamic morality. LGBT Muslims are also perceived as enemies of Islam and their presence a 
threat to the sanctity of Islam. The voices supporting LGBT Muslims are few and far in 
between. In 2014, a social media controversy against the LGBT community erupted, and 
voices denouncing liberal Islam also came to the fore. This started when an Associate 
Professor from the National University of Singapore, Dr Syed Khairudin Aljunied claimed 
that lesbianism and liberal Islam were said to be “cancers” which needed to be cleansed from 
society on his personal Facebook page. The post became viral, and he was soon heavily 
criticized for the homophobic sentiments. At the same time, he garnered massive support 
from the Muslim community and from several Muslim organizations, who saw him as a 
national “icon of Islam” for defending Islam from the supposed threat of lesbianism and 
liberal Islam.  
A snippet from his Facebook post, which is a response to a question on the development of 
liberal Islam and lesbianism is quoted here:  
“Liberal Islam, Lesbianism and the likes of it. 
Question: Dear Prof, could you share about what we should do with this 




Answer: We must adopt a comprehensive and systematic strategy in dealing 
which such phenomenon which would inevitably affect our children’s faith 
and social lives. 
Here are my recommendations: 
1) Scholars and religious teachers (asatizahs) must speak up and write 
against these ideologies and practices. They are obligated to explain to the 
public the true meaning of what Islam is and sexuality as defined by the 
Quran and Sunnah. When the scholars and asatizahs are silent about these 
issues, corruption will spread like wild fire. 
2) Parents and school teachers must be made aware of these challenges. 
They must detect early signs of waywardness from their children and 
students. Give advice, send them to proper religious classes and seek help 
from counsellors, if necessary. Win over the hearts of the misled youths and 
explain to them what is right with knowledge and wisdom. All social issues 
must be dealt with at home, if not, in schools. 
3) The youths must assist scholars, asatizahs, parents and teachers to spread 
the message of true Islam in all media platforms. They have the power of 
technology in their hands and could play the crucial role of alerting groups 
and movements that are spreading the ideologies of liberal Islam and 
lesbianism and all other ideologies. Make the pure message of Islam viral to 
cleanse the impurities of liberal Islam and lesbianism. 
Together, we will stop these cancers in their track!” (Nur, 2016: 961) 
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It is not clear how the link is made between lesbianism and liberal Islam, but it could be 
presumed that the antagonism towards liberal Islam is likely due to the idea that liberal 
Muslims are generally supportive of LGBT rights. Nur Amali Ibrahim, however, argues that 
“the link made between liberalism and homosexuality is a narrative construction that is born 
out of evangelical Christian history rather than from Muslim anxieties over the disruption of 
their social order.
74
 Similarly, an Islamic based websites which champions the Sunni creed 
and discusses deviant sects also claims that the bigger issue at hand is that of liberal Islam, 
rather than the LGBT members of the Muslim community.
75
 The link is simply drawn here to 
show how both out-groups are to be seen as deviant. The LGBT community is also portrayed 
as a threat to Muslims’ faith, and is even seen as a sign of the end of times, alongside 
“militant feminism”.76 The recent emergence of homophobia within the Muslim community 
has been manifested into the Wear White campaign, which seeks to address the so-called 
threat from the LGBT community.  
Portrayals on social media indicate a lack of understanding of what the liberal Other stands 
for. Popular knowledge about liberal Islam disseminated publicly is largely based on 
rumours, fear-mongering and oversimplification. Religious or theological arguments which 
point towards religious deviance are often used to incite fear amongst Muslims about liberal 
Islam.  For instance, Ustaz Zhulkeflee Ismail shared publicly on his Facebook page and 
website that liberal Muslims “are actually advocating a movement ‘to freeing the Muslims 
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 For a more in-depth discussion of the online controversy and the wider phenomenon of homophobia among 
Singaporean Muslims, see Nur Amali Ibrahim, “Homophobic Muslims: Emerging Trends in Multireligious 
Singapore”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2016  
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 “Rather than focusing merely on the LGBT issue, Muslims need to realize the bigger issue at hand; the liberal 
leanings and ideology that is currently reshaping our religion,”( http://www.islamiq.sg/2014/03/liberal-islam-in-
singapore-1st-open.html accessed on 10 September 2016)  
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 This was during a talk delivered by Ustaz Noor Deros entitled “Aqeedah and Ideological Trials of End 
Times”on 29 August 2015 at Masjid al-Ansar.. 
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from Islam’” and that “it is not a type of Islam”. By making such a claim, he is actually 
denouncing the liberal Muslims from the folds of Islam. There is no further clarification as to 
who these liberals were or what they stood for, but simply the notion that they were not true 
Muslims and should thus be feared.  
There are several Singaporean-based websites and social media pages which adopt an 
antagonistic outlook against the liberal Muslims. Most of these websites are about Islam and 
the Sunni creed, while some cover the more contemporary issues of interest to the Malay 
community. For instance, a popular site amongst Singaporean Malays, Rilek1corner.com, 
reflects the prejudices within the Malay community towards liberal Islam. It posts articles by 
writers who condemn or are suspicious of liberal Islam. In one article, the writer claims that 
“MUIS has a ‘grand strategy’ to move society towards liberal Islam”.77 The article is 
essentially criticizing the move made by MUIS’ then-President Alami Musa who was seen as 
veering the organization towards liberal Islam. The author claims that “It was a bold social 
experiment, probably done as a bulwark against terrorism against the backdrop of the JI 
arrests. There was clearly a movement to present a ‘version’ of Islam that is palatable to 
Liberal ideas. So a plan was established to use MUIS to push the Liberal agenda. No effort 
and money were spared. They got top Liberal ‘scholars’ to our shores – even Ali Asghar 
Engineer, the chap who coined the term Liberal Islam. Then scholars from Jaringan Liberal 
Islam from Indonesia was roped in, and MUIS even published a booklet filled with writings 
of Liberal scholars. Then Asatizahs doing their PhD were sent to a hub of Liberal Islam in 
Indonesia. Then MUIS came up with the 10 points for an ideal Muslim community, with 
ideas of secularism and pluralism being pushed. Then there was the tie-up with Hartford 
Seminary and sending MUIS officials there, presumably so that there can be ‘bridges of 
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understanding’ with the seminary. Isn’t the primary function of a seminary to train Christians 
to do proselytization? Is there no other place to send MUIS officials?” The wariness about 
MUIS endorsing so-called liberal scholars and their ideas reflect the sense of moral anxiety 
among those who oppose liberal Islam. They also reflect the fundamentalist exclusivism that 
Muslims should only be educated in traditional Islamic institutions of learning, since a venue 
like Hartford Seminary may tarnish the faiths of Muslim due to it being a Christian 
institution.  
Similar references made about MUIS’ stance on liberal Islam is made a Facebook page called 
Al-Makhazin SG.
78
 Al-Makhazin was founded by Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff, who had been 
detained by the Internal Security Department (ISD) in 2016 for his support for the Islamic 
State (ISIS).
 79
 He was also behind the earlier tudung controversy in 2002 and was one of the 
administrators of Fateha.com, which was controversial in terms of the concerns it raised vis-
à-vis the Singaporean government. The accusation of MUIS’ inaction towards liberal Islam is 
very telling of the prejudicial outlook towards Muslims of the liberal or progressive 
orientation. It is stated here that:  
“Mufti has made comments on the hijab issue. There's another issue that's 
the elephant-in-the-room that Mufti and MUIS is silent over. That is the 
issue of the poison of Liberal Islam. 
The issue of the tudong is very important, no doubt. Hence, the hive of 
activity on social media. But let us call a spade a spade. It is still an issue of 
fiqh. No Ulema of ahlus sunna ever declared not using one takes one 
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outside the fold of Islam. Only the khawarij would make such an outrageous 
stand. 
The Liberal Islam issue is totally different. It is an issue of Aqeedah. It can 
take one outside the fold of Islam. There has also been some discussion and 
awareness-raising on Social Media on the issue. A group Singapore 
Muslims Against Liberal Islam has been set up. Alhamdulillah, there is a 
lively exchange of ideas there. Even our Asatizahs have commented on the 
issue. 
Malaysia has issued fatawa against the poison of Liberal Islam. So has 
Indonesia. The Sultan of Brunei and the Ulema there has also come out 
strongly against these ideas. 
MUIS, however, is deafening in their silence. It is an 'open secret' that there 
are those in MUIS who have Liberal Islam leanings. Some are so bold as to 
write articles. And they have moved outside of academia. On the 
anniversary of 911 this year, they 'came out' - a bit like the Pink Dot 
movement - and joined the mainstream with an odious article on TODAY 
newspaper. One of the writers is an official from MUIS. The Muslim 
community is worried. There has been a growing cry for MUIS - and 
specifically the Mufti - to address the issue. 
Some weeks back, there was a khutbah (I believe the ibn Qayyim one) about 
the issue of fatwas being influenced by time and space. That a fatwa in, say 
Malaysia, may not be valid as the conditions may be different in Singapore. 
82 
 
My view is that this is a disingenuous way of side-skirting the issue. Yes, in 
issues of fikh, there could be reasons why spatio-temporal conditions play a 
part in making fatwas. For example, a fatwa on HDB Joint Tenancy would 
be only relevant in Singapore. Issuing such a fatwa would be pointless in 
other countries. 
However, the issue of Liberal Islam is an issue of Aqeedah. In Aqeedah 
issues, it should be the same whether you are in Singapore, Malaysia, 
Brunei... even on the moon. If Singapore has been 'innoculated' from the 
poison of Liberal Islam, then MUIS must explain why this is so. If not, then 
we strongly urge MUIS - and our Mufti - to make their stand clear. The time 
of skirting about the issue is over. 
MUIS could be 'chained' because of their previous associations with people 
of Liberal persuasions. Let us not look back. Let us look forward. 
Couragously make a strong stand now on Liberal Islam. And we move on 
from there. 
I look forward to Mufi and MUIS making their stance clear on Liberal 
Islam.” 
There is a Facebook group which opposes liberal Islam called Singapore Muslims Against 
Liberal Islam.
80
 It has over 2000 members. In this group, articles and Facebook postings 
which denounce liberal Islam are regularly shared. Its members often discuss the worrying 
trend of the growth of liberal Islam within the Singaporean community, as well as the trends 
in neighbouring countries, Malaysia and Indonesia.  
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A vocal critique of liberal Islam, a religious teacher by the name of Abdul Halim Abdul 
Karim, has this to say on his Facebook page:  “The liberal muslim will not give up on 
misleading the ummah by their mantras.” He also claims that “The thinking that Islamic 
jurisprudence is "common-sensical" often espoused by liberal muslims destroys Islam from 
within because they pervert the idea of the Qur'anic injunction to think. They jump from the 
Qur'an enjoining us to think to the idea that we can then decide for ourselves jurisprudential 
rulings based on our "common sense". Any beginner student of Logic knows that common 
sense is not and may indeed contradict sound thinking. What these liberals are actually 
advocating is that jurisprudential rulings and its acceptance be decided by vain desires 
disguised as thinking.” He then went on to demonize the liberals by saying that, “In the end it 
is clear these liberals are like Iblis himself who do not want to fully submit to Allah's swt 
commands.”81 His criticisms of liberal Muslims tend to overgeneralize them. He presumes 
that those who disagree with certain interpretations of Islam are merely doing it out of 
arrogance or personal interests. He also demonizes Muslims who adopt a more rational and 
independent thinking towards Islam.  
Most of the anti-liberal Islam sentiments in Singapore are expressed online and via social 
media. There have not been many public discussions on the subject, though sometimes the 
subject may be deliberated in more detail in private religious classes or in certain circles.
82
 In 
a public talk which aimed to warn Muslims about the dangers of liberal Islam
83
, the 
moderator talked about how Iblis was the “first liberal” because he questioned God’s order to 
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bow down to Adam at the point of his creation. By likening liberal Muslims to the Devil, he 
was effectively demonizing them, by using the stereotype of liberals as people who gave 
primacy to the faculty of reason. He even claimed that liberals are those who “worship their 
reason”. It was certainly an act of fear-mongering as well, since Muslims generally perceive 
Iblis as the greatest enemy and traitor to God.  
In the same talk, ideas on liberalism and secularism are claimed to be “belief systems 
spreading like cancer.” To the speaker, Ustaz Zhulkeflee Haji Ismail, “non-traditional” or 
“secular” approaches to learning Islam are seen as truncation in the way Muslims understand 
their traditions, heritage and identity. Notions of freedom and individualism are perceived as 
drawing Muslims away from their Islamic identity. Secular education is also seen to be 
dichotomizing the minds of young Muslims and the speaker also expressed his concern about 
how many religious teachers imitate and adopt the methods of secular education. To him, 
secular education is not Islamic and not conducive to Muslims. In the same vein, he also 
accused “Orientalists” and academics dealing with Islam as having a low regard for Islamic 
teachings. To him, “elites, intellectuals and progressives” who are liberal-minded re-
introduce Mu’tazilite ideas through scepticism in Islamic beliefs. Mu’tazilites are commonly 
known here to be deviant. The exercise of reason is often viewed suspiciously by religious 
conservatives, due to their authoritarian and black-and-white understanding of Islam. The 
exercise of reason may undermine the absolutist certitude that they hold to the faith, and 
liberal Islam is thus seen as having the power to weaken that certitude. To the speaker, for 
instance, the act of questioning and the use of scepticism tend towards opposing the faith and 
the legitimacy of revelation.  
The second speaker, who is Abdul Halim Abdul Karim, gave a talk entitled “Responding to 
the challenges of liberal Islam”. Liberal Islam is depicted as an ideology that is a grave 
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source of concern. The speaker defines liberal Islam as the emergence of Muslims who argue 
against established teachings of Islam, by reinterpreting, manipulating, misrepresenting the 
Quran and Hadith to serve agendas. Liberal Muslims are also seen to be undermining the 
aqidah or faith of Muslims and evading akhlak or Islamic ethics. Liberals are also said to 
undermine the legitimate religious authorities of Islam including Prophet Muhammad. They 
are also labelled as the “enemy within” since they are groomed by Orientalist thinkers to put 
down Islam. The main concern about liberal Islam, as expressed by the speaker, is that it aims 
to overturn whatever is established in the Islamic tradition. Hence, liberal Muslims are 
perceived as enemies from within or as a threat because they are undermining the authorities 
of mainstream or Sunni Islam.  
The speaker then went on to identify the so-called principles of liberal Islam. However, what 
he referred to as these principles were simply just the principles adopted by Indonesia’s 
Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) which they outlined on their website. It was as though JIL was 
the main spokesperson of the liberal Islam bogeyman that he tried to warn the audience 
about. Some of the principles of JIL that he tried to refute include the “openness to all forms 
of intellectual exploration on all dimensions” and the emphasis on religious pluralism. To 
him, it was not possible to be open to all forms of intellectual exploration because that would 
mean granting primacy to reason, which was not possible since reason is limited. He also 
used verse (3:7) from the Quran to show how liberals are seeking to cause dissension (fitnah) 
in religion by seeking to give their own interpretations, as opposed to abiding by the 
established ones. On the subject of religious pluralism, the speaker vehemently denied it as he 
understood the concept as the maintenance of equal validity of all religions. There was no 
attempt to clarify where he obtained such a definition, or whether there were other definitions 
of this concept. His aim was simply to assert the supremacy of the truth espoused by Islam, 
and that was to be an unquestionable fact.  
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The speaker also went on to assert that contemporary issues faced by Muslims are being 
hijacked by the liberal Muslims in Singapore. They are seen as Muslims who have an agenda. 
However, there was no attempt at discussing who these so-called liberals were and what their 
agenda was. The liberals are often portrayed as having an “agenda”, but it is never articulated 
what this so-called agenda was. They are simply accused as trying to undermine the authority 
of the traditional ulama and that they are championing Western notions of freedom and the 
primacy of reason. To the speaker, being a liberal Muslim is a paradox, since the pursuit of 
freedom or in his terms, “freeing oneself from Islam”, was an act of rebelliousness. The 
notion of hypocrites was also attributed to the liberals, despite claiming that the Prophet 
refused to identify them during his time.  
During the talk, nobody questioned or tried to challenge the problematic portrayals of the 
liberal Muslims. It was as though the fear-mongering and demonization of the liberal 
Muslims was acceptable to the audience, who mostly comprised of young people in their 20s 
and 30s. Since it was in my interest to observe how the liberal Muslims were talked about 
publicly, I refrained myself from questioning the speakers. I also noted some positive 
remarks about the talk later on social media, which meant that many people were indeed in 
agreement with the speakers. This is what I am attempting to capture in this study, which is 
the prevalence and normalization of prejudiced views about the intra-Muslim Other.  
Such portrayals of the liberal Muslims, as exemplified by the two speakers during the talk, 
reflect the popular understanding and prejudices towards liberal Muslims. There is a tendency 
to not identify who these people usually are, aside from Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) as the 
most obvious target, given their self-identification as liberals. Thus, there is a heavy reliance 
on stereotypes and oversimplification, due to the lack of understanding of what the liberals 
stand for. There is also an overarching tendency to homogenize the liberals as a monolithic 
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whole, rather than understanding them as a spectrum of orientations and competing ideas. 
The liberal Other is perceived as a bloc, as though it is a sect with its own embedded theology 
and jurisprudence. There is no attempt at trying to properly contextualize and comprehend the 
multiplicity of views amongst those who are perceived as liberal or progressive in their 
thought orientation. The main aim is to project the liberals as a deviant enemy from within, 
and to warn and curb the Muslim populace, especially the youth, from the “cancerous” 
influence of liberal thinking. Ideas championed by liberal or progressive thinkers are seen as 
contaminating Islam, and hence it becomes a religious imperative to cleanse society of such 
contaminants. This is fundamentally an attempt at safeguarding the status quo and 
maintaining the position of the self-appointed custodians of Islam within the community.  
Anti-liberal stereotypes and prejudices are also sometimes conveyed in local religious 
classes. In the same abovementioned lecture at the Al-Zuhri Institute which denounces 
Shiism, the lecturer identified certain elements of what are seen as liberal Islam thought. This 
includes rejecting Islam as the only religion of God, rejecting the purity of the Quran, 
rejecting Prophet Muhammad as the final prophet, and rejecting and distorting Islamic law. It 
is not clear where such ideas about the liberals originate from, though they clearly are 
misrepresentations and oversimplification of what liberal and progressive Muslim thinkers 
stand for. Such portrayals of liberal Islam give the impression that the liberals are out of the 
fold of Islam, or that they are inherently against Islam because the liberals supposedly do not 
subscribe to the fundamentals of Islam. The negative definition of liberal Islam, i.e. outlining 
what liberal Islam is supposedly against as opposed to what it stands for, is also used to 
exclude them from the mainstream.  
All of the examples illustrated in this chapter demonstrate the prejudices among 
contemporary Malay-Muslims. These prejudices point to deeper problem of the 
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fundamentalist orientation, which is becoming more evident amongst Singaporean Muslims. 
The traits of fundamentalism that shape these prejudices include oppositional and reactionary 
outlook, exclusivism and the demonization of the Other. This is seen in terms of the 
exclusionary and antagonistic attitudes projected towards Muslims who are perceived as 
deviant. The so-called deviant Muslims are excluded from the mainstream Muslim 
community through fear-mongering, caricaturing and misrepresentation, but they are also 
perceived as threats to the community and hence to be wary of at all costs.  
Such an antagonistic view of the Other reflects an absolutist and dualistic outlook on religion, 
whereby only one’s interpretation is deemed as correct while all others are not only 
unacceptable, but also antagonizes one’s position. The dualistic outlook, which is 
demonstrated in terms of the “us against them mentality” (West against Islam, Sunni against 
Shiite, mainstream against liberal, liberals against traditional ulama) posits that the out-group, 
by virtue of not being in accordance with the in-group, is inherently at odds with the in-
group. The idea that varying interpretations may co-exist does not occur to those who have 
such an outlook on religion. In other words, if A does not agree with B, A must certainly be 
against B, and so B should reject A. Such an antagonistic outlook on the Other and this 
preoccupation with defending oneself against the supposed enemies of Islam reflects clearly 
the fundamentalist orientation, which has become normalized within the Muslim community. 
This is in line with the siege mentality or threat orientation that fundamentalists have, 
whereby the world outside of its in-group is seen as dangerous and is against them. Thus, in 
the case of the anti-Shiite and anti-liberal Islam prejudices, the very fact that these two groups 
of Muslims differ from the norm or mainstream warrants enough anxiety from the 
fundamentalists. The presence of differences challenges the absolute certitude and stability 
that fundamentalists seek in their religious lives.  
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The exclusivism of the fundamentalists is clearly reflected in terms of how the Other is 
perceived and rejected. The sense of exclusivism is also reflected in terms of how the in-
group is negatively defined vis-à-vis the Other; in other words, I am a Sunni Muslim because 
I am not Shiite, or because I am not a liberal. The boundaries of self-definition are laid out 
very explicitly and the fundamentalists thus endeavour to maintain them in order to maintain 
a sense of purity of Islam. Aside from seeing the Other as contaminants to the purity of one’s 
faith, there is also a fear of pluralism from within the religion. In fact, one of the greatest 
sources of anxiety towards the liberals is the latter’s endorsement and promotion of pluralism, 
be it amongst religions, or from within a particular religion. For those of the fundamentalist 
orientation, pluralism poses as a threat because it seems to put all religions or all 
denominations on the same level, thus undermining the hierarchy of truth claims that they 
seek to establish. The hierarchical way of ordering society reflects the fundamentalists’ 
authoritarian and supremacist understanding of the religion. The Other is not to be seen as an 
equal, but to be seen as a threat and excluded from one’s monopoly of truth.  The deference 
to the authorities in seeking to curb the spread of these so-called deviant brands of Islam also 
reflects the fundamentalists’ authoritarian posture.  
The demonization of the Other is clearly evident in the way the Other is presented and 
articulated about. The language of threat or enmity that is employed is an effective tool in 
rallying mass support for the fundamentalist cause. That the liberals are painted as hypocrites, 
a cancer or likened to Iblis is an act of demonization. They are not only to be seen as deviant 
for various reasons, but as enemies from within and to be feared, hence the comparison to 
Iblis. That the Shiites are also seen as hypocrites or kafir, is also an act of demonization, to 
dehumanize them and make them appear as a bogeyman to the mainstream Sunnis. When the 
Other is demonized as such, there is no need to draw bridges and engage with the Other, 
because the Other is not seen as being of any benefit to oneself. It is also an aspect of the 
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fundamentalist orientation which is anti-intellectual in nature, thus the Other is simply 





Analysis: The manifestations of the prejudiced personality and its correlation to 
religious fundamentalism  
Manifestations of the prejudiced personality 
In this chapter, we return to Allport’s conception of the prejudiced personality, which is used 
here to support the argument that the increasing visibility of prejudices is attributed to the 
fundamentalist orientation among Singaporean Muslims. As discussed in Chapter 1, some 
key traits of the prejudiced personality as discussed by Allport include moralism, 
dichotomization, a need for definiteness, externalization of conflict, institutionalism, and 
authoritarianism. (Allport, 1955: 397) Some of the traits of the prejudiced personality, 
namely authoritarianism, institutionalism and the need for definiteness will be discussed here 
to help us further make sense of its connection to the problem of fundamentalism amongst 
contemporary Malay-Muslims. I will conclude this chapter by discussing how prejudice, and 
its connection to fundamentalism, is founded upon an underlying sense of insecurity, as 
exemplified through what Allport and Newcomb (1952) terms as the “threat orientation”.  
Authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism underlies the prejudiced personality. Authoritarianism is also a crucial trait 
of the religious fundamentalist worldview. (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Hunsberger 
1995) As seen in the examples given in Chapter 4, the sense of threat to the existing 
authorities reflects the authoritarian tendencies of those who are opposed to Shiite and liberal 
Islam. One of the main negative stereotypes of liberal Islam is that it is against the authority 
of the traditional ulama due to the emphasis given to critical reasoning and the questioning of 
established traditions. To those with the authoritarian outlook, the mere act of questioning the 
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ulama is almost like an affront to Islam itself. However, it can be argued that what the 
progressive and liberal Muslims oppose is the authoritarianism in religion and the monopoly 
over truth claims by certain groups of Muslims. The trait of authoritarianism, as found within 
the prejudiced personality, can be thus used to understand the fundamentalist orientation as 
well.  
The traditionalist religious elites, or those who claim the status of ulama, when empowered 
through various means to control religious deviance and monopolize over the interpretation 
of Islam, reflect authoritarian and exclusivist tendencies. Both authoritarianism and 
exclusivism are pertinent characteristics of the fundamentalist orientation. This is very much 
the case in Malaysia and Indonesia. The curbing of deviant teachings is legitimated through 
various fatwas and then disseminated through public discourse (e.g. seminars, sermons, 
classes, think tanks, universities, publications, mass media and social media). The assertion 
of monopoly of interpretation, through legal means and having the power to persecute and 
outlaw (e.g. through fatwas and book-banning) deviance indicates the authoritarianism of the 
religious elites. The centralization of the religious bureaucracies is largely responsible for the 
creation of “exclusivist Islam” in the hands of the official ulama, where they are given the 
authority to delineate, define and promote what they deemed as “true” Islam. (Norshahril, 
2014: 360) The exclusivism of the Malaysian religious elites, which is bolstered by 
authoritarian mechanisms, cuts across their orientations. (Norshahril, 2016: 9) Such is the 
case in Indonesia as well, where the MUI assumes its role as the custodian of orthodoxy, has 
increased its preoccupation with the policing of religious deviance. (Feener, 2014; Olle, 
2009) The authoritarianism of the elites contributes towards greater exclusivism, as they seek 
to assert greater control over the Muslims, hence justifying the prejudices towards the intra-
Muslim Other.  
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In Singapore, although the religious elites do not have the same amount of power to police 
religious deviance, they may share similar ideas and attitudes about the intra-Muslim Other 
by referring to discourses from Malaysian religious elites and preachers and introducing them 
through religious classes and public lectures. There have also been instances whereby certain 
religious elites articulated the desire to implement more control over what they saw as 
religious deviance. In the discussion about the role of the Asatizah Recognition Scheme 
(ARS) to recognize qualified and legitimate religious teachers, the President of Pergas and 
member of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) Ustaz Hasbi Hassan demanded that the 
ARS have more “fangs” (taring) to assert over religious teachers with deviant or unorthodox 
(ganjil) views.
84
 There was also a call by Ustaz Jakfar Embek in 2007 for there to be a 
stronger political will (iltizam politik yang lebih tegas) to combat deviant and liberal beliefs.
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This echoes a similar assertion made by Ustaz Embek Ali in combating deviant teachings in 
the 1990s to form a committee at the national level to curb the spread of such teachings.
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Authoritarianism is often entrenched through the political system, and one way for it to be 
inculcated is through the educational institutions. Religious education, too, is not divorced 
from ideological battles, especially where it is seen to be a legitimate site for the inculcation 
of religious truths. Here, I am not simply referring to universal truths and values propounded 
by all religions, but I am more interested in looking into the contestations by the various 
groups vying for representation of such truths. Religious education is not neutral, and the 
ideological leanings of the proponents from various organizations and institutions thus shape 
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the way certain religious truths are to be expressed and inculcated. It is crucial to note that 
religious curriculum is not free from ideological contestations.
87
 Beginning with such a 
premise, we can argue henceforth that all education is inherently ideological. In the context of 
religious education, it is related to the construction and maintenance of those who proclaim 
orthodoxy, pitted against those whom they would then define as heretics.  
Several studies on Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia have noted what Fromm  
would term as authoritarian ethics (as discussed in an earlier chapter) and practices in Islamic 
education. Such themes are also reflected in studies of Islamic education in Muslim societies 
elsewhere, and this can be said to be one of the greatest impediments to development of 
progressive thinking in Muslim societies. For instance, in the Indonesian context, Tan (2011: 
121) cites from Rusydy Zakaria, a former policymaker at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 
Indonesia, who claims that “The form of teaching is characterised by one-way direction in 
which the teacher is a dominant party, the teacher is the only owner of knowledge and a 
student is an “empty box” to be filled. The learning process occurs in the narrative way in 
which a teacher gives a teaching instruction that needs to be accepted and memorised by 
students in order to pass their examinations. This “Banking Concept of Education” has 
significant consequences, not the least being a strong barrier against developing critical skills 
and creativity in students. As a result, most graduates from Islamic schools have lacked self-
confidence and are unable to create a valuable response in term of resolving their daily 
problems.” The over-reliance of the teacher as the primary source of knowledge and the 
uncritical regurgitation of such knowledge means that the students are likely to internalize 
and reproduce their prejudices as well.    
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Tan also finds that this dominant approach towards Islamic education in Indonesia deprives 
students of the opportunity to learn about other traditions and worse, they may be susceptible 
to indoctrination of extremist views in a situation of ideological totalism. (Ibid, 125) This 
occurs when teachers are dogmatic in their approaches, and as citing from Zakiyuddin 
Baidhawy, she notes that teachers teach “their own systems of religion or belief as the truth 
and the only path to salvation and regarding other religions as inferior”. Such an approach 
also leaves the students ignorant of and uninterested in other people’s religions, does not 
dispel the misunderstandings and mutual suspicion of other religions, and fails to prevent 
existing religious conflict and violence. (Ibid, 127) 
Hefner (2009) echoes similar problems from the Malaysian context. He finds that due to the 
standardization of Islamic education in the national schools, the curriculum and education 
materials generally provide one-sided and parochial views on various themes related to Islam 
and society. He draws from the example of the portrayals of gender roles and responsibilities 
vis-à-vis Islam, which are generally patriarchal, exclusivist and undermine the public statuses 
of women. This does not consider at all the increasing numbers of women pursuing higher 
education and high posts in public. (Hefner, 2009: 130) Hence students are expected to learn 
the problematic interpretations on gender roles without receiving any exposure to the 
diversity of interpretations in the Islamic tradition. Furthermore, their ability to think 
critically on such issues is severely stunted through memorization from the same textbooks 
and regurgitation in standardized tests. Such an approach not only over-simplifies the 
richness of Islamic traditions, but also stultifies the continued development and production of 
knowledge. Given that most students would receive their formal religious training in the 
national schools, such an education system would later affect the way they view religious 
issues, and also lead them to internalize and perpetuate the biases of the dominant 
conservative voices.  
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The authoritarian approach towards religious education is related to the increasing 
Islamization of the Malaysian state. Norani Othman (2003) discusses the problem of 
authoritarianism which has intensified with the encroachment of Islamizing tendencies in 
public institutions. She argues that “Islamization affects the prospects for democracy in all 
these Muslim nation-states not because there is any intrinsic contradiction between Islam and 
democracy but because the resurgent movements of political Islam do not (or perhaps refuse 
to) recognize the intellectual prerequisites of reactualizing shari’a principles with democratic 
trajectories in the modern world…” (Norani, 2003: 24) An example of these anti-democratic 
tendencies is the prevalence of the “ISA mentality” which “permeates the thinking of the 
Islamic bureaucracy in their attempts to safeguard the integrity and faith of Muslim citizens 
in Malaysia. Authoritarian and punitive measures in Islamic matters are often justified in the 
name of ‘upholding the faith of Muslims in Malaysia’.” (Ibid, 127) Due to the centralization 
and standardization of Islamic education, it is unsurprising that such a mentality also shapes 
the curriculum and pedagogical approach.  
The illustration of the regional context above reflects the type of religious education found in 
Singapore as well. In the Singaporean context, some of the greatest concerns related to the 
full-time madrasahs relate to their survivability and the safeguarding of its authenticity and 
autonomy. (Azhar, 2006: 97) This has severely neglected the need to question its 
fundamental aims as well as the problems of its dualistic philosophy of knowledge, which 
dichotomizes “religious” and “secular” knowledge. Furthermore, backed by a reactionary 
attitude by the proponents of the Islamic resurgence against the supposed threats of 
secularism, this dualistic paradigm persists unchallenged. This crisis mentality has overridden 
the concern for a serious evaluation of the current madrasah curriculum and pedagogy (Ibid, 
96). The emphasis on the survival of the madrasah as a bastion of Muslim religiosity in 
secular Singapore, and other threats to Muslim identity and morality can be understood as a 
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form of a “threat orientation”. As we had discussed earlier, Allport (1955: 396) highlights this 
“threat orientation” as one of the key factors explaining authoritarian tendencies and 
prejudice towards the out-groups. As such, the pedagogical approach in the madrasahs is 
more apologetic and conservative rather than reformist, hence perpetuating the ideological 
biases of its key proponents.  
Similar attitudes about the aims of Islamic education here have been replicated by the private 
institutions as well. Some have adopted the Islamization of knowledge approach propounded 
in the International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIUM), and have started offering 
programmes on Islamic science, economics and psychology.
88
 Another example would be the 
Andalus education institute introduced in the early 2000s, but have branches proliferating all 
over the island now. Although they claimed on their official website that they would expose 
students to different schools of thought in Islam,
89
 in my own experience and observation of 
the courses offered, there was little or no space for alternative and critical viewpoints to be 
cultivated. In fact, students have been warned of certain alternative viewpoints on Islam, and 
courses are offered to train students on how to guard their hearts and minds from such 
influences.  
For instance, in modules pertaining to the subject of Aqidah or the Islamic creed, it is very 
common for teachers to identify in a black-and-white manner Muslim sects and orientations 
which are deemed as deviant as a means of affirming the validity of the Sunni creed. Rather 
than explaining why the Sunni creed is supposedly the only valid sect, teachers opt to show 
why the others are deviant by virtue of their theological, jurisprudential and ritualistic 
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differences from the Sunnis. There is no room for understanding of why these differences 
arise, or a critical evaluation of such differences. Hence, for instance, the Shiites are deviant 
because they believe in the 12 Imams or that they combine their obligatory prayers into three 
sessions per day. The liberals, usually exemplified by Indonesia’s Jaringan Islam Liberal 
(JIL) or Malaysia’s Sisters in Islam (SIS), are labeled as heretical because they support 
freedom of religion and women’s rights. The liberals are also likened to the deviant 
Mu’tazilites due to their emphasis on the use of reason in interpreting Islam. However, there 
is no further clarification or deliberation as to why such values are seen as inimical to the 
Islamic creed. The aim of such Aqidah courses are thus simply to reinstate the supremacy of 
the Sunnis and to undermine the diversity of views and practices within Islam. There was no 
room for questioning, and students would generally graduate from these courses with a 
narrower outlook on the Islamic creed and tradition. Such an education system thus enables 
the students to perpetuate and normalize the prejudices of their teachers.  
I was personally following the Andalus Institution’s Diploma in Islamic Studies programme 
and was once required to attend a two-day symposium on the role of the Quran in the 21
st
 
century. Unfortunately, the symposium adopted a predominantly apologetic and defensive 
outlook against the supposed threats of modern hermeneutics, liberal thinking and contextual 
approaches to reading the text. There was no further discussion after that and the students 
were then required to answer some examination questions based on the symposium. Such 
attitudes are thus further exacerbated by the over-emphasis on examinations and also the 
modular system, which does not allow time for in-depth inquiry and reflection to be 
developed. This perpetuates an anti-intellectual learning environment which does not bode 
well for the development of pluralistic approaches towards thinking and learning.  
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I had also personally experienced the implications of an authoritarian religious education 
system. During an examination on the subject of Aqidah, a question was posed to me as such: 
“Mengapakah golongan Syiah, Islam liberal dan Ahmadiah sesat?” (Why are the Shiites, 
liberal Muslims and Ahmadiyyahs deviant?” This seems to suggest that the deviance of these 
groups is a matter of fact and that it is only normal and expected to perceive them as deviant. 
The question also does not seem to require a discussion on the validity of the assumption of 
these groups’ deviance. Moreover, the fact that it is being used as an examination question 
implies that there has to be a right answer, which aims to affirm the rightness of the 
question’s basic premises. My response to the question was to challenge its problematic 
fundamental assumptions, and to which I was eventually rewarded with a C+.  
Penalization through the bad grade indicates the strong need to homogenize religious views, 
and in this case, by taking advantage of modern disciplining tools such as the examination 
and grading system. The ideological biases of the teacher were simply normalized and 
unquestioned through this system, which clearly rewards homogeneity of thought and 
punishes critical ideas. Ethical concerns in approaching differences, rational thinking and 
attention to factual accuracy were never put into consideration. This approach silences people 
into accepting oppressive behaviour and renders them impotent in combating the forces of 
bigotry. Even though some of these classes allow for group discussions, the dominant 
prejudices about the intra-Muslim Other remains entrenched and unchallenged. They do not 
equip Muslims with the ability to deal with new questions and face diversity through its 
emphasis on the unquestioning acceptance of knowledge. Prejudicial thinking also becomes 





Institutionalism and the need for definiteness 
In the context of this study, the need for certainty or definiteness has been expressed through 
the desire for institutional backing in dealing with the deviant Other. This is also tied to the 
authoritarian outlook, which is highly reliant on the authorities to determine what is 
acceptable or not in the society. The recourse to MUIS and authorities, as seen in the 
articulations of those who oppose to the presence of Shiites or liberal Muslims, reflects the 
sense of institutionalism. This is often reflected in lamentations or questions over the role of 
MUIS in addressing this concern over religious deviance. It is expected that MUIS should do 
something to curb the spread of Shiism and liberal Islam. MUIS is generally still accepted by 
Singaporean Muslims as the central authority of Islam, and whenever there are problems 
within the community, MUIS is required to adopt a stance. It is thus a source of worry to 
those who are prejudiced towards Shiism and liberal Islam when MUIS does not seem to take 
a strong stance against these two deviant groups of Muslims, or when MUIS is seemingly 
“infiltrated” by liberal Muslims. Some of the commenters who oppose Shiism even suggest 
that MUIS might be on the side of the Shiites, since they seem silent on the matter. Such 
distrust towards the role of MUIS in handling concerns within the Muslim community is 
often articulated online via social media platforms, such as on a Facebook group called 
Singapore Muslims for an Independent MUIS.
90
 This distrust is often attributed to the 
assumption that MUIS is being co-opted by the State and therefore losing its legitimacy as a 
source of authority for Muslims.  
There are thus competing claims for Islamic authority among Muslim organizations in 
dealing with the issue of Shiism and liberal Islam within the local community. MUIS has 
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been cautioned by a former MP against being swept by modernity and liberal Islam due to its 
proposal to have women leaders in mosque committees.
91
 Such a view reflects the anti-
feminist stance amongst certain segments within the community, who still see women as a 
source of slander or sexual temptation (fitnah) and thus seeing such a move as a basis of 
liberal Islam.
92
 In fact, the increasing visibility of fundamentalism among Singaporean 
Muslims has seen the continued silencing of the voices of women in the contestations within 
the community. (Suzaina, 2005: 130) Other Muslim elites and organizations also contribute 
to the perpetuation of anti-liberal Islam sentiments, by claiming that Singaporean Muslims 
are not only faced with the problem of religious extremism and terrorism, but also liberalism. 
In a forum organized by al-Istiqamah mosque and the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) 
which counsels and educates terrorist detainees on Islam, Muslims were cautioned against 
liberal Islam, who are “those who want to practice a simplified version of Islam, or trivialize 
Islam”. The speaker, Ustaz Haji Ali Haji Mohamed, also claimed that liberal Muslims include 
those who give interpretations of the Quran based on their own whims without consulting the 
experts; allowing the hajj to be performed anytime, or allowing women to become Imams.
93
 
These are clearly stereotypes about liberal Islam, but they are used to stir anxieties within the 
community about Muslims who are so-called deviant. The competition for authority in 
dealing with Shiism and liberal Islam is also expressed during Pergas’ Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) in 2015, when Ustaz Pasuni Maulan expressed his concerns over MUIS’ 
inclusivity, and thus their inability to curb the spread of Shiism and liberal Islam.
94
 Such 
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attitudes among the religious elites and organizations in Singapore thus lend credence to the 
fundamentalist mode of thinking, which sees the Other as a threat that is to be stopped.  
The recourse to religious authority and institutions reflects a desire for definiteness in 
navigating one’s religious life. The need for certainty is very evident among those who are of 
the fundamentalist orientation.  Brandt and Reyna (2010: 722) argue that “fundamentalism 
provides a sense of closure and certainty and that prejudice helps protect the certainty 
fundamentalism provides. This proposition suggests that fundamentalism may serve an 
underlying motivational function (i.e., the need for epistemic certainty) that many humans 
face (see also Hood et al., 2005; Pargament, 2002).” They also find that fundamentalists 
protect threats to this certainty by excluding and otherwise discriminating against groups that 
appear to violate their beliefs. (Ibid, 2010: 715) It could be argued that the fear or 
ambivalence towards the use of reason in religion, which is a trait attributed to the liberal 
Muslims, threatens the fundamentalists’ need for certainty in religion. The presence of 
differing views within Islam also threatens the certainty and absolutism that the 
fundamentalists seek in their religious life. This hence perpetuates the idea that the liberals 
cause confusion among the Muslims.
95
 Similar things have been said about the Shiites, who 
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Insecurity and the turn towards fundamentalism 
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Allport argues that the prejudiced personality is 
conditioned by what is called a “threat orientation”, meaning that insecurities underlie this 
personality. These insecurities are founded upon fears that one has “of his own 
consciousness, of change, and of his social environment” and also a sense of “ego-alienation, 
longing for definiteness, for safety, for authority.” (Allport, 1955: 396) The threat orientation, 
as argued by Newcomb, is expressed through a sense of defensiveness towards the out-group. 
A growing sense of insecurity and the need for certainty explains the turn towards 
fundamentalism among contemporary Malay-Muslims. This sense of insecurity, as 
demonstrated through the “threat orientation” can be seen in terms of how the Shiite and 
liberal Muslim Other is seen as a source of threat to one’s faith or aqidah.  
There is a link between fundamentalism and insecurity. For instance, Moaddel and 
Karabenick (2008: 1682) find that “the feeling of existential insecurity that is said to enhance 
in-group solidarity and the mistrust of outsiders (Inglehart, Moaddel and Tessler 2006; Maehr 
and Karabenick 2005) may also promote religious centrism and fundamentalism.” This sense 
of insecurity is tied to the need for certainty that was discussed earlier. This need for 
certainty, which is shaken in the presence of those who have differing views from the in-
group thus perpetuates prejudices. Prejudice also protects the fundamentalist system. (Brandt 
and Reyna, 2010: 716) Thus, the idea that other Muslims, such as the Shiites and liberal 
Muslims, are threats to the faith of Muslims points to the threat towards one’s worldview. 
The supposed “faith” of Muslims actually refers to one’s religious worldview, which in this 
case is fundamentalist and absolutist in nature.  
In the context of the mainstream Sunni Muslims today, the insecurity stems from the 
increasing diversity of views and interpretations of Islam, which is therefore seen as a threat 
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to the traditionalist religious elites. The presence of diversity means that there will be more 
voices challenging that of the establishment, and therefore seen as a source of discord within 
the community. This is especially pertinent in an environment where Muslims generally have 
not been exposed to diversity from within Islam. As such, Singaporean Muslims are generally 
quite ignorant about Shiism and other sects within Islam. This makes them more susceptible 
to internalizing and perpetuating the prejudices about the Shiites. 
The anxieties of the elites with regards to growing diversity from within are thus projected 
upon the Muslim masses, hence perpetuating a sense of threat orientation amongst the 
Muslim community, through the idea that it is being infiltrated by alien sects and ideologies. 
This phenomenon has to be seen in light of maintaining the status quo of the Sunni Muslims, 
as well as the role of the self-appointed custodians of Islam. The status quo here refers to the 
title of ASWJ, and those who claim to represent it claim authority over the true and authentic 
interpretation of Islam. It can thus be argued here that the issue here is not so much about 
what true Islam means, but who possesses the monopoly of truth claims and the production of 
Islamic knowledge in society. As pointed by Quraish Shihab (2007: 29), the problem is not 
with the mere existence of diversity, but with the quest for monopoly and control of truth 
claims.  
The traditionalist religious elites have a role to play in contributing to the rise of exclusivist 
and prejudicial attitudes towards the intra-Muslim Other. The traditionalists dominate the 
practice and interpretation of Islam in Singapore. As argued by Norshahril (2010: 172), 
“Traditionalism is manifested in the lack of engagement in alternative ideas and opinions 
before arriving at the selected judgment deemed absolute and complete. As reflected in the 
attitude towards the ‘Other’, it is dismissive of opinions that differ from those upheld without 
justification or reasoning. Hence, discussions on the ‘Other’ remain very shallow and 
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superficial. Labels are passed unthinkingly towards the ‘Other’ and hence dismissive. 
Without any discussion of new ideas and a more comprehensive understanding of an issue 
including problems and ramifications of views expounded, very little attempts towards 
reform can be initiated. The religious elite are quick to label the ‘Other’ unthinkingly, 
resulting in the ‘Other’ being categorized, stereotyped, depersonalized, and negatively 
evaluated (Pieterson 1997: 347).” Such an attitude towards the Other or those who differ 
from the mainstream clearly reflects the dominant orientation of the Muslim religious elites 
in Singapore.  
Since the 1970s and 1980s, the traditionalist religious elites in Singapore have been 
preoccupied with asserting the one true brand of Islam, hence inculcating a sense of alarmism 
or fear towards those accused of ajaran sesat or deviant teachings. An approach by MUIS to 
streamline the diversely oriented religious organizations in Singapore is through the 
establishment of the-then Department of Missionary Activities (JHD: Jabatan Hai’ah 
Dakwah) in April, 1974. (Mariam, 1990: 132) The emphasis on curbing the spread of ajaran 
sesat or deviant teachings is thus “an attempt to exclude competing variants and at the same 
time assert one’s claim to authority.” (Ibid, 127) Mariam also finds that “Most of the 
discourse aimed at legitimating the authority of the ulama and denying the right of the 
individual interpretation works by talking about alternative presentations of Islam and their 
associated practices as enemies of Islam, supposedly out to waylay Muslims and often 
associated with Satan’s work.” (Ibid, 127) Even up till as recent as 2010, the preoccupation 
with eradicating ajaran sesat was still visible within the Muslim community.
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Such an attitude towards Muslims who differ from the mainstream has thus been sowed since 
then. There were already calls to curb Shiism in Singapore in the mid-1980s when the youth 
organization Himpunan Belia Islam (HBI) converted to Shiism, and in a seminar by the 
Jabatan Hai’ah Dakwah in 1986, Shiism was also identified as one of the deviant teachings 
in Islam.
98
 The alarmist language of the threat of the intra-Muslim Other has also been 
employed to delegitimize other groups, such as the anti-Hadith or Ingkar Sunnah groups in 
the mainstream media. These groups were portrayed as disbelievers who were bent on 
destroying Islam from within.
99
 Such an approach towards inculcating in the masses has been 
continuing since then, and such ideas are still propagated in religious classes today.  
The desire to extend the notion of deviance towards liberal Islam has been articulated since 
the 1990s, when Singapore was undergoing rapid modernization, and Westernization was 
seen as a source of moral anxiety. Such anxieties were echoed by local religious clerics in 
their attempt to curb the spread of Western or alien ideologies. For instance, in an article in 
Perdaus’ magazine, Takwim (issue 1/1995), a cleric called for a more comprehensive 
definition of heresy – one which would include adherence to any human ideology that goes 
against Islamic doctrines. (Mohamed, 2012: 10) The cleric claimed that heretical beliefs and 
practices that were detected and reported were isolated cases, whereas a bigger danger was 
identified as lurking in the form of such ideologies as secularism, materialism, liberalism and 
movements demanding women’s rights. (Ibid, 10) 
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Although once in a while, we have the religious elites speaking up about the issue of diversity 
within the community,
100
 Muslims here are generally not equipped with the necessary skills 
in engaging with differences. There is a strong fear of deviance and deviating from the 
mainstream, so evidently many Muslims would shy away from developing their personal 
ideas and interpretations on Islam. Muslims here generally simply defer to the religious elites, 
even if the latter might be promoting problematic notions of the Other. This thus makes the 
Muslim populace more susceptible to accepting the prejudices established by the religious 
elites. Aside from the lack of exposure to intra-Muslim diversity, there is also a sense of 
insecurity about the presence of diversity within the community. The overarching emphasis 
that ummah has to be united and harmonious becomes a call for homogenization and 
uniformity of thought and practice instead. As articulated by some of the religious elites, the 
presence of deviant teachings poses as a threat to harmony in the community
101
 and that the 
propagators of such teachings were paid by the enemies of Islam to divide the Muslims and 
destroy the Islam’s reputation.102 
The prejudices towards liberal Muslims also demonstrate the Muslims’ ambivalences or 
insecurities vis-à-vis modernity, secularism and pluralism in the context of democratic 
nation-state. It is a more recent development, since the period of the 2000s. Liberal Islam 
seems to undermine status quo by its very thought orientation which validates openness to 
critical inquiry, freedom of conscience and pluralism of ideas.  This goes against the 
traditionalists’ pre-existing ambivalences towards the use of reason in religion, which also 
contributes to the fundamentalists’ anti-intellectual and absolutist stance. The openness 
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towards religious pluralism also threatens the absolutist understanding of religion adopted by 
the fundamentalists. Liberal Muslims, who are deemed as secularized and therefore 
Westernized, are seen as not siding with the cause of mainstream Muslims, who should be 
rejecting Western and liberal values. Liberal Islam is also seen as an affront to the traditional 
ulama, due to the critical stance adopted by liberal and progressive thinkers about dominant 
or pre-existing interpretations on various subject matters. This was the same criticism used by 
the proponents of anti-liberal Islam in Singapore, who claim that liberal Muslims have no 
respect for the ulama and are arrogant in their promotion of critical and independent thinking. 
The promotion of absolute deference to the traditional ulama when it comes to religious 
matters reflects an authoritarian and absolutist stance on religion, which thus cultivates a 
prejudicial outlook towards those who are seen as threats to the authority.  
Malay insecurities in Malaysia and its effects on Singaporean Muslims  
In Malaysia, the intra-Muslim Other is seen as a source of threat to the Malays. This reflects 
the growing sense of political insecurity in the predominantly Malay leadership, which is 
expressed in religious terms. The complex interplay between Islam and Malaysian politics is 
an on-going phenomenon since the period of Islamization from the 1970s. The current wave 
of anti-Shiism across various levels of the Malaysian political and religious elite has to be 
understood in light of the on-going Islamization of the nation-state, whereby only Sunni 
Islam of the Shafii school is to be privileged. The anti-liberal Islam sentiments also have to 
do with the need to control the brand of Islam that is to be dominant, and the liberal Muslims 
are seen as threats due to their challenge of the established versions of Islam as propounded 
by the state. Aside from constant vilification in various Islamic seminars, lectures and 
sermons, liberal Muslim scholars such as Ulil Abshar-Abdalla had also been barred from 
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giving lectures in Malaysia.
103
 There was also a fatwa passed against Sisters in Islam, 




In the case of the discrimination and persecution of the Shiites, the political and religious 
elites in Malaysia consider the Shiites to be threats to Muslim unity, as well as national 
security. By perceiving Shiism as different from the orthodoxy or even out of the fold of 
Islam, some propagandists of anti-Shiite rhetoric posit Shiism to be a threat to the unity of 
Muslims. A common perception portrayed in the media is how Shiism would undermine the 
unity of Muslims as it is different from the Sunni majority. The Shiite history of breaking 
away from the majority is emphasized upon. It is evident here that diversity within Islam is 
not to be tolerated.  
In the Malaysian context, the so-called “Muslim” unity is to be understood in terms of Malay 
unity. UMNO sees the growth of Shiism as dividing the Malays. Before 1979, the largest 
Shiite community in Malaysia was of Indian origin. However, there has been an increasing 
number of Malays converting to Shiism since then. Another reason for UMNO's concern is 
that the Shiites are regarded as supporters of its main Malay political rival, PAS, the 
Malaysian Islamist party. Rumours have spread that Shiism has infiltrated PAS and that some 
                                                          
103
 The controversy surrounding this ban from Malaysia has been covered in the media quite extensively. See for 
example: “No entry for ‘deviant’ Indonesian Islamic scholar Ulil Abshar, says Zahid Hamidi,” The Malay Mail, 
12 October 2014  (http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/no-entry-for-deviant-indonesian-
islamic-scholar-ulil-abshar-says-zahid-hami, accessed on 20 December 2016, “Malaysia slaps ban on liberal 
Muslim scholar,” The Australian, 18 October 2014, (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/malaysia-
slaps-ban-on-liberal-muslim-scholar/news-story/4ebe1271767ae396a919bef185fa85d2, accessed on 20 
December 2016), “Malaysia bans Indonesian Muslim scholar Ulil from seminar on radicalism,” Jakarta Globe 
(http://jakartaglobe.id/news/malaysia-bans-indonesian-muslim-scholar-ulil-seminar-radicalism/, accessed on 20 
December 2016) 
104
 The fatwa can be found here: http://www.muftiselangor.gov.my/fatwa-tahunan/pewartaan/2010-terkini/362-
fatwa-pemikiran-liberalisme-dan-pluralisme-agama (accessed 18 April 2017). Sisters in Islam has since 
challenged the fatwa in court. See their press statement, “Sisters in Islam  challenges fatwa on pluralism and 




of its leaders have converted. Such stories are without foundation, but the fact that PAS and 
its state government in Kelantan have opposed the anti-Shiite drive is regarded as adequate 
evidence of Shiite sympathies by some. (Gee, 2013) 
Given the perception of the Shiite threat to Muslim unity, it also becomes perceived as a 
threat to national security. This view is pertinent in Malaysia and is constantly reiterated in 
the media. Sectarian issues in the Middle East also influence such sentiments, with the Shiites 
being seen as the culprits in causing death and terror towards the Sunnis. For instance, Mufti 
of Perak Harussani Zakaria claimed that whatever was happening in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and 
Lebanon was caused by the Shiites.
105
 According to him, the Shiites made it obligatory to kill 
and so having Shiites in Malaysia would cause chaos and strife. Here, the Shiites are depicted 
as murderous and are thus to be feared.  
In another article, it is said that the spread of Shiism (as likened to that of a virus) would not 
only threaten the Islamic faith and law, but would also affect the harmony of the Sunnis in 
Malaysia.
106
 According to the Assistant Secretary of the Home Ministry, in the Department of 
Security and Public Order, such a situation would cause distress and affect the unity of the 
society. In Malaysia, Shiism is treated as a national security concern. Now, 11 out of 14 states 
have enforced the fatwa banning Shiism in Malaysia. The UMNO youth wing in Kedah has 
also lodged a police report upon receiving information of a Shiite gathering in Pendang, 
Kedah. Such action has been legitimized by the Chief Minister of Kedah, who said that the 
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spread of Shiism can damage Islam, cause the breakdown of families, topple the government 
and create disunity and killings like what is happening in other countries.
107
  
At the collective level, the abovementioned anti-Shiite rhetoric represents the prevalence of 
the prejudiced personality. As mentioned earlier, underlying the prejudiced personality is 
“threat orientation”. The anxiety surrounding the supposed threat of Shiism reflects not the 
anxiety at the level of the masses, but at the level of the elites in Malaysia. As mentioned 
earlier, the growth of Shiism is seen as potentially dividing the Malays. The threat orientation 
stems from internal insecurities among the Malay-Muslims about the position of the 
orthodoxy in light of a growing diversity in orientations of Islam. There are more voices now 
asserting their views on Islam and its place in society, so those who have been used to 
claiming orthodoxy are worried that their position might be jeopardized. In Malaysia, this 
reflects the growing diversity in the Malay electorate. It is also related to the competing 
Islamization tactics between the ruling party UMNO and the opposition PAS. By outlawing 
and demonizing Shiism, UMNO is seen as the rightful defender and protector of Islam and 
Malay rights.  
What is noteworthy here is that there are Singaporean Muslims who have adopted a similar 
language of threat towards the Shiites and liberal Muslims. If the Muslims in Malaysia are 
rallied to support the existing authorities through the presence of supposed enemies from 
within, why are Singaporean Muslims also adopting a similar trajectory, despite the differing 
socio-political contexts? This is something that needs to be looked into more deeply. It can be 
seen that many Singaporean Muslims consider Malaysia to be an important source of 
influence when it comes to Islamic knowledge, and given the proximity between the two 
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countries, it is understandable that whatever happens in Malaysia will have its repercussions 
in Singapore. Thus, it can be argued that Singaporean Muslims, especially the Malays, share 
a similar religious orientation as their Malaysian counterparts, and that the turn towards 
religious fundamentalism is a notable phenomenon amongst the Muslims within the region.  
Bruinessen (2013) also notes this phenomenon in his study of Indonesian Muslims. He finds 
that that a “conservative turn” had taken place in mainstream Islam by 2005, and that “the 
modernist and liberal views that had until recently found relatively broad support within 
Muhammadiyah and NU were increasingly rejected… Many ulama and other Muslim leaders 
appear preoccupied with the struggle against “deviant” sects and ideas.” (Bruinessen, 2013: 
3). He also points that “the clearest expression of the conservative turn” was the “Sipilis” 
fatwa which demonized Muslims who advocated for secularism, liberalism and pluralism. 
(Ibid, 4) It is not known if the fatwa had a direct impact on other Muslims in the region, but it 
certainly has been referred to as a legitimating source in the vilification of liberal Muslims in 
Singapore and Malaysia.  
As discussed in an earlier chapter, it is important to note the regional influences in shaping 
the fundamentalist orientation among Muslims in Singapore. Despite having different socio-
political contexts, Muslims in the region still share similar insecurities vis-à-vis the Other. 
Although these insecurities are expressed in religious terms, i.e. the threat to one’s faith, it 
would be insufficient to view this issue solely through the religious or theological lens. The 
problem of fundamentalism goes beyond religious scriptures and dogma. One’s religiosity or 
attitude towards religion is shaped by a complex interplay of religious, as well as socio-
political and ideological factors. As seen in the examples found in this study, the insecurities 
of the elites due to challenges to their authority often gets trumpeted to the masses and gets 
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reproduced.  It is thus in the need to maintain the supremacy of the in-group that prejudices 




















In this chapter, I will summarize the key points in each chapter and discuss the possible 
contributions of this study. I will also discuss how this study can be developed further for 
future research purposes.  
Summary of key points 
In this study, I have attempted to discuss the intra-Muslim prejudices, specifically towards 
the Shiite and liberal Muslims. This study aims to make sense of the phenomenon of 
prejudice and how it operates from within the Muslim community. I would like to point that 
the phenomenon has become prevalent and normalized within the Muslim community, 
because such ideas can be found in various circles and are constantly reproduced from by 
laypeople. It is not just the elites who play a role in disseminating prejudicial ideas about the 
Other. Furthermore, the absence or lack of voices which challenge the prejudices demonstrate 
how normalized they have become. As illustrated in chapter 1, I point that the problem of 
anti-Shiite and liberal Islam prejudices points to the growth of the fundamentalist orientation 
among Singaporean Muslims. This is publicly reflected through what is being said about the 
Other, and how the Other is caricaturized. I chose to look at public expressions of such 
sentiments because they reflect how visible these prejudices have become.  
In chapter 1, I had also illustrated the context to which the prejudices against the Shiite and 
liberal Muslims arise. I have looked into the regional influences, namely from Malaysia and 
Indonesia, which cannot be discounted. The manifestation of anti-Shiite and liberal Islam 
prejudices has escalated more intensely in these two countries, such as the violence against 
the Shiites in Indonesia and the persecution of the Shiites by the state in Malaysia. There 
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have also been fatwas which denounce liberal Islam from the folds of Islam from both 
countries, which serve to justify such prejudices. In Singapore, despite the absence of 
violence or persecution committed against the Shiite and liberal Muslims, the kind of 
articulations expressed about these groups of Muslims is very similar as that from the 
neighbouring countries. A similar type of language is used to denigrate the Other, and they 
share similar anxieties about the presence of the Other. I have also illustrated in this chapter 
the sources of such sentiments, which include certain scholars, writers and preachers, as well 
as the mass media, notably from Malaysia and the Indonesian Hang 106 FM radio station. 
Social media also plays a significant role in influencing the views of Singaporean Muslims, 
where preachers who actively promote such bigotry often have a mass following from 
Singaporean Muslims as well. I also discussed the role of Salafism, which is an orientation in 
Islam known for its intolerance of differences and especially in its vilification and rejection of 
Shiism. The Salafi orientation has become more widespread amongst Muslims in Malaysia, 
for instance, through education and bureaucratic system which has been filled by graduates 
returning from Saudi Arabia, which is the main exporter of the Salafi/Wahhabi ideology. In 
Singapore, there are mosques and private religious institutions which expound Salafi 
teachings through their teachers. They also sometimes invite preachers from Malaysia and 
Indonesia to give lectures here.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the literature and approaches that have been adopted in the study of 
religious fundamentalism. I demonstrated the need to adopt a social psychological 
perspective to help us better understand the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, 
especially within the Muslim context. Not much has been talked about with regards to 
religious fundamentalism as a religious orientation among the Muslims, and so this study 
seeks to fill that gap. As I had pointed in the first chapter, the problem of fundamentalism 
among the Muslims here is to be understood through prejudice. Many studies have been done 
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to show the correlation between religious fundamentalism and prejudice, but not many looks 
specifically into the Muslim context. 
In Chapter 3, I attempted to develop the theoretical framework for the study, which rests 
upon the concept of prejudice. The problem of prejudice is tied to the broader phenomenon of 
religious fundamentalism, which is exemplified through its dominant traits.  I concluded this 
chapter by discussing how religious fundamentalists are predisposed to prejudice, especially 
through the trait of authoritarianism.  
Chapter 4 lays out the expressions of antagonistic sentiments towards Shiite and liberal 
Muslims. Prejudice towards these so-called deviant Muslims are broadly expressed publicly 
especially via social media, where Muslims have more freedom to articulate their hatred 
towards the Other. Though it may be argued that social media sentiments may sometimes be 
exaggerated or cloaked beneath the veneer of anonymity, it nevertheless is a good reflection 
of the kinds of anxieties shared within a significant population of the Muslim community. 
The fact that the anti-Shiite and liberal Islam views have a resonance within the Muslim 
community here indicates that they do share those prejudices. I concluded this chapter with 
the discussion on how the expressions of the anti-Shiite and liberal Islam sentiments reflect 
fundamentalist tendencies, through the traits of an oppositional and dualistic outlook and the 
demonization of the Other.  
Chapter 5 goes back to the problem of the prejudiced personality and its connection to 
fundamentalist religious orientation. To make sense the prejudiced personality and its 
manifestation through the anti-Shiite and liberal Islam sentiments in Singapore, we look into 
a few of its pertinent traits. One of which is authoritarianism, and in this study, I have 
demonstrated it through how knowledge is disseminated within the Muslim community. In 
this case, it is the authoritarian nature of religious education which shapes the dominant 
117 
 
thinking about the Other. An authoritarian type of education is when knowledge is 
transmitted from the teacher to the student in a one-way fashion. Rote learning is a crucial 
aspect of an authoritarian type of education. The student simply memorizes what has been 
taught and later reproduces it through regurgitation. The emphasis on examinations and the 
grading system further entrenches the authoritarian mode of education. Critical thinking is 
thus not emphasized in this type of education system and so students are generally not 
equipped with the skills of independent inquiry, and what more to question their teachers. 
This is especially pertinent in the context of religious education. Questioning of the religious 
teachers is generally frowned upon and is seen as a lack of adab (proper etiquette) on the part 
of the student. I have demonstrated how this type of education is prevalent in the religious 
institutions in Singapore. This means that students too will internalize the prejudices of their 
teachers and reproduce them. The predominance of this type of education also means that 
students are not exposed to diversity of traditions within the Islamic tradition and so they are 
unable to embrace diversity in a positive light. 
The trait of authoritarianism is also linked to the traits of institutionalism and the need for 
definiteness. Here, I discussed how the recourse to institutions such as MUIS, by writing 
letters to MUIS and calling out for MUIS to adopt a stronger stance against religious 
deviance reflects this tendency towards institutionalism. This trait of institutionalism, which 
is tied to authoritarianism, exemplifies the prejudiced personality’s need for definiteness. 
This very much ties to the fundamentalist orientation as well, which sees the sense of 
certainty as an important aspect of one’s religiosity. It can be argued that the fear of diversity 
within the Muslim community is attributed to this need for certainty amongst the 
fundamentalist Muslims.  
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Finally, I argued, consistent with Allport’s discussion of the prejudiced personality, that at the 
heart of a prejudiced outlook lies an underlying sense of insecurity. A growing sense of 
insecurity, both political and religious, and the need for certainty explains the turn towards 
fundamentalism. This sense of insecurity, as demonstrated through the “threat orientation” 
can be seen in terms of how the Shiite and liberal Muslim Other is seen as a source of threat 
to one’s faith or aqidah. I demonstrated how the insecurity has its roots in one’s socio-
political context, and that this rhetoric of the threat to one’s faith actually reflects a sense of 
threat to one’s religious worldview, which in this case is fundamentalist in nature. Socio-
political insecurities, which are largely constructed and peddled by the elites, are expressed in 
religious terms, as though implying that it is Islam that is under siege. What is threatened, 
however, is actually the authority of those in power, as shown in the Malaysian context.   
Contributions of this study 
This study aims to shed light on the fundamentalist religious orientation, by specifically 
going into the question of prejudice. As I had demonstrated earlier, prejudice is a significant 
dimension of fundamentalism, since fundamentalism, especially through the traits of 
authoritarianism, exclusivism and the demonization of the Other, becomes a predictor of 
prejudice. While most of the studies of Muslim fundamentalism look into its political 
dimensions, it is hoped that this study shows how visible and prevalent fundamentalism has 
become, even in secular Singapore. Fundamentalism, as discussed through the problem of 
prejudice, has not been talked about within the Muslim context, and this is an area through 
which this study seeks to contribute.  
It is also hoped that this study will help to shed more light on the dynamic complexities of the 
Muslim community, in terms of the dominant religion orientations, as well as the voices who 
seek to assert their influence within the community. As I had pointed out earlier, despite 
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being a numerically small community, Islam in Singapore is also not detached from the 
broader intra-Muslim dynamics, and such influences have played a crucial role in shaping 
how Islam is lived and understood within the Muslim community in Singapore. It is too 
simplistic to assume that Singaporean Muslims are all harmonious and tolerant, or even 
monolithic, because although the prejudices have not escalated to the extent of violent 
conflicts due to the secular nature of Singaporean society as well as how the state manages 
religion, sectarian thinking and bigotry still exists and plays a significant role in shaping the 
religious orientation of Singaporean Muslims.  
The boundaries between the in-group against the out-groups are clearly demarcated along the 
lines of religious orientation and sectarian differences, and it is in the interest of those 
maintaining the boundaries to ensure that the general populace does not overstep them. This 
is to ensure the maintenance of the status quo, in which the in-group projects itself as 
representing mainstream or normative Sunni Islam, while the out-groups represent religious 
deviance due to their differences from the norm. The status quo, as maintained by the elites, 
represent those who get to monopolize over the truth claims of Islam. These boundaries, as 
discussed in the earlier chapters, are maintained through the propagation of prejudiced 
sentiments towards the Other, by not only constructing the Other as deviant, but as enemies 
or threats to the faith itself. The presence of the Other is crucial in determining how the self is 
perceived, and in the case of the anti-Shiite and liberal Islam sentiments, the self is portrayed 
as being under siege because of the presence of the Other. This siege mentality is expressed 
through the sense of alarmism and anxiety that the Other is slowly encroaching into the 
mainstream community, and tarnishing the purity of mainstream Sunni Islam.  
The prejudices towards the Other also informs us about the in-group, rather than the out-
group. As such, the oppositional attitude towards the Other can be seen as reflecting the 
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growth of a particular type of Islam in Singapore, specifically that of the fundamentalist 
orientation. Thus, it is also hoped that this study will contribute to the on-going discussion of 
the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, in terms of its dominant traits, and how they 
relate to the problem of prejudice. So far, there has not been any study which employs the 
concept of prejudice to discuss the link between fundamentalism and intra-Muslim 
sectarianism. The traits of fundamentalism which are tied to prejudice, such as the 
oppositional and reactionary outlook, exclusivism and demonization of the Other, are useful 
in helping us understand how sectarian sentiments are manifested in society. As I had argued 
earlier, fundamentalism, as a religious orientation, has become normalized in many Muslim 
societies, including Singapore. This means that although the Singaporean Muslims might be 
limited in terms of their quest to establish an Islamic state, they nevertheless have adopted a 
similar type of thinking when it comes to viewing diversity from within the religion. This will 
have repercussions in terms of how the community will forward as a whole, as Singaporean 
society in general becomes more pluralistic.   
Further research 
It is hoped that more research can be done to further explore the problem of sectarianism and 
religious fundamentalism within the Malay Muslim community, as well as how geopolitical 
dynamics from within the region and elsewhere shape the development of Islam in Singapore. 
Research topics enquiring into the reasons why contemporary Muslims view the Other as 






Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2001), Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic law, Authority and Women, 
Oxford: Oneworld  
Adorno, Theodor W. et al (1950), The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper & Row 
Adian Husaini (2009), Virus Liberalisme di Perguruan Tinggi Islam, Gema Insani  
Adian Husaini (2009), Liberalisasi Islam di Indonesia: Fakta, Gagasan, Kritik dan 
Solusinya, Gema Insani 
Ahmad Fauzi (2016), “The Extensive Salafization of Malaysian Islam,” Singapore: ISEAS- 
Publishing 
Al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib (1978), Islam and Secularism, International Islamic 
Thoughts and Civilization 
Alatas, Syed Hussein (1972), Siapa yang Salah, Singapore: Pustaka Nasional 
Alatas, Syed Hussein (1979), Kita dengan Islam: Tumbuh Tiada Berbuah, Singapore: 
Pustaka Nasional 
Alatas, Syed Hussein (1968), “Feudalism in Malay Society: A Study in Historical 
Continuity,” Civilisations, Vol. 8, No. 4 
Allport, Gordon W. (1955), The Nature of Prejudice, Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 
Pub. Co.; Boston: Beacon Press 
122 
 
Allport, Gordon W. (1968), The Person in Psychology: Selected Essays, Boston: Beacon 
Press  
Allport, Gordon W. and Ross, J. Michael (1967), “Personal Religious Orientation and 
Prejudice,” Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, Vol. 5, Issue 4  
Almond, Gabriel A., Sivan, Emmanuel and Appleby, R. Scott (1995), “Explaining 
Fundamentalism,” in Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott (Eds.), Fundamentalisms 
Comprehended, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Almond, Gabriel A., Sivan, Emmanuel and Appleby, R. Scott (1995), “Fundamentalism: 
Genus and Species,” in Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott (Eds.), Fundamentalisms 
Comprehended, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Altemeyer, Bob and Hunsberger, Bruce (1992), “Authoritarianism, Religious 
Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice,” International Journal for the Psychology of 
Religion, Volume 2, Issue 2  
Altemeyer, Bob and Hunsberger, Bruce (2005), “Fundamentalism and Authoritarianism,” in 
R. F. Paloutzian & C. L. Park (Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality, 
New York, NY: Guilford 
Antoun, Richard T. (2008), Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic and Jewish 
Movements, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Arens, William F. (1980), The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropagy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press  
123 
 
Azhar Ibrahim (2006), “An Evaluation of Madrasah Education: Perspectives and Lessons 
from the Experiences of Some Muslim Societies”, in Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah 
Eng, Secularism and Spirituality: Seeking Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah 
Education in Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies: Marshall Cavendish 
Academic,   
Azhar Ibrahim (2008), “Discourses on Islam in Southeast Asia and their Impact on the 
Singapore Muslim Public,” in Lai Ah Eng (Ed.), Religious Diversity in Singapore, Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies jointly with Institute of Policy Studies 
Azhar Ibrahim (2009), “The Idea of Religious Reform: Perspectives of Singapore Malay-
Muslim Experiences,” in Alatas, Syed Farid (Ed.), Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia: 
Perspectives from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura (MUIS)  
Azhar Ibrahim (2014), Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World: 
Critical Perspectives, Selangor, Malaysia: SIRD 
Barzegar, Abbas (2011), “The Persistence of Heresy: Paul of Tarsus, Ibn Saba’, and 
Historical Narrative in Sunni Identity Formation,” Numen: International Review for the 
History of Religions, Vol. 58, Issue 2-3, pp. 207-231  
Blogowska, Joanna and Saroglou, Vassilis (2013), “For Better or Worse: Fundamentalists’ 
Attitudes toward Outgroups as a Function of Exposure to Authoritative Religious Texts,” The 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Vol. 23, Issue 2 
124 
 
Brandt, Mark J. and Reyna, Christine (2010), “The Role of Prejudice and the Need for 
Closure in Religious Fundamentalism,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 36, 
Issue 5  
Bruinessen, Martin van (Ed.) (2013), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: 
Explaining the “Conservative Turn”, Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian Studies  
Budiwanti, Erni (2009), “Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jama’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia 
and its Persecution,” ARI Working Paper Series No. 117, Asia Research Institute: National 
University of Singapore  
Burhani, Ahmad N. (2013), When Muslims are not Muslims: The Ahmadiyya Community and 
the Discourse on Heresy in Indonesia, PhD Dissertation, University of California, Santa 
Barbara  
Burhani, Ahmad N. (2014), “Hating the Ahmadiyya: The Place of ‘Heretics’ in 
Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Society,” Contemporary Islam, Vol. 8, Issue 2 
Crow, Karim D., and Moussavi, Ahmad K. (Eds.) (2005), Facing One Qiblah: Legal and 
Doctrinal Aspects of Sunni and Shi’ah Muslims, Singapore: Pustaka National Pte Ltd 
Fauzan Saleh (2001), Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20
th
 Century 
Indonesia: A Critical Survey, Leiden; Boston: Brill 
Feener, R. Michael (2014), Shari’a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic 
Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Formichi, Chiara (2014), “Violence, Sectarianism, and the Politics of Religion: Articulations 
of Anti-Shi’a Discourses in Indonesia,” Indonesia, Vol. 98. Issue 98 
125 
 
Freire, Paulo (2005), Teachers as Cultural Workers: Letters to Those Who Dare Teach, trans. 
Donaldo Macedo, Dale Koike, and Alexandre Oliveira, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 
Fromm, Erich (1941), Escape from Freedom, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
(reprinted in 1968) 
Fulton, Aubyn S., Gorsuch, Richard L., & Maynard, Elizabeth A. (1999), “Religious 
Orientation, Antihomosexual Sentiment, and Fundamentalism among Christians,” Journal for 
the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 38, Issue 1 
Gee, John (2013), “Syria Conflict Casts Shadow over Malaysian Shi'i”, The Washington 
Report on Middle East Affairs, pp. 34-35 
Goplen, Joanna and Plant, E. Ashby (2015), “A Religious Worldview: Protecting One’s 
Meaning System through Religious Prejudice,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
Volume 41, Issue 11 
Hirji, Zulfikar (Ed.) (2010), Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary 
Discourses amongst Muslims, London; New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers 
Hefner, Richard (2009), Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in 
Southeast Asia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press  
Henderson, John B. (1998), The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian, 




Hoffman, Valerie J. (1995), “Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Profiles,” in Marty, 
Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott (Eds.), Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
Hood, Ralph W., Hill, Peter C., & Williamson, W. Paul (2005), The Psychology of Religious 
Fundamentalism, New York, NY: Guilford 
Hunsberger, Bruce, Pratt, Michael, & Pancer, S. Mark (1994), “Religious Fundamentalism 
and Integrative Complexity of thought: A Relationship for Existential Content Only?” 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 33, Issue 4  
Hunsberger, Bruce (1995), “Religion and Prejudice: The Role of Religious Fundamentalism, 
Quest, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism,” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 51, Issue 2  
Hussin Mutallib (2012), Singapore Malays: Being Ethnic Minority and Muslim in a Global 
City-State, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge  
Inglehart, Ronald, Moaddel, Mansoor and Tessler, Mark (2006), “Xenophobia and In-Group 
Solidarity in Iraq: A Natural Experiment on the Impact of Insecurity,” Perspective on 
Politics, Vol. 4, Issue 3 
Jackson, Sherman A. (2002), On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abu 
Hamid al-Ghazali’s “Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa”, Karachi: Oxford 
University Press 
Jackson, Lynne M., & Esses, Victoria M. (1997), “Of Scripture and Ascription: The Relation 
between Religious Fundamentalism and Intergroup Helping,” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 23, Issue 8 
127 
 
Jackson, Lynne M., & Hunsberger, Bruce (1999), “An Intergroup Perspective on Religion 
and Prejudice,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 38, Issue 4 
James, William (2010), The Varieties of Religious Experience, First Library of America 
Paperback Classic Edition (original printed in 1902) 
Jones, Julie S. (2010), Being the Chosen: Exploring a Christian Fundamentalist Worldview, 
Burlington: Ashgate Pub.  
Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir, Pereira, Alexius A. and Turner, Bryan S. (2010), Muslims in 
Singapore: Piety, Politics and Policies, London; New York: Routledge 
Khalif Muammar (2006), Atas Nama Kebenaran: Tanggapan Kritis Terhadap Wacana Islam 
Liberal, Akademi Kajian Ketamadunan 
Khalif Muammar (2013), Islam dan Pluralisme Agama: Memperkukuh Tawhid di Zaman 
Kekeliruan, Centre for Advanced Studies on Islam, Science and Civilisation (CASIS), 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia  
Knysh, Alexander (1993), “‘Orthodoxy’ and ‘Heresy’ in Medieval Islam: An Essay in 
Reassessment,” The Muslim World, Vol. 83, Issue 1 
Kurzman, Charles (1998), Liberal Islam: A Source Book, New York: Oxford University Press 
Kurtz, Lester R. (1983), “The Politics of Heresy,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88, 
No. 6 
Laythe, Brian, Finkel, Deborah G., Bringle, Robert G. and Kirkpatrick, Lee A. (2002), 
“Religious Fundamentalism as a Predictor of Prejudice: A Two-Component Model,” Journal 
for the Scientific Study of Religion, Volume 41, Issue 4 
128 
 
Maehr, Martin L., and Karabenick, Stuart A. (Eds.) (2005), “Advances in Motivation and 
Achievement,” Motivation and Religion. Vol. 14, Oxford: Elsevier Press  
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (n.d.), Noktah Hitam: Ajaran Sesat di Singapura, Singapore: 
MUIS & Perdaus 
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (1986), Seminar Jabatan Hai’ah Dakwah, Singapura: MUIS 
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (1991), Kumpulan Fatwa (2), Singapura: Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura 
Mannheim, Karl (1986), Conservatism: a Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge, 
London: Routledge 
Mannheim, Karl (1991), Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of 
Knowledge, London: Routledge  
Mannheim, Karl (1953), Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, London: Routledge & 
K. Paul 
Marcinkowski, Christoph (2006), Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia 
(II): Malaysia and Singapore, Working Paper No. 121, Singapore: Institute of Defence and 
Strategic Studies 
Marcinkowski, Christoph (2008), “Aspects of Shi’ism in Contemporary Southeast Asia,” The 
Muslim World, Vol. 98, Issue 1  
Marcinkowski, Christoph (2009), “Selected Historical Facets of the Presence of Shi’ism in 
Southeast Asia,” The Muslim World, Vol. 99, Issue 2 
129 
 
Mariam Mohamed Ali (1990), Uniformity and Diversity among Muslims in Singapore, M.A. 
Thesis, National University of Singapore  
Marty, Martin E., and Appleby, R. Scott (Eds.) (1995), Fundamentalism Comprehended, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Mavor, Kenneth I., & Gallois, Cindy (2008), “Social Group and Moral Orientation Factors as 
Mediators of Religious and Multiple Attitude Targets,” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion, Vol. 47, Issue 3 
Moaddel, Mansoor and Karabenick, Stuart A. (2008), “Religious Fundamentalism among 
Young Muslims in Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” Social Forces, Vol. 86, Issue 4  
Mohd Faizal Musa (2013a), “The Malaysian Shi’a: A Preliminary Study of their History, 
Oppression, and Denied Rights,” Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 4 
Mohd Faizal Musa (2013b), “Malaysian Shiites Lonely Struggle”, World Public Forum 
“Dialogue of Civilizations”   
Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib (2012), “Neofundamentalist Thought, Dakwah, and 
Religious Pluralism among Muslims in Singapore,” ISA eSymposium for Sociology 
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman (2014), “Salafi Ulama in UMNO: Political Convergence 
or Expediency?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 206-231  
Muzaffar, Chandra (1987), Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Sdn. 
Bhd.  
Nagata, Judith (1984), The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and 
their Roots, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press  
130 
 
Newcomb, Theodore M. (1952), Social Psychology, London: Tavistock Publications 
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman (2004), “Traditionalism and its Impact on the Administration of 
Justice: The Case of the Syariah Court of Singapore,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Vol. 5, 
Issue 3 
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman (2007), “Changing Roles, Unchanging Perceptions, and 
Institutions: Traditionalism and its Impact on Women and Globalization in Muslim societies 
in Asia,” The Muslim World, Vol. 97, Issue 3 
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman (2008), “The Muslim Religious Elite of Singapore,” in Lai Ah 
Eng (Ed.), Religious Diversity in Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
jointly with Institute of Policy Studies 
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman (2014), “Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women and the Prospect of Development of Muslim Personal Law in Singapore,” 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Volume 34, Issue 1  
Noorainn Binte Aziz (2009), Malay Stereotypes: Acceptance and Rejection in the Malay 
Community, M.A. Thesis, Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore 
Norani Othman (2003), “Islamization and Democratization in Malaysia in Regional and 
Global Contexts”, in eds. Heryanto, Ariel and Mandal, Sumit K., Challenging 
Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia, London; New 
York: Routledge Curzon  
Norshahril Saat (2010), The Muslim Religious Elite in Contemporary Malaysia: A Study of 
Dominant Ideas and Orientation of Prominent Religious Personalities and their Impact, 
M.A. Thesis, National University of Singapore 
131 
 
Norshahril Saat (2014), “Deviant Muslims: The Plight of Shias in Contemporary Malaysia,” 
in Platzdasch, Bernhard and Saravanamuttu, Johan (Eds.), Religious Diversity in Muslim-
majority States in Southeast Asia: Areas of Toleration and Conflict, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof 
Ishak Institute 
Norshahril Saat (2016), “Exclusivist Attitudes in Malaysian Islam have Multifarious Roots,” 
Perspective, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute 
Nur Amali Ibrahim (2016), “Homophobic Muslims: Emerging Trends in Multireligious 
Singapore”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 58, Issue 4  
Olle, John (2009), “The Majelis Ulama Indonesia Versus Heresy: The Resurgence of 
Authoritarian Islam,” in van Klinken, Gerry and Barker, Joshua (Eds.), State of Authority: 
The State in Society in Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications: 
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University  
Opotow, Susan (1990), “Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction,” Journal of Social 
Issues, Vol. 46, No. 1 
Pargament, Kenneth I. (2002), “The Bitter and the Sweet: An Evaluation of the Costs and 
Benefits of Religiousness,” Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 13, Issue 3 
Pergas (2004), Moderation in Islam, Singapore: Pergas  
Pieterson, Lloyd (1997), “Despicable Deviants: Labelling Theory and the Polemic of the 
Pastorals,” Sociology of Religion, Vol. 58, pp. 343-352 
Qodir, Zuly (2007), Islam Liberal: Paradigma Baru Wacana dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, 
Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar (Revised edition) 
132 
 
Qodir, Zuly (2010), Islam Liberal: Varian-varian Liberalisme Islam di Indonesia 1991-2002, 
Yogyakarta: LKIS  
Quinn, Molly (2010), “Religious Orthodoxy Curriculum Ideology”, in Encyclopedia of 
Curriculum Studies, ed. Craig Kridel, SAGE Publications Inc 
Rahimin Affandi Abd. Rahim, “Traditionalism and Reformism in Polemic in Malay-Muslim 
Religious Literature,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vo1. 17, No. 1 
Roff, William (1962), “Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua: Innovation and Reaction Amongst the 
Malays, 1900-1941,” in K.G. Tregonning (Ed.), Papers on Malayan History: Papers 
Submitted to the First International Conference of South-East Asian Historians, Singapore, 
January 1961, Singapore: Journal of South-East Asian History  
Rowatt, Wade C., Franklin, Lewis M., & Cotton, Marla (2005), “Patterns and Personality 
Correlates of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes toward Christians and Muslims,” Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 44, Issue 1  
Rowatt, Wade C., Tsang, Jo-Ann, Kelly, Jessica, LaMartina, Brooke, McCullers, Michelle, & 
McKinley, April (2006), “Associations between Religious Personality Dimensions and 
Implicit Homosexual Prejudice,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 45, Issue 3,  
Roy, Olivier (2004), Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University 
Press 
Saroglou, Vassilis (2002), “Beyond Dogmatism: The Need for Closure as Related to 
Religion,” Mental Health, Religion, and Culture, Vol. 5, Issue 2 
133 
 
Shaharuddin Maaruf (2002), To Err is Inhuman and to Punish Divine: A Study of Religious 
Orientations of the Malays, Seminar Paper, Department of Malay Studies, National 
University of Singapore 
Shihab, M. Quraish (2007), Sunni- Syiah Bergandengan Tangan! Mungkinkah?: Kajian atas 
Konsep Ajaran dan Pemikiran, Penerbit Lentera Hati  
Sivan, Emmanuel (1995), “The Enclave Culture,” in Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott 
(Eds.), Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press 
Strozier, Charles B., Terman, David M., Jones, James W. and Boyd, Katherine A. (2010), 
The Fundamentalist Mindset: Psychological Perspectives on Religion, Violence, and History, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Suzaina Kadir (2005), “When Gender is Not a Priority: Muslim Women in Singapore and the 
Challenges of Religious Fundamentalism,” in Norani Othman (Ed.), Muslim Women and the 
Challenge of Islamic Extremism, Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Sisters in Islam 
Tabataba’i, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn (2010), Shi’ite Islam, Selangor, Malaysia: Islamic 
Book Trust  
Tan, Charlene (2011), Islamic Education and Indoctrination: The Case in Indonesia, New 
York: Routledge 
Törnberg, Anton and Törnberg, Petter (2016), “Muslims in Social Media Discourse: 




Towler, Robert (1984), The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional 
Religion, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henly: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Zainah Anwar (1987), Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students, Petaling 
Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications  
Zainah Anwar and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (2003), Political and Security Outlook 2003: Islam: 
the Challenge from Extremist Interpretations, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
Newspaper articles 
“Ajaran sesat: Nasihat supaya lebih waspada,” Berita Harian, 24 April 1982 
“Pengaruh Syiah dikhuatiri bawa pecah-belah,” Berita Harian, 21 August 1986 
“Muhammadiyah ambil keputusan pecat ahli: Enam akui berfahaman Syiah,” Berita Harian, 
6 September 1986 
“Antara Sunah dengan Syiah,” Berita Minggu, 7 September 1986 
“Fahaman Syiah: ‘Tuduh-menuduh’ kurang disenangi,” Berita Minggu, 7 September 1986 
“Jauhi kaum ingkar sunnah,” Berita Minggu, 13 March 1994 
“Probe into man with 10 wives ‘complete’,” The New Paper, 20 April 1994 
“Syiah jadi pegangan,” Berita Harian, 29 July 1994 
 “Bahaya dan anti Islam,” Berita Harian, 11 August 1995 
“Hindarkan permusuhan sesama kita,” Berita Harian, 25 August 1995  
“HBI kecewa sikap panel forum Pergas,” Berita Harian, 26 August 1995   
135 
 
“Pergas: Kami tidak pernah mengkafirkan mana-mana orang Islam,” Berita Harian, 2 
September 1995 
“MUIS: Hentikan debat Syiah-Sunnah,” Berita Harian, 9 September 1995 
“Ajaran sesat semakin merebak,” Berita Harian, 4 March 1997 
“Ajaran sesat boleh jejas keharmonian umat,” Berita Harian, 14 June 1997“Muslim harus 
hati-hati akan strategi halus ilmiawan ‘Orientalis’,” Berita Minggu, 10 August 1997 
“Diari: Forum ‘Menangani Gelombang Sekularisme’,” Berita Harian, 19 July 2000 
“Muslims should speak and let other Muslims speak,” The Straits Times, 25 January 2003 
“Pergas tidak seru masyarakat Islam bersifat sekular,” Berita Harian, 19 September 2003 
“Waspada terhadap golongan tolak hadis,” Berita Harian, 28 May 2004 
“Islam dengan pelbagai label,” Berita Harian, 23 May 2005 
“Mendakap erti kepelbagaian dengan persefahaman,” Berita Harian, 30 August 2006  
“Waspada juga pada pelopor Islam liberal,” Berita Harian, 9 February 2007  
“Muslim perlu bersatu perangi ideologi,” Berita Harian, 12 February 2007  
“Cegah alirah tegar pengaruh minda,” Berita Harian, 30 December 2007  
“Tidak harus berpuak-puak walau berbeza fahaman,” Berita Harian, 16 July 2010 
“Jurnal pemikiran sosioagama,” Berita Harian, 12 September 2009 “Skim iktiraf Asatizah 
perlu diberi ‘taring’,” Berita Harian, 25 July 2010 
136 
 
“Tidak elok wanita pimpin masjid,” Berita Harian, 1 October 2011 
“Kepimpinan wanita di masjid datangkan lebih banyak fitnah,” Berita Harian, 12 October 
2011  
“Islam bukan agama antisekular,” Berita Harian, 16 October 2011 
“Mufti: Usah mudah bertelagah atas sebab perbezaan,” Berita Harian, 12 April 2014  
“Singaporean Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff, 44, detained under ISA for promoting violence and 
ISIS, radicalising others,” The Straits Times, 29 July 2016 
“Saling hormat biarpun jika ada perbezaan perfahamaan”, Berita Harian, 6 November 2016  
Websites 
Andalus Institute homepage (http://www.andalus.sg/dpia/tentang.html#visi accessed on 30 
November 2013)  
Alatas, Syed Farid, Salafism and the Persecution of Shiites in Malaysia, 2014 
(http://www.mei.edu/content/map/salafism-and-persecution-shi%E2%80%98ites-malaysia 
accessed on 19 September 2014) 
“Syiah ancaman kepada Islam,” Utusan Online, 28 July 2013 
(http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/Rencana/20130728/re_02/Syiah-ancaman-kepada-Islam 
accessed on 4 October 2014) 
“Ancaman Syiah semakin serius,” Sinar Harian Online, 3 November 2013 
(http://www.sinarharian.com.my/ancaman-syiah-semakin-serius-1.217034 accessed on 4 
October 2014)  
137 
 
“Penerangan tentang bahaya Syiah,” Sinar Harian Online, 29 July 2013 
(http://www.sinarharian.com.my/nasional/penerangan-tentang-bahaya-syiah-1.187709 
accessed on 4 October 2014) 
Shia SG homepage (http://www.shia.sg/ accessed on 4 October 2014) 
 “Syiah di Singapore sedang rancak dengan mengadakan acara mereka,” 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AEpNt5OW8_k accessed on 9 September 2016) 
Twitter page (https://twitter.com/idzkieee/status/658337232495882240 accessed on 9 
September 2016)  
“Syiah Singapore” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0oCa4DMBjq4&app=desktop 
accessed on 9 September 2016) 
Muslim Singapura Tolak Syiah Facebook page 
(https://www.facebook.com/MuslimSingaporeTolakSyiah?ref=br_tf accessed on 9 September 
2016) 
“Sunni Singapore hentam Syiah” blog post (http://syiahmalaysia.blogspot.sg/2012/10/sunni-
singapore-hentam-syiah.html accessed on 9 September 2016) 
Second open letter to MUIS on liberal Islam (http://www.islamiq.sg/2014/03/liberal-islam-in-
singapore-2nd-open.html accessed on 9 September 2016) 
First open letter to MUIS on liberal Islam (http://www.islamiq.sg/2014/03/liberal-islam-in-
singapore-1st-open.html accessed on 9 September 2016) 
138 
 
“Tanbih warning concerned brothers” blog post (http://an-
naseehah.blogspot.sg/2009/09/tanbih-warning-concerned-brothers.html accessed on 9 
September 2016) 
Abdul Halim bin Abdul Karim’s Facebook post (https://www.facebook.com/notes/abd-al-
halim/liberal-muslims-and-their-common-sense/10153693285442252 accessed on 9 
September 2016) 
“Kenyataan Tajuddin bukti penyakit sekularisme, liberalisme makin parah: Dr Khalif 
Muammar” (http://www.ismaweb.net/2016/08/kenyataan-tajuddin-bukti-penyakit-
sekularisme-liberalisme-makin-parah-dr-khalif-muammar accessed on 9 September 2016) 
Dr Khalif Muammar’s Facebook post 
(https://www.facebook.com/drkhalif/posts/1206920762661191 accessed on 9 September 
2016) 
“Islam dan Liberalisme – Bahagian 1” (http://hakim.org.my/blog/?p=695 accessed on 9 
September 2016) 
“The Dangers of Pluralism and Liberalism in Muslim Society”, 
http://www.ikim.gov.my/index.php/ms/buletin/8591-the-dangers-of-pluralism-and-
liberalism-in-the-muslim-society accessed on 9 September 2016   
“The ironies of Malaysian liberals” (http://www.ismaweb.net/2016/07/ironies-malaysian-
liberals/ accessed on 9 September 2016)  
“Al-Azhar: Sekuler Liberal Berupaya Hancurkan Islam dan Lebih Bahaya daripada ISIS dan 
Takfir” (http://ruwaqazhar.com/al-azhar-sekuler-liberal-berupaya-hancurkan-islam-dan-lebih-
bahaya-daripada-isis-dan-takfiri.html accessed on 9 September 2016) 
139 
 
Singapore Muslims against Liberal Islam Facebook group 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/718486958164730/ accessed on 9 September 2016)  
Islamiq SG homepage (www.islamiq.sg accessed on 9 September 2016) 
“Radio Hang’s dangerous network of Islamist extremists,” Today Online, 30 August 2016 
(http://m.todayonline.com/commentary/radio-hangs-dangerous-network-islamist-extremists 
accessed on 10 September 2016) 
“The radicalisation of Islam in Malaysia,” The Star, 28 August 2016 
(http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/08/28/the-radicalisation-of-islam-in-malaysia-
academicians-worry-that-an-exclusivist-way-of-interpretating/ accessed on 10 September 
2016) 
“MUIS has ‘grand strategy to move society towards liberal Islam” 
(http://rilek1corner.com/2014/08/26/muis-has-grand-strategy-to-move-society-towards-
liberal-islam/ accessed on 10 September 2016)  
Al-Makhazin SG Facebook post 
(https://www.facebook.com/AlmakhazinSG/posts/420736384723739 accessed on 10 
November 2016) 
Report of Pergas’ Annual General Meeting 
(http://www.pergas.org.sg/media/pdf/AnnualReport/AGMAnnualReport2015.pdf accessed on 
5 December 2016)  
MUIS fatwa against Ahmadiyyah 
(http://www.muis.gov.sg/officeofthemufti/documents/Ahmadiyah%20(English).pdf accessed 
on 6 December 2016)  
140 
 
“Singapore’s Sunni and Shiite Muslims live in harmony: Imam”, Yahoo News, 12 January 
2016 (https://sg.news.yahoo.com/singapores-sunni-and-shiite-muslims-live-in-
083049968.html accessed on 7 December 2016)  
 “Managing differences of opinion (fiqh ikhtilaf)”, on 21 November 2014 
(http://www.muis.gov.sg/officeofthemufti/documents/E14Nov21%20-
%20Fiqh%20Ikhtilaf.pdf accessed on 8 December 2016),  
“Appreciating Diversity in Community Living”, on 28 November 2014 
(http://www.muis.gov.sg/officeofthemufti/documents/E14Nov28%20-
%20Appreciating%20Diversity%20In%20Community%20Living.pdf accessed on 8 
December 2016)  
The Reading Group homepage (http://www.thereadinggroup.sg/ accessed on 8 December 
2016)  
Aljunied, Syed Khairudin, “The Ulama in Singapore and their Contemporary Challenges,” 
Pergas Working Paper, No 1, 2015 (http://www.pergas.org.sg/media/Comment-
Working/The-Ulama-in-Singapore-and-their-Contemporary-Challenges.pdf accessed on 12 
December 2016)  
Singapore Muslims for Independent MUIS Facebook page 
(https://www.facebook.com/Singapore-Muslims-for-an-Independent-MUIS-
804978062888434/ accessed on 13 December 2016) 
“No entry for ‘deviant’ Indonesian Islamic scholar Ulil Abshar, says Zahid Hamidi,” The 
Malay Mail, 12 October 2014  (http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/no-
141 
 
entry-for-deviant-indonesian-islamic-scholar-ulil-abshar-says-zahid-hami accessed on 20 
December 2016 
“Malaysia slaps ban on liberal Muslim scholar,” The Australian, 18 October 2014, 
(http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/malaysia-slaps-ban-on-liberal-muslim-
scholar/news-story/4ebe1271767ae396a919bef185fa85d2 accessed on 20 December 2016) 
“Malaysia bans Indonesian Muslim scholar Ulil from seminar on radicalism,” Jakarta Globe 
(http://jakartaglobe.id/news/malaysia-bans-indonesian-muslim-scholar-ulil-seminar-
radicalism/ accessed on 20 December 2016) 
“Tapis sebaik mungkin, pastikan tiada unsur Syiah,” Sinar Harian, 26 May 2015 
(http://www.sinarharian.com.my/nasional/tapis-sebaik-mungkin-pastikan-tiada-unsur-syiah-
1.394587 accessed on 20 December 2016) 
 “In otherwise tolerant Malaysia, Shiites are banned,” Al Arabiya News, 13 January 2011 
(https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/14/133463.html accessed on 22 December 2016) 
“The perils of non-violent extremism – Syed Farid Alatas,” The Malay Mail Online, 3 August 
2016 (http://www.themalaymailonline.com/what-you-think/article/the-perils-of-non-violent-
extremism-syed-farid-alatas accessed on 28 December 2016) 
Kersten, Carool, “Religious Pluralism versus Intolerance: Sectarian Violence in Indonesia”, 
2014 (http://www.mei.edu/content/map/religious-pluralism-versus-intolerance-sectarian-
violence-indonesia?print=, accessed on 6 April 2017) 
“Hardliners ambush Monas rally,” The Jakarta Post, 6 February 2008, 
(https://www.thepersecution.org/world/indonesia/08/06/jp02a.html accessed on 6 April 2017) 
142 
 
“A Singaporean in Iran: Life in a Shiite Seminary,” The Straits Times, 1 January 2017, 
(http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/a-singaporean-in-iran-life-in-a-shiite-seminary, 
accessed on 8 April 2017) 
Fatwa against liberalism and pluralism, Malaysia (http://www.muftiselangor.gov.my/fatwa-
tahunan/pewartaan/2010-terkini/362-fatwa-pemikiran-liberalisme-dan-pluralisme-agama 
accessed 18 April 2017) 
“Sisters in Islam challenges fatwa on pluralism and liberalism,” 31 October 2014 
(http://www.sistersinislam.org.my/news.php?item.1300.50 accessed on 18 April 2017) 
JIL’s Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/pg/Jaringan-Islam-Liberal-
200893173256160/about/ accessed on 18 April 2017) 
Fatwa “Sipilis” (https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/tahukah-anda/fatwa-mui-tentang-
pluralisme-liberalisme-dan-sekulerisme-agama.htm#.WPrVaNKGM2w accessed on 22 April 
2017) 
“Behind the Belief: The Ahmadis of Singapore,” Yahoo News Singapore, 2 May 2017 
(https://sg.news.yahoo.com/behind-belief-ahmadis-singapore-234827643.html accessed on 4 
May 2017) 
“Bigotry in the Muslim backyard,” The Middle Ground, 12 May 2017 
(http://themiddleground.sg/2017/05/12/muslim-islam-shia-sunni-bigotry-shiism-divide-
singapore/ accessed on 17 May 2017) 
Singapura Tolak Fahaman Wahabi/Salafi page 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/1566809086931687/ accessed on 17 May 2017) 
143 
 
Ustaz Abdul Rahman’s Facebook post 




























MUIS’ published fatwa on Shiism, in Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (1991), Kumpulan 
Fatwa (2), Singapura: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 
 
